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Consensus standardization is a social process in which technical experts from 
public, private, and non-profit sectors negotiate the direction and shape of technological 
change.  Scholars in a variety of disciplines have recognized the importance of consensus 
standards as alternatives to standards that arise through market mechanisms or standards 
mandated by regulators.  Rather than treating the consensus method as some sort of 
timeless organizational form or ever-present alternative to markets or laws, I argue that 
consensus standardization is itself a product of history.   
In the first two chapters, I explain the origins and growth of consensus standards 
bodies between 1880 and 1930 as a reaction to and critique of the existing political 
economy of engineering.  By considering the standardization process—instead of the 
internal dynamics of a particular firm or technology—as the primary category of analysis, 
I am able to emphasize the cooperative relations that sustained the American style of 
competitive managerial capitalism during the Second Industrial Revolution.  In the 
remaining four chapters, I examine the processes of network architecture and 
standardization in the creation of four communications networks during the twentieth 
century: AT&T’s monopoly telephone network, the Internet, digital cellular telephone 
networks, and the World Wide Web.  
Each of these four networks embodied critiques—always implicit and frequently 
explicit—of preceding and competing networks.  These critiques, visible both in the 
technological design of networks as well as in the institutional design of standard-setting 
bodies, reflected the political convictions of successive generations of engineers and 
 iii 
network architects.  The networks described in this dissertation were thus turning points 
in the century-long development of an organizational form.  Seen as part of a common 
history, they tell the story of how consensus-based institutions became the dominant 
mode for setting standards in the Third Industrial Revolution, and created the 
foundational standards of the information infrastructures upon which a newly globalized 
economy and society—the Network Society—could grow. 
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The standards bug bit me sometime in the late 1990s.  I’m not sure exactly when 
it happened, but the symptoms were unmistakable: standards were everywhere I looked, 
and I began to see the world as a massive compilation of standards.  It started with 
computers—why did the new machines have USB ports and Zip drives, and where was I 
supposed to put my 3.5 inch floppy disks?—but soon spread to almost everything else I 
noticed in my daily activities.  Who decided if a #2 pencil is not a 3 or a 1.5?  Why were 
all the cement bricks in the high school gym 8 inches by 16 inches?  How was it that any 
telephone would work when I plugged it into the jack in the wall?   
Although the presence of standards—once I noticed them—was puzzling, the lack 
of standards was infuriating.  When my cell phone battery died, I couldn’t use my 
friend’s charger (or his battery) to power my phone.  My web page looked fine on 
Netscape Navigator, but awful on Internet Explorer.  The nuts and bolts aisle of Home 
Depot was utterly baffling, a vivid demonstration that the term “standard” could very 
well be somebody’s idea of a sick joke.  Andrew Tanenbaum, a Dutch computer scientist, 
captured the irony of the situation in his 1981 textbook Computer Networks: “The nice 
thing about standards is that you have so many to choose from; furthermore, if you do not 
like any of them, you can just wait for next year’s model.”1 
My conclusion from this initial exploration was: standardization is the social 
process by which we come to take things for granted.  Through standardization, 
inventions become commonplace, novelties become mundane, and the local becomes 
                                                
1 Andrew S. Tanenbaum, Computer Networks (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1981), 168. 
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universal.  It is, in short, the historical process by which discoveries are rendered into the 
material and immaterial substance of our everyday lives.  The standardization process is 
lengthy, laborious, and often contested at every step.  However, for standards to be 
successful, this contested process must be transparent (or at least opaque) so that the 
resulting standards are perceived as authoritative and objective.  The history of 
standardization provides opportunities to explore this authority and objectivity and reveal 
how people sought to resolve fundamental tensions—scientific, economic, political, and 
cultural—as they laid the technological foundations of modern society.  
In this dissertation I examine the creation of our modern communication 
networks—telephone networks, the Internet, digital cellular networks, and the World 
Wide Web—by keeping an eye on the standardization process.  There are, of course, 
other ways to examine the history of these networks.  Previous studies have mentioned 
standards in passing, but typically these analyses revolve around a particular person or 
company, a specific technology, the processes of invention and research, government 
regulation, or user adoption.  While many of these studies are excellent, they often fail to 
examine what occurred within the black box of standardization.   
My dissertation began with a hunch—that this history might look different if I 
adopted the standardization process itself as my primary unit of analysis.  Standardization 
could be interrogated, not assumed.  Because its effects are so pervasive, standardization 
provides an ideal vantage point for integrating insights produced by historians who have 
focused on other units of analysis—individuals, firms, innovation, regulation, adoption, 
and so on.  Because they are crucial components of the infrastructure of modern society, 
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communication networks provide important examples of standardization in action, and 
are thus an ideal subject for this study. 
One of the many ironies of standardization is that there are no standard definitions 
of what standards are, what they do, and how they are made.  The term “standard” often 
refers to customs, norms, and regular social practices.  In technical realms, however, it 
has more specific meanings that refer to documented practices.  In my usage of the term, 
I follow a definition that the economic historians Paul David and Shane Greenstein 
articulated in a seminal 1990 article, in which they defined a standard as “a set of 
technical specifications adhered to by a producer, either tacitly or as a result of a formal 
agreement.”2 
Having adopted this basic definition of what a standard is, two fundamental 
questions remain: first, what do standards accomplish? And second, who makes 
standards?  In response to the first question, theorists of standardization agree that most 




                                                
2 Paul A. David and Shane Greenstein, “The Economics of Compatibility Standards: An 
Introduction to Recent Research,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1 (1990): 4. This 
section draws on a large body of literature that offer various versions of my general typology. See 
for example Carl Cargill, Open Systems Standardization: A Business Approach (Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Paladin Consulting, 1997); Ross E. Chiet, Setting Safety Standards: Regulation in the Public and 
Private Sectors (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); U. S. Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment, Global Standards: Building Blocks for the Future (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1992); Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: 
Classification and its Consequences (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999); and Urs von Burg, The 
Triumph of Ethernet: Technological Communities and the Battle for the LAN Standard (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001). 
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1. Performance: These standards specify ways to perform certain tasks.  
Performance standards seek to ensure a minimum level of quality by 
specifying either a process, such as the ISO 9000 “Quality Management 
Principles,” or a result, such as a safe and accident-free workplace.  
 
2. Measurement: These standards specify an objective quantifiable unit of 
measurement, such as a meter, a gallon, or ohm.  Measurement standards 
make it possible for people to compare physical qualities, such as length, 
volume, or electrical current. 
 
3. Compatibility: These standards define interfaces between discrete objects.  
Compatibility standards create efficiencies and economies of scale in the 
production process, and promote interoperability between complementary 
products.  Interfaces between various components of computer hardware—as 
well as computer software—provide many familiar examples of compatibility 
standards, such as Universal Serial Bus (better known as USB) ports and the 
Ethernet local area networking protocols. 
 
Two important concepts emerge when we consider these three types of standards 
in the context of communication networks.  The first is what economists refer to as 
network externalities.  Standards (especially compatibility standards) facilitate the 
connection of components into networks that provide electrical power, telephone service, 
and computer communication.  In general, networks become more valuable as more 
people use them.  In successful networks, externalities grow and are sustained by 
“positive feedback” (or “bandwagon effects”), which make large and valuable networks 
even larger and more valuable.  Numerous strategic implications flow from this economic 
concept, and many books and articles have examined strategies for generating and 
capturing value from network externalities, as well as the process by which consumers 
get “locked in” to specific networks and the high “switching costs” they sometimes face 
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when moving to a competing network.3  Further, some scholars argue that 
communication networks can be fruitfully understood as “information platforms” or 
“information infrastructure.”  Both metaphors indicate the potential for communication 
networks to sustain more advanced and complex social and economic activity.4   
The second concept is actually a puzzle about the essential character of standards: 
are standards static or dynamic?  This question invites philosophical reflection on 
uniformity and diversity.  In Paul David’s assessment, this puzzle “may be construed as 
nothing more and nothing less than the fundamental issue with which all social 
organizations are confronted: where to position themselves on the terrain between the 
poles of ‘order’ and ‘freedom.’”5   
Is standardization the tool of order and control?  Or does it facilitate innovation 
and creativity?  Numerous critics, most notably Aldous Huxley and George Orwell, 
imagined the homogenous and oppressive societies that would result if the logic of 
                                                
3 See for example Paul A. David and W. Edward Steinmueller, “Economics of Compatibility 
Standards and Competition in Telecommunications Networks,” Information Economics and Policy 6 
(1994): 217-241; Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, “Systems Competition and Network Effects,” 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (1994): 93-115; Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, Information 
Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1999); and W. 
Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1994).  
4 Philip J. Weiser, “Law and Information Platforms,” Journal of Telecommunications and High 
Technology Law 1 (2002): 1-35; Steven W. Usselman, Public Policies, Private Platforms: Antitrust 
and American Computing,” in Richard Coopey, ed., Information Technology Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 97-120; Richard R. John, “Recasting the Information Infrastructure 
for the Industrial Age,” in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and James W. Cortada, eds., A Nation 
Transformed By Information: How Information Has Shaped the United States from Colonial Times to the 
Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 55-106; and Paul N. Edwards, Steven J. 
Jackson, Geoffrey C. Bowker, and Cory P. Knobel, Understanding Infrastructure: Dynamics, 
Tensions, and Designs, Report of a Workshop on “History & Theory of Infrastructure: Lessons for 
New Scientific Cyberinfrastructures,” National Science Foundation, January 2007. 
5 Paul A. David, “Standardization Policies for Network Technologies: the Flux Between Freedom 
and Order Revisited,” in Richard Hawkins, Robin Mansell, and Jim Skea, eds., Standards, 
Innovation and Competitiveness (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), 15-35. 
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standardization was left unchecked.6  On the other hand, advocates of standardization 
argued that variation and standardization were the two processes that drove evolution and 
thus progress in both nature and society.  In a 1924 essay, the safety advocate Albert 
Whitney suggested that  
Variation is creative, it pioneers the advance; standardization is 
conservational, it seizes the advance and establishes it as an actual 
concrete fact… Standardization is thus the liberator that relegates the 
problems that have already been solved to their proper place, namely to 
the field of routine, and leaves the creative faculties free for the problems 
that are still unsolved. Standardization from this point of view is thus an 
indispensable ally of the creative genius.7 
 
On the whole, I am most convinced by Whitney’s interpretation—that 
standardization is part of a dynamic and arguably evolutionary process that consists in 
part of the codification of existing knowledge.8  However, critics are right to point out 
that authority figures can use standards to stifle innovation that does not suit their 
purposes.  The three types of standards listed above—performance, measurement, and 
compatibility—help us to think more concretely about these philosophical dilemmas.  All 
standards attempt to create a certain permanency, especially measurement standards.  
However, upon closer consideration it becomes clear that all standards—even 
measurement standards such as the meter or the kilogram—can be updated, revised, or 
overthrown as time passes and conditions change.  This process of change, even for 
                                                
6 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World: A Novel (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1932); 
George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Novel (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949). 
7 Albert Whitney, The Place of Standardization in Modern Life (Washington, DC: Central Executive 
Council, Inter American High Commission, 1924), 5. 
8 J.S. Metcalfe and Ian Miles, “Standards, Selection and Variety: An Evolutionary Approach,” 




standards that are designed to be permanent, reminds us that standards are products of 
power structures that also change over time. 
 The second fundamental question posed above—who makes standards?—also 
reminds us that standardization is a power-laden process.  On whose authority does 
something become “standard”?  How are different types of standards created and 
enforced?  In response to these questions, theorists have identified three different 
institutional origins of standards: de facto, de jure, and voluntary consensus. 
1. De facto standards arise from common usage or market adoption.  Individual 
people or single firms often generate these standards, which spread either 
through the efforts of a sponsor or in a more organic way. Two examples of de 
facto standards include Microsoft’s word processing software and the 
QWERTY keyboard. 
 
2. De jure standards are mandated by regulators at the local, state, federal, or 
international level.  Governments commonly test conformance with mandated 
standards, and can legally (and at times severely) punish non-compliance. 
Two examples of de jure standards are the European GSM transmission 
standards for cellular telephones, and the American Federal Communications 
Commission Part 68 rules that govern the telephone terminal equipment. 
 
3. Voluntary consensus standards are specified within a range of private 
institutions, including engineering societies, trade associations, accredited 
standards setting organizations, and industry consortia. Consensus refers to 
the collaborative and non-coercive process in which these standards are 
developed; voluntary indicates that nobody is legally compelled to adopt these 
standards.  However, there can be strong economic incentives that encourage 
conformance with voluntary standards, and many parties involved in 
developing these standards make a priori commitments to adopt them. Two 
examples of consensus standards include the TCP/IP networking protocols 
and the HTML language for the World Wide Web. This is the central subject 






In practice, these three styles of standardization co-exist, and have porous 
boundaries: for example, de facto standards frequently gain wider approval through 
voluntary consensus bodies, and consensus standards can be either referenced in 
government regulations or codified through government procurement specifications.  Of 
these three styles, the voluntary consensus process is the most complicated and perhaps 
most important—a vital component of the American system of standardization that 
embodies the characteristically American preference for voluntarism, local control, and 
private control over commercial activity.9  
Historians, sociologists, and economists all have studied standards that were 
created through a consensus process.  This literature demonstrates that consensus 
standardization is a fundamentally political process, one where different stakeholders 
seek to exercise control over the direction and shape of technological change.  Our 
technological world, therefore, needs to be understood as a consequence of the power 
negotiations and social tensions inherent in the creation of technical knowledge and 
artifacts, and we must not forget that “consensus” is as much about exclusion as it is 
about inclusion.10   
                                                
9 U. S. Congress, Global Standards: Building Blocks for the Future, 45-50. See also Samuel Krislov, 
How Nations Choose Product Standards and Standards Change Nations (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 83-133; Jay Tate, “National Varieties of Standardization,” in Peter A. Hall 
and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Andrew L. Russell, “Industrial 
Legislatures: The American System of Standardization,” in International Standardization as a 
Strategic Tool (Geneva: International Electrotechnical Commission, 2006). 
10 Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999); Amy Slaton, Reinforced 
Concrete and the Modernization of American Building, 1900-1930 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001); Stefan Timmermans and Marc Berg, The Gold Standard: The Challenge of 
Evidence-Based Medicine (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003); Theodore Porter, Trust in 
Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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My contribution to this literature is to point out that the consensus process is itself 
a product of history.  Rather than treating the consensus method as some sort of timeless 
organizational form or ever-present alternative to markets or laws, we need to understand 
that consensus standardization arose under specific historical circumstances, and in 
response to specific technological, organizational, and political problems.  It is an idea 
manifest in institutions.  Moreover, this organizational form faced moments of crisis in 
which the survival of specific consensus standards committees were called into question.  
Some of these committees failed; others reformed themselves and survived.  At all points, 
the system was in flux.  It was dynamic, not static—and organizations that participated in 
the system were no less susceptible to the gale of creative destruction than were firms in 
competitive markets.11 
My history starts in the late nineteenth century, when engineers and scientists 
created the first consensus standards bodies as a response to the inadequacies of existing 
institutions.  The collaborative institutions and negotiated procedures in consensus 
standardization bodies matured during the first three decades of the twentieth century, not 
only as a response to the limitations of existing forms of technological cooperation but 
also as a political critique of these limitations.  The creation of subsequent standard-
setting bodies also advanced this implicit—and at times, explicit—critique: consensus 
                                                                                                                                            
1995); Peter Grindley, Standards, Strategy, and Policy: Cases and Stories (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995); Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, “The Economics of 
Telecommunications Standards,” in Robert Crandall and Kenneth Flamm, eds., Changing the 
Rules: Technological Change, International Competition, and Regulation in Communications 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989). 




standardization was a technologically and politically superior means for coordinating 
technological change. 
These critiques were particularly sharp during the 1920s, a decade in which 
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover advocated greater cooperation within the private 
sector and between private and public organizations.12  The leading forum for consensus 
standardization during this era was the American Engineering Standards Committee 
(AESC), a federation of engineering societies, trade associations, safety groups, and 
government departments.  Members of the AESC created consensus standards within 
sectional committees that consisted of experts drawn from the public, private, and non-
profit sectors and fell into technological categories, such as Civil Engineering and 
Construction, Electrical Engineering, and Ferrous Metals and Metallurgy.  Paul Gough 
Agnew, the longtime Secretary of the AESC, described each committee as “a miniature 
industrial legislature organized upon a subject basis instead of upon a geographical 
basis.”13  
Agnew’s term “industrial legislature” is a fitting title for this dissertation because 
it characterizes standardization as political economy—a topic at the intersections of 
economics, politics, and law.  Agnew was experienced in all aspects of consensus 
standardization, worked tirelessly to promote consensus standards and the institutions 
that made them, and was one of the most vocal advocates of the cause.  Throughout his 
career, Agnew argued that self-government among technical experts was superior to the 
                                                
12 Ellis W. Hawley, “Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an ‘Associative 
State,’ 1921–1928,” Journal of American History 61 (1974): 116–40. 
13 P. G. Agnew, “Work of the American Engineering Standards Committee,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 137 (May, 1928): 13-16. 
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adversarial, winner-takes-all style of rulemaking as practiced in the United States 
Congress and judicial system.  For example, in an article published in the New Republic 
in 1926 he wrote: 
Experience in diverse fields has amply shown that the [cooperative] 
method combines many of the advantages of the common-law and the 
statutory-law methods… while it avoids many of the limitations and 
abuses that have grown up about the legislative process.”14 
 
We will explore these political and cultural critiques as we consider the technical 
and economic aspects of standardization.  First, I will explain how consensus 
standardization originated during the Second Industrial Revolution as a reaction to the 
existing political economy of engineering.  Second, I will build on that foundation an 
examination of the history of communications networks during the twentieth century 
from a standardization perspective.  This history illustrates how successive generations of 
engineers and network architects adopted and adapted consensus standardization 
practices.  What they did was and is today important.  By the end of the twentieth 
century, these new networks—including the Internet, digital cellular telephone networks, 
and the World Wide Web—emerged as the core information infrastructure of the Third 
Industrial Revolution.   
In Chapters One and Two I discuss the origins of the organizational form of 
consensus standardization.  Chapter One contains a literature review built around three 
themes in the historiography of standardization: efficiency, power, and trust.  In the late 
nineteenth century, scientists and engineers in the electrical and chemical industries 
                                                
14 P. G. Agnew, “A Step Toward Industrial Self-Government,” The New Republic (March 17, 1926), 
95. Albert Whitney advanced a similar critique in “The Place of Standardization in Modern Life.” 
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created the first consensus standards committees to solve technical problems that 
threatened the efficient development of telegraph and railroad networks.  In the United 
States, the first consensus standardization committees brought together producers and 
consumers of technologies (such as steel rails) who came from different firms and 
industries.  During this era, respected engineer/scientists such as Charles Dudley and 
Elihu Thomson leveraged their status in order to construct these committees as trusted 
and impartial forums.  By considering standardization itself—instead of the internal 
dynamics of a particular firm or technology—as the primary category of analysis, I am 
able to emphasize the cooperative relations that sustained the American style of 
competitive managerial capitalism during the Second Industrial Revolution. 
In Chapter Two I discuss the creation and growth of the American Engineering 
Standards Committee (AESC).  The AESC was a national federation of standards setting 
organizations, created in 1918 through the joint effort of five professional engineering 
societies.  During the 1920s, the AESC aligned its practice of consensus standardization 
with Herbert Hoover’s “associative” vision, in which efficiency and cooperation between 
the public and private sectors were promoted as the keys to progress and prosperity.  The 
AESC attracted significant interest from engineering societies as well as trade 
associations and safety groups: by 1928, individuals from over 350 organizations were 
participating in AESC “industrial legislatures.”  The AESC experienced growing pains 
during this period of rapid expansion.  In response to demands that it work with greater 
speed and more flexibility, it reconstituted itself into the American Standards Association 
in 1929.  The conspicuous omission of the word “engineering” from the group’s new title 
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indicates the extent to which control over standardization had spread from the domain of 
scientists and engineers into the domain of corporate executives and trade associations. 
In the remaining four chapters I examine the processes of network architecture 
and standardization in the creation of new communications networks during the twentieth 
century.  These chapters discuss four examples: AT&T’s monopoly telephone network, 
the Internet, digital cellular telephone networks, and the World Wide Web.  I do not treat 
these examples as isolated networks, or merely as sites to compare and contrast divergent 
strategies for developing new standards.  Instead, I link these four examples within a 
longer historical narrative, one that shows how individuals adapted and changed the 
practice of consensus standardization in ways that suited their needs in a particular time 
and place.  When viewed in historical succession, these examples reveal a process of 
“learning by doing” in which we can see refinements to and permutations of the core 
ideas and institutions of consensus standardization.15  These examples also illustrate the 
variety of organizational forms in the “middle ground” between de facto and de jure 
standardization, as well as the instability and tensions that scientists and engineers 
confronted within consensus standard-setting bodies. 
Further, each of these examples illustrates a central argument of this dissertation: 
that new networks were designed as critiques of their predecessor networks.  These 
critiques are visible both in the technological design of networks as well as in the design 
of the institutions created to sustain the standardization process.  In each chapter, I shed 
light on these critiques, which were always implicit but frequently explicit.  These 
                                                
15 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, eds., Learning by Doing in Markets, 
Firms, and Countries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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critiques reflected the ideological convictions of their network architects, who were 
responding to the specific challenges and opportunities of their own historical situations.   
In Chapter Three, I examine standardization within the archetypical regulated 
monopoly, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T).  From the very 
beginning, American telephone networks were designed as a political critique of Western 
Union’s telegraph network.  Gardiner Hubbard, who backed Alexander Graham Bell’s 
initial telephone patents and created the Bell Telephone Company in 1877, believed that 
Western Union’s telegraph monopoly concentrated too much power among business 
elites.  Telephones, in Hubbard’s view, presented opportunities for middle-class 
Americans to gain access to the information they needed to be prosperous citizens and to 
make American democracy successful.16  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, AT&T executives such as Edward J. Hall and Theodore N. Vail rejected the 
notion that the telephone industry should be divided between competitors.  Instead, they 
sought to create a standardized national network over which they would exercise 
monopoly control—“One System, One Policy, Universal Service.”17  AT&T engineers 
were obsessed with standardization as they assimilated local and regional systems into a 
national network.  Beginning in the 1920s, AT&T engineers, led by their Vice President 
and Chief Engineer Bancroft Gherardi, also began to participate in consensus standards 
                                                
16 W. Bernard. Carlson, “The Telephone as Political Instrument: Gardiner Hubbard and the 
Political Construction of the Telephone, 1875-1880,” in Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht, 
eds., Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 25-55. 
17 Theodore N. Vail, Annual Report of the Directors of American Telephone and Telegraph Company to 
the Stockholders for the Year Ending December 31, 1909 (Boston: Geo. H. Ellis, Co., Printers, 1910), 18.  
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bodies and learned to use these bodies to attack critical problems that they could not 
resolve inside the Bell monopoly.   
In Chapter Four I examine the development of a new global communications 
infrastructure that used electronic computers as communication devices.  In the second 
half of the twentieth century, researchers in the United States and Europe designed new 
networks that, in stark contrast to the circuit-switched networks ruled by the national 
telephone monopolies, utilized electronic computers and digital packet-switched 
transmission.  The American effort, led by Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf, was at first 
funded by the Department of Defense, and eventually developed into the Internet.  The 
European effort was coordinated by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), a standard-setting body that consisted of representatives of national governments 
around the world.  Although most experts assumed that the ISO network architecture 
would become the global standard, users found that they could adopt Internet standards 
more quickly and easily.  The Internet’s victory in this “standards war” was a function of 
its informal methods for creating standards.  On the other hand, ISO’s effort failed 
because its consensus-building efforts suffered from excessive bureaucracy: too much 
consensus, it seems, can hinder the speedy production of standards.18  
In Chapter Five I again contrast American and European efforts to build new 
communications networks—in this case, digital cellular networks.  In both places, 
fundamental changes in regulation shaped the technological and strategic choices that 
engineers made.  With the demise of regulated monopoly control in both settings, 
                                                
18 Roy Rada, “Consensus Versus Speed,” Communications of the ACM 38 (1995): 21-23. 
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engineers and regulators were forced to create new institutions to coordinate the 
production of new standards and new networks.  European engineers designed their 
network—the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM)—to enable users to 
stay in touch while they “roamed” across national borders.  Unlike the ISO effort to 
create a computer network architecture (discussed in Chapter Four), pan-European 
technical cooperation for digital cellular standards was a successful diplomatic initiative 
to establish a common European market.   
In the United States, political change influenced the standardization process in a 
completely different manner.  American regulators, having dismantled the AT&T 
telephone monopoly in the early 1980s, refused to mandate a digital cellular standard or 
network architecture.  Instead, they decided that market forces were the best means for 
creating new digital cellular standards—an implicit critique of the conditions of regulated 
monopoly that had prevailed in the American telecommunications industry since the 
early twentieth century.  This regulatory restraint, combined with the divestiture of 
AT&T, created a temporary leadership vacuum in the nascent cellular industry that was 
soon filled by a number of trade associations and technical bodies.  The resulting delay 
allowed the European GSM standard to become the global leader over the short term.  
However, by refusing to lock all American firms into the development of a single 
standard, the American decision provided venues for continued radical innovation, a 
process which seems likely to generate greater technological and economic benefits—as 
well as a new generation of legal problems—over the long term.    
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In Chapter Six I examine the creation and growth of a new institutional form to 
coordinate consensus standardization—industry consortia—during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Because they limited participation and focused narrowly on specific technologies, 
consortia provided opportunities for firms to create standards much more quickly than 
could traditional consensus bodies—an important feature for fast-moving markets for 
information and communication technologies.  These advantages, however, were 
accompanied by claims that standards violated existing patents or so-called “submarine 
patents” disclosed late in the standardization process or after the process was completed.   
The history of one such consortium, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), 
illustrates some of these problems.  In 1994, Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World 
Wide Web, created the W3C in order to maintain his authority in the rapidly expanding 
Web community and prevent the balkanization of new Web standards.  The Web grew 
successfully during the 1990s because Berners-Lee built the Web based on non-
proprietary and freely available standards, but in 2001 the W3C proposed to change this 
tradition and allow patents into Web standards.  Open source Web developers protested 
furiously.  They threatened to look for new venues to develop their own non-proprietary 
Web standards.  Faced with this renewed danger of balkanization, the W3C responded by 
forging a patent policy consistent with its founding values and the patent-free convictions 
of open source programmers.  The W3C was able to maintain its legitimacy during this 
crisis, but its leading position in the market for Web standards remained under constant 
attack from competing standards organizations—each operating with its own definition of 
“consensus” and most willing to accept patents in its standards.  
 
 18 
Seen as part of a common history, these examples illustrate a striking trend in the 
political economy of technological systems.  In the Second Industrial Revolution, 
systems such as electrical power networks and telephone networks were developed 
within individual firms, led by entrepreneurial “system-builders” such as Thomas Edison 
and Theodore Vail.19  By the late twentieth century, the combined effects of 
technological and regulatory change presented fundamental challenges to this centralized 
style of system architecture.  The design of computer systems that utilized electronic 
components occurred within an increasingly decentralized and highly competitive 
industry structure.  The firms that had once exercised complete control over system 
architecture—AT&T and IBM—were hindered by antitrust and agency regulations that 
strove to facilitate competitive entry.  They now missed opportunities to pursue radical 
innovations.  The locus of control over compatibility standards changed from the domain 
of the dominant single firm to the domain of industry standards bodies, thus facilitating 
the emergence of a new style of global “alliance capitalism.”20 
This change—from systems innovation to modular innovation—not only occurred 
within a broader trend of social and economic globalization.  It was, in fact, one of the 
                                                
19 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 
20 Thomas McCraw, ed., Creating Modern Capitalism: How Entrepreneurs, Companies, and Countries 
Triumphed in Three Industrial Revolutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Alfred 
D. Chandler, Jr., “The Information Age in Historical Perspective: Introduction,” in Alfred D. 
Chandler, Jr. and James W. Cortada, eds., A Nation Transformed By Information: How Information 
Has Shaped the United States from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 3-38; and Louis Galambos and Eric John Abrahamson, Anytime, Anywhere: Entrepreneurship 
and the Creation of a Wireless World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
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drivers of globalization, and it created the information infrastructure upon which a newly 
globalized economy and society—the “Network Society”—could grow.21 
The networks described in this dissertation were thus turning points in the 
century-long growth of an organizational form that was responsible for fundamental 
changes in the history of the twentieth century.  The networks were simultaneously 
extensions and critiques of the Industrial Age.  Viewed together, they tell the story of 
how consensus-based institutions became the dominant form for setting standards in the 
Third Industrial Revolution.  They reveal the growth of a political economy within a 
political economy, designed to accomplish what existing forms of governance and 
engineering could not.  These network architectures—and the institutions created to 
sustain them—were political statements, critiques of the existing order, and innovations 
that articulated a different vision of the future and new means of getting there. 
 
                                                
21 Richard N. Langlois, “Modularity in Technology and Organization,” Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 49 (2002): 19-37; Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society 
(Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International 
Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002); Louis Galambos, “Recasting the Organizational Synthesis: Structure and Process in the 
Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries,” Business History Review 79 (2005): 1-37; and Louis 
Galambos, “Globalization, Competition, and The Information Age of Manuel Castells,” 
unpublished manuscript, courtesy of the author. 
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Chapter 1: Trust in Institutions: Engineering Standards for the Second Industrial 
Revolution, 1880-1910 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The search for order.  The control revolution.  The managerial revolution in 
American business.  The rise of corporate capitalism.  The emergence of modern 
America.  Students of American history recognize each of these summary descriptions 
from the canonical histories that document the interrelated and far-reaching changes in 
the sciences, technology, industry, and society that occurred between roughly 1880 and 
1930.  These concepts all describe how of a new class of professionals, inspired by the 
power and methods of science, developed a new social and technological order that 
enhanced their abilities to control nature, machines, markets, and other men and women.1   
My own preferred term for this era in American history is “the second industrial 
revolution.”  Historians define the second industrial revolution as sparked by major 
advances in technical knowledge—especially knowledge of electricity and chemistry—
and driven by corporations that developed managerial hierarchies to exploit knowledge 
within a market economy.  These developments occurred in the United States, Britain, 
Germany, and France between the 1880s and 1930s, and were characterized by advances 
in communication and transportation technologies, the widespread adoption of the 
internal combustion engine and electrical power, and the emergence of large corporations 
                                                
1 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); James R. 
Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977); David F. Noble, 
America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (New York: Knopf, 1977). 
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that integrated the functions of scientific research, technical production, and mass 
marketing.  The concept of the “second industrial revolution” is useful because it 
indicates that social and technological innovations were integrated within a longer and 
broader trajectory, with the implicit recognition of the cumulative, contested, and 
punctuated character of these changes.2 
Standardization was a fundamental aspect of American economic growth during 
the second industrial revolution.  The distinction between a standard and standardization 
is important.  The term “standard” typically refers to a product—a specification for the 
composition, interfaces, or characteristics of a given material, such as the quality of a 
steel rail, the size and angle of a screw thread, or a common measure of electrical 
resistance.  “Standardization,” on the other hand, describes a process—a more 
comprehensive range of practices and ideas.  In broad terms, standardization was part of a 
broader discourse of rational planning and attempts to exert systematic control over the 
complexities of the modern industrial world.  Standardization was one manifestation of 
an ideology that was influential among the expanding ranks of professional engineers and 
corporate managers, and an element of a broader strategy to apply knowledge toward 
practical ends and commercial gain.  Standards, therefore, were by-products of broader 
social and technological transformations.  Standards and standardization were vital 
elements in the broader rationalization and systematization of American technology, 
                                                
2 See Thomas K. McCraw, ed., Creating Modern Capitalism: How Entrepreneurs, Companies, and 
Countries Triumphed in Three Industrial Revolutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); 
and Louis Galambos, “Recasting the Organizational Synthesis: Structure and Process in the 
Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries,” Business History Review 79 (2005): 1-37. 
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business, and society—trends that concerned leading social critics of the era, including 
Joseph Schumpeter, Thorsten Veblen, and Max Weber. 
Historical examinations of the second industrial revolution tend to focus either on 
a particular person, company, or technology.  We are fortunate to have a large literature 
on industrial development that occurred inside second industrial revolution firms; but we 
know comparatively little about how technical knowledge functioned in relationships 
between firms and the ways that this knowledge became embedded in artifacts, 
specifications, and industry standards.  This overarching historiographical trend—and the 
few exceptions to it—suggests the need to look more deeply into the production and use 
of technical knowledge across the boundaries of second industrial revolution firms and 
technologies.3  If we consider standardization itself—instead of the internal dynamics of 
a particular firm or technology—as the primary category of analysis, a richer picture of 
the second industrial revolution emerges, one that highlights the cooperative relations that 
sustained the American style of competitive managerial capitalism.   
                                                
3 On science and technology within second industrial revolution firms, see Leonard S. Reich, The 
Making of Industrial Research: Science and Business at GE and Bell, 1876-1926 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985); Margaret B. W. Graham and Bettye H. Pruitt, R & D for Industry: A 
Century of Technical Innovation at Alcoa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); David A. 
Hounshell and John Kenly Smith, Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902-1980 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and David A. Hounshell, “The Evolution of 
Industrial Research in the United States,” in Richard S. Rosenbloom and William J. Spencer, eds., 
Engines of Innovation: U.S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era (Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1995), 13-86. The clearest exceptions to this historiographical trend include the studies 
conducted by a team of scholars under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, including Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Daniel M. G. Raff, eds., Coordination and 
Information: Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, eds., Learning by Doing in 
Markets, Firms, and Countries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); and Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, “Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a 
New Synthesis of American Business History,” American Historical Review 108 (2003): 404-433. 
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Existing historical studies of industrial standardization concentrate on 
interchangeable parts manufacturing within private industry and, to a lesser degree, 
within government agencies such as the National Bureau of Standards and the Bureau of 
Public Roads.4  Important developments in industrial standardization also occurred in a 
number of institutions, such as professional engineering societies and trade associations, 
that have attracted significantly less scrutiny.  The few existing studies of these 
engineering societies treat standardization as one of many developments in a broader 
trend toward professionalization.5  As a result of their preoccupation with the internal 
dynamics of firms and government agencies, historians have not been looking in the right 
places to fully appreciate the character and importance of inter-firm, industry-wide, and 
national standardization. 
The most revealing sites for examining the initial growth of industry-wide 
standardization in the second industrial revolution are in the communities of engineers 
that began to take shape in the middle and latter decades of the nineteenth century.  
Standards committees—venues where industry participants negotiated common technical 
specifications—quickly emerged as an important function of these societies.  These 
committees provided engineers with the opportunity to forge technical solutions within a 
                                                
4 David Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1984); Chandler, The Visible Hand; Rexmond C. Cochrane, Measures for 
Progress: A History of the National Bureau of Standards (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of 
Commerce, 1966); Bruce E. Seely, “Engineers and Government-Business Cooperation: Highway 
Standards and the Bureau of Public Roads, 1900-1940,” Business History Review 58 (1984): 51-77. 
5 A. Michal McMahon, The Making of a Profession: A Century of Electrical Engineering in America 
(New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 1984); Bruce Sinclair, A Centennial 
History of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1880-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1980); Louis Galambos, Cooperation and Competition: The Emergence of a National Trade 
Association (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). 
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network of like-minded practitioners from a wide variety of institutions, including private 
firms, universities, and government agencies. Standards committees functioned as venues 
for disseminating “state of the art” technical information and as fora that could generate 
an industry-wide consensus over technical matters through negotiations between all 
interested firms and organizations.  
One of the important insights that emerges from looking at standardization across 
corporate boundaries is that the successes of the second industrial revolution were not 
exclusively the accomplishments of entrepreneurs and managers working within large, 
vertically integrated firms.  We must also consider the contributions of engineers whose 
loyalties were not exclusive to individual companies, but who also worked in the interests 
of the engineering professions and were driven by a shared desire to build and improve 
new technologies, even if these technologies could not be controlled by a single firm.  
These standardization efforts were vital not only for the second industrial revolution; they 
also laid some of the organizational groundwork for important developments in the 
twentieth century, including the extension of bureaucratic power, the rise of the 
administrative state, and, by the end of the century, a third industrial revolution.  
 
1.2  Creating Industrial Standards: Efficiency, Power, and Trust 
Standards permit a consistent approach to routine tasks that are technically 
complex or require a high degree of precision.  When adopted broadly, standards 
facilitate the transfer of scientific and engineering knowledge from one person or location 
to another—from the local to the universal.  Many economic considerations of 
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standardization situate standards within a transaction-cost interpretation, in which 
standards serve the goals of efficiency by lowering costs and reducing complexity.6  
Efficiency goals also are prominent in many historical interpretations of the growth of 
corporate capitalism, where various forms of standardization were important strategies 
for managing complexity in technical, labor, and administrative functions.7  For some 
historians, professional engineers were united by the single-minded pursuit of efficiency: 
as Bruce Seely argued, “engineers, regardless of their institutional affiliation, pursued a 
common goal.”8  Although this claim is helpful as a broad generalization, we can 
discover a great deal of variety in the meaning and purposes of “efficiency” by examining 
how social, cultural, and institutional factors shaped the practice and ideology of 
efficiency in particular settings.  In other words, a drive toward efficiency does not fully 
explain the creation of standards in technologies and industries that lacked a single 
overarching authority. 
Two concepts—power and trust—are essential for establishing a richer historical 
understanding of the standardization process.  Although standardization frequently was 
justified in the rhetoric of efficiency and consensus, it was not simply a rational or 
frictionless endeavor.  Many familiar episodes in the history of technology, such as the 
“battle of the systems” between Thomas Edison’s direct current and George 
                                                
6 See for example Charles P. Kindleberger, “Standards as Public, Collective and Private Goods,” 
Kyklos 36 (1983): 377-396; Paul A. David and Shane Greenstein, “The Economics of Compatibility 
Standards: An Introduction to Recent Research,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1 
(1990): 3-41; and Cristiano Antonelli, “Localized Technological Change and the Evolution of 
Standards as Economic Institutions,” Information Economics and Policy 6 (1994): 195-216. 
7 See Robert Kanigel, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency (New 
York: Viking, 1997); Chandler, The Visible Hand; and Beniger, The Control Revolution.  
8 Seely, “Engineers and Government-Business Cooperation,” 52.  
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Westinghouse’s alternating current, illustrate how the standardization process often 
functioned as an arena for conflict between powerful interests.9  Such standards wars 
occurred with more regularity in the latter half of the twentieth century, which prompted 
economists and management scholars to generate an extensive body of literature 
describing the strategic importance of “winning” the standard-setting process—even if 
the cost of victory leads to the establishment or “lock-in” of a less efficient standard.10  In 
other cases, market power led to de facto standardization.  Hence, not only did 
standardization function as a route to achieving a powerful market position; industry 
leaders, in turn, could chart the future technological course of their industry by using that 
market power to set new standards.  Firms such as AT&T, Alcoa, and DuPont provide 
good examples of de facto standardization achieved through market power. 
A third concept—trust—adds further contextual richness to the social and cultural 
dimensions of standardization.  Because it is a fundamentally social activity, 
standardization cannot occur without at least a minimum level of trust, even between 
rivals.  Historians and sociologists of science and technology have developed an 
extensive literature that examines the dynamics of trust across a range of collaborative 
activities.  One strand of this literature examines the activities of natural philosophers and 
scientists—such as Robert Boyle, Pierre Laplace, and Lord Rayleigh—whose elite status 
                                                
9 Tom McNichol, AC/DC: The Savage Tale of the First Standards War (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2006), 77-142; and James Surowiecki, “Standard-Bearers,” The New Yorker (October 16, 2006). 
10 See for example Carl Shaprio and Hal Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the 
Networked Economy (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1998), especially Chapter 9, “Waging 
a Standards War,” 261-296. Economists debate whether it is theoretically or empirically 
demonstrable that “inferior” technologies can or have won market acceptance. The opening salvo 
was Paul David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic Review 75 (1985): 332-
337; an important response was S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis, “The Fable of the Keys,” 
Journal of Law and Economics 33 (1990): 1-33. 
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established them as leading figures of their respective social networks.  Aided by a 
fortunate mix of wealth, social standing, and technical ability, these men pioneered 
experimental methods and instruments that became authoritative points of reference for 
their peers.  Their preeminence in technical and experimental realms was based on their 
privileged positions in the moral economies of their respective local settings.11   
The production of accurate and objective standards in second industrial revolution 
technological practice—including electricity, chemicals, and materials testing—was 
contingent upon social and cultural perceptions of morality and trust.  In his insightful 
study of electrical practice in Victorian Britain, Graeme Gooday demonstrates how moral 
judgments of “fairness, fidelity, and honesty” were key indicators of the trustworthiness 
of the instruments and measurements of a given physicist, chemist, electrician, or 
engineer.12  Trust—in instruments, institutional practices, theories, and individuals—was 
the key factor in spread of tools and techniques for electrical measurement.  An example 
from a leading American chemist supports Gooday’s observation of the importance of 
morality and trust for Victorian electrical practice.  In 1893, Charles Benjamin Dudley, 
the founder of the first industrial laboratory in the United States (at the Pennsylvania 
Railroad), emphasized that hard work, skill, and a “sincere disposition” were necessary 
                                                
11 Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Robert Fox, “The Laplacian School,” in Charles 
Coulston Gillispie with the collaboration of Robert Fox and Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Pierre-Simon 
Laplace, 1749-1827: A Life in Exact Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 209-215; 
and Simon Schaffer, “Rayleigh and the Establishment of Electrical Standards,” European Journal of 
Physics 15 (1994): 277-285. See also Martin J. S. Rudwick, The Great Devonian Controversy: The 
Shaping of Scientific Knowledge Among Gentlemanly Specialists (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985). 
12 Graeme J. N. Gooday, The Morals of Measurement: Accuracy, Irony, and Trust in Late Victorian 
Electrical Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xv. 
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for determining standards for accurate chemical analyses of steel and iron.13  In her study 
of materials testing in the early twentieth century, Amy Slaton found a similar emphasis 
on morality and trust: “experts instantiated the notion that it was the tester, not the test, 
that assured quality production.”14  
A second strand of the historical and sociological literature emphasizes the 
processes by which instruments, organisms, and methods functioned as standards in the 
production of scientific knowledge.  Classic examples include Galileo’s use of telescopes 
and Lavoisier’s use of balances and calorimeters as part of their scientific and social 
authority claims.15  In the twentieth century, scientists came to rely upon standardized 
“model organisms,” such as T.H. Morgan’s drosophila and Ivan Pavlov’s dogs, as 
instruments for abstracting objective facts in disciplines such as genetics and 
physiology.16   
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During this period, quantitative methods became an essential component of 
authority claims in scientific, mathematical, economic, and political realms.  In his book 
Trust in Numbers, Theodore Porter demonstrates how quantification—including 
numbers, graphs, and formulas—functioned as communicative strategies that facilitated 
the abstraction of knowledge from its localized and particular origins to more general and 
universal status.  Porter’s description of quantification in accounting, actuarial practice, 
and engineering—much like Amy Slaton’s history of building materials and 
construction—reveals how elites used standardized and mathematical techniques to 
construct themselves as objective experts who were worthy of power and control.  Rather 
than a Machiavellian grab for power, claims of objective expertise came to be essential 
aspects of moral claims to fairness in democratic societies.17 
As a complement to this extensive literature on trust in individuals, instruments, 
and quantification, historians have (to a lesser extent) paid attention to the 
institutionalization of trust in organizations and networks that sustained the creation and 
distribution of valid technical knowledge.  Trusted scientific institutions have a rich 
history that reaches back to the seventeenth-century gatherings of elite natural 
philosophers and savants in the Royal Society of London and the Paris Academy of 
Sciences.  These types of collaborative institutions became increasingly common during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and slowly established themselves as 
legitimate and impartial arbiters of technical knowledge.   
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Just as non-commercial institutions (like the Royal Society and Paris Academy) 
became trusted sites of collaborative scientific activity, so too did institutions such as 
engineering societies and trade associations become trusted sites for technological and 
commercial activity.  A hypothetical example illustrates this point.  In the early 1800s, a 
firm in the market to buy steel or concrete would have relied on local contractors to find 
reliable materials either by virtue of their reputation or through a process of ad hoc trial 
and error.  After 1900, the forces of mechanization and modernization made it highly 
unlikely that a buyer in a similar situation still would rely primarily on personal contacts 
or local networks to guide their purchasing decisions.  Instead, buyers could choose from 
a variety of producers whose steel or concrete passed a series of laboratory tests 
performed by university-trained experts, to ensure uniformity through compliance with 
industry standards created within an impartial body such as the American Society for 
Testing Materials or the Association of American Portland Cement Manufacturers.18  In 
short, technical standards—and standard-setting organizations—were part and parcel of a 
broader shift from traditional to impersonal social relationships.19 
Rather than taking the existence of such intermediary organizations as a given, we 
need to examine more closely the processes by which trust became institutionalized in 
organizations and codified in technical standards.  How were institutions and standards 
constructed as “impartial”?  The utility of a standard is in its perceived objectivity; this 
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objectivity must be constructed, and this construction should be understood as a historical 
process, set in a particular technological and social context.  Trust in these institutions 
enhanced, rather than replaced, the trust in instruments and men of elite status that were 
vital elements of the social production of technical knowledge.  Ironically, elite 
mechanics, electricians, and chemists were the prime movers behind this 
institutionalization of trust.  In a number of industries, technical and social elites lent their 
reputations and leveraged their stature in order to help establish new institutions as 
legitimate, impartial, and trusted forums for industry standardization, thus embedding 
their social and moral standing into rules and norms that governed these new institutions.  
Standardization projects that were pursued within a range of institutional settings thus 
provide revealing sites for examining the historical tension between efficiency, power, 
and trust in the second industrial revolution. 
 
1.3  Industrial, Commercial, and Scientific Standardization in the Nineteenth 
Century 
 
In the nineteenth century, standardization occurred within a variety of institutional 
settings, including federal armories, private factories, scientific associations, and 
government laboratories.  In each setting, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, scientists, and 
engineers acted on the belief that collective action—mediated through relations of power 
and trust—would be an essential step for rationalizing and improving the quality and 
quantity of mechanical production.   
The first instances of interchangeable parts manufacturing occurred in France as 
part of the military reforms led by Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval and Honoré 
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Blanc in the late eighteenth century.  By utilizing interchangeable parts in guns, 
Gribeauval and Blanc pursued complementary technical and political objectives: a more 
efficient means of making and repairing guns, and a new method of production that 
would obsolete the “ancien régime of the manufactures.”20  In his account of these events, 
Ken Alder emphasized that the new techniques—and the artifacts they produced—were 
not a manifestation of some sort of “inexorable logic” of efficiency-seeking technological 
development, but, instead, material consequences of an exercise of bureaucratic state 
power.  In his subsequent work, Alder demonstrated how similar political and 
bureaucratic impulses motivated the expeditions that generated a global standard for 
measurement, the metric system.21 
Americans began to experiment with interchangeable parts manufacturing after 
Thomas Jefferson, the American minister to France, witnessed Blanc’s demonstration of 
his new guns and urged Congress to introduce similar methods in American armories.  
The new techniques were first introduced in federal armories at Springfield and Harper’s 
Ferry between 1815 and 1845.  Managers at these armories developed equipment to 
manufacture interchangeable parts for muskets, as well as procedures to inspect and test 
the parts to ensure uniformity.  Led by private contractors such as Simeon North and Eli 
Whitney, the use of standard interchangeable parts in arms manufacturing began as part 
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of the conditions of military procurement contracts, and spread as entrepreneurs such as 
Colonel Samuel Colt used these techniques to bring new products to market.22 
This “American System of Manufactures”—as it was termed by admiring British 
observers in the middle decades of the nineteenth century—spread to other industries as 
armory mechanics moved to new jobs.  The pivotal means for the spread of the new 
techniques was the machine tool industry itself.  Throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century, makers of machine tools dealt with similar problems—namely, the 
use of specialized machinery to create standardized products—across a number of 
industries.  As mechanics built skill into precision machinery in new firms and industries, 
an increasing number of American factories adopted standard methods, precision 
measurements, and standardized parts.23   
This period in American history is rich with examples of firms that introduced the 
new manufacturing techniques to a succession of new products.  For example, the Pratt 
and Whitney Company introduced machinery to create interchangeable parts for 
manufacturing firearms, and then moved on to pioneer machinery for sewing machines, 
bicycles, and automobiles.  Another significant example is Henry Leland, a mechanic 
who worked at the Springfield Armory before he went on to manufacture machine tools 
and sewing machines, and eventually created the Cadillac Automobile Company.  In each 
of these cases, efficiencies and cost savings did not flow in a rational and seamless 
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manner simply from the introduction of mechanized production and interchangeable 
parts.  And, as scholars such as Jack Brown and Philip Scranton have shown, many firms 
did not abandon custom and batch production in industries where mass production and 
standardized products would not meet the needs of their customers.24  
Historians frequently trace the roots of the “American System” to the experiences 
of federal armories, but the adoption of interchangeable parts in American manufacturing 
may also be seen in a separate group of entrepreneurs who were producing wooden 
movement clocks (as early as the 1820s), watches, and typewriters.  Thus, not only did 
the power of the state—manifest in military objectives and government investment—
drive the development of standards in American industrial production; so too did private 
capital and the impulses of profit-seeking entrepreneurs who created products for 
consumers in the private sector.25 
As early as the 1820s, Americans began to create cooperative institutions to apply 
scientific knowledge to shared technical and industrial problems.  The first successful 
efforts to establish technical standards through such institutions occurred within 
Philadelphia’s Franklin Institute for the Promotion of the Mechanic Arts.  The 
membership of the Franklin Institute was dominated by Philadelphia-area mechanics, 
who, despite their rhetoric of democracy and professed opposition to class distinctions, 
consisted more of social and commercial elites than rank-and-file workers or artisans.  
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The Franklin Institute pursued several strategies to raise its own profile (and the status of 
the mechanic arts) through popular lectures, exhibits, the establishment of a Journal, and 
the provision of technical advice to the State of Pennsylvania, the U. S. Patent Office, and 
U. S. Congress.  As a result, the Franklin Institute became the leading technical society in 
the United States by the 1840s.26  
The stated aim of the Franklin Institute was to “promote the useful arts by 
diffusing a knowledge of mechanical science.”27  One early and prominent manifestation 
of this application of scientific knowledge to practical affairs occurred through the 
Institute’s investigation of steam boiler explosions between 1830 and 1837.  Steamboats 
had proven to be a vital means for transportation and commerce in the expanding nation, 
but the explosion of steam boilers was a chronic problem that had cost over 300 lives (by 
1830), destroyed dozens of boats, and threatened to undermine public confidence in 
steamboat travel.  In 1830, leaders of the Franklin Institute decided that they, as a group 
of public-minded technical experts, were ideally positioned to examine the causes of 
these accidents and publish a way to prevent or diminish their severity.  Supported with 
funds from the U. S. Treasury Department, mechanics from the Franklin Institute 
performed a number of tests on machines and materials used in boilers.   
Although the Institute’s General Report on the Explosion of Steam Boilers 
provided clear advice for enhancing safety, their recommendations were not immediately 
enacted.  Steamboat operators, despite more explosions and continued loss of life, did not 
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seem interested in complying voluntarily with stricter (and more costly) safety measures; 
and Congress, as historian Bruce Sinclair observed, “had yet to accept the principle that 
public safety demanded constraints on private industry.”  It took until 1852 for Congress 
to reverse course and pass legislation that backed the recommendations of the General 
Report with the force of law.28 
The establishment of standards for screw threads was a second project where the 
Franklin Institute mobilized its technical expertise and social connections to influence an 
area of fundamental importance for mechanical practice.  Unlike English mechanics, who 
had adopted Sir Joseph Whitworth’s 1841 proposal for a standard system of screw 
threads, American mechanics were using a vast array of threads that varied according to 
locality and the customary practice of respective firms.  In 1864, William Sellers, 
Philadelphia’s leading machinist and president of the Franklin Institute, presented a paper 
to the Franklin Institute that proposed a new system for uniform American screw threads.  
Sellers promoted his own system (and rejected the Whitworth system) by arguing that it 
would make screws easier and cheaper to produce and use.  Such practical features would 
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enable American machinists to utilize a greater number of less skilled workmen in their 
workshops, thus enhancing interchangeability and increasing output at the same time.29 
Sellers saw the Franklin Institute, dominated as it was by a network of mechanics 
from Philadelphia’s leading firms, as the best vehicle for promoting the widespread 
acceptance of his system.  By 1868, Sellers convinced the secretary of the Navy to 
declare his system—also known as the Franklin Institute system—as the Navy standard.  
In his account of these events, Sinclair argued persuasively that the Franklin Institute’s 
technical prestige, combined with the power of the Institute’s members and its allies in 
the Navy and powerful institutions in the railroad industry, were keys to establishing the 
Sellers system in American mechanical practice.  Sinclair, reflecting on the sources of 
this success, concluded that the Franklin Institute “gave Sellers an institutional 
framework for his system, providing a platform, a mechanism for its advancement, and 
an aura of objectivity.”30  Relations of trust institutionalized within the Franklin Institute 
were key to the success of the Sellers system.  Unlike the earlier example of the Franklin 
Institute’s recommendations for steam boiler safety, the Sellers system did not need the 
power of federal legislation to be adopted in private industry.  Instead, to the extent that 
machinists reaped efficiency gains—in the shape of interchangeability of parts and 
simplification of machinery—from the Sellers system, these efficiencies should be seen 
as the consequences of a sustained effort to mobilize the status and power of men in the 
Franklin Institute to effect changes in industrial practice.  
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As with the recommendations from their investigations of steam boiler 
explosions, the Franklin Institute’s promotion of standard screw threads was not the final 
word on this important and controversial topic.  Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, numerous organizations, conferences, and prestigious scientists (including the 
Johns Hopkins physicist Henry Rowland) continued to address the need for accuracy and 
standardization of screw threads.  The catastrophic 1904 fire that destroyed downtown 
Baltimore—in part because fire departments from neighboring cities were forced to stand 
by helplessly when their hoses did not fit the Baltimore water hydrants—demonstrated 
the consequences of the persistent lack of interoperability among threaded devices.31  
Even today, one needs only to walk the aisles of any hardware store to recognize that 
screws, nuts, and bolts are nowhere near a universal level of standardization. 
As their commercial ambitions outgrew their traditional local communities and 
markets, Americans developed new institutions to serve as trusted intermediaries that 
could sustain commercial activity on a regional and national scale.  One of the earliest 
applications of this “spirit of voluntarism” may be seen in the United States 
Pharmacopeial Convention, founded in 1820 by delegates from eleven state societies of 
medicine.  The delegates produced the U. S. Pharmacopeia, a compendium of materia 
medica organized according to a standard nomenclature that intended to bring uniformity 
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to medical and pharmacy practice throughout the young nation.32  Similar associational 
efforts to create quality standards—an essential step in the development of a national 
economy—occurred through the evaluation of wheat in the Chicago Board of Trade in 
the 1850s and the establishment of standards in beer production by the United States 
Brewers Foundation beginning in the 1860s.33  In these and other industries, producers 
acted on the growing recognition that institutions and standards could generate the 
confidence needed for consumers to trust unknown merchants and manufacturers.  These 
types of associations seemed to confirm Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that 
Americans, more than any other people, were constantly forming voluntary and private 
associations to accomplish a wide variety of social, commercial, and political objectives. 
Voluntary associations, important to sustain the creation of new commercial 
networks at a national level, were equally important for sustaining scientific, commercial, 
and technological networks on an international level.  One important example, the 
establishment of standards for electrical technologies, grew out of the intersections of 
scientific investigations, commercial ambitions, and imperial desires.  Beginning in the 
early 1860s, elite physicists, electrical scientists, and telegraph engineers met under the 
auspices of the British Association for the Advancement of Science to establish precise 
and consistent units of resistance.  Founded in 1831, the British Association was a 
multilateral institution designed to create space for learned discussion among “gentlemen 
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of science.”  British Association meetings attracted leading scientists from Britain and 
beyond, and, according to historians Jack Morrell and Arnold Thackray, “quickly 
assumed a central role in early Victorian culture.”34  The British Association soon 
became a forum for groundbreaking announcements and controversial discussions, 
vividly demonstrated at Oxford in 1860, when Thomas Huxley and Bishop Samuel 
Wilberforce engaged in their famous debate over the theories presented in Charles 
Darwin’s book On the Origin of Species.  
The leading authorities of electrical science, including James Clerk Maxwell, 
Fleeming Jenkin, James Joule, John William Strut (later Lord Rayleigh), JJ Thomson, 
and William Thomson (later Lord Kelvin), participated in the British Academy’s 
Electrical Standards Committee that was formed in 1861.  In order to identify the best 
methods for measuring electrical resistance, the committee invited contributions from a 
number of distinguished foreign scientists, including Ernst Esselbach, Joseph Henry, 
Henry Rowland, Werner von Siemens, and Wilhelm Weber.  The topic of standardization 
drew such an illustrious crowd because of the scientific interest in electricity and the 
strategic importance of the primary technological application of electricity, in cable 
telegraphy.  After a period of tests and negotiations, the committee eventually arrived at a 
consensus on a standard unit of resistance—known first as the “unit of 1862,” then as the 
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“BA unit” or “BA ohm”—that was acceptable both to the theoretical physicists and 
practical electricians who worked closely with telegraph networks. 35 
The British Academy’s Electrical Standards Committee provided an institutional 
middle ground to help resolve the numerous rivalries and disagreements among the 
various constituencies—academics and practitioners, British and Germans—who were 
interested in the advancement of electrical technologies.  Moreover, these meetings in the 
early 1860s laid the technical and organizational foundations for more regular and formal 
international electrical standardization in the International Electrical Congresses that met 
in conjunction with World’s Fairs, beginning in Paris in 1881.36  At the 1904 Congress in 
St. Louis, the leaders of these Congresses (including the British inventor and engineer 
Colonel R. E. B. Crompton, Swedish Nobel Prize winner Svante Arrhenius, Lord Kelvin, 
and the American inventor Elihu Thomson) created the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) as a representative body that could bring the “cooperative spirit that 
animates electrical workers” into a formal and permanent organization.37  Like the 
Franklin Institute (but on an international scale), the IEC was an institution created by 
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scientists and engineers that was neither government nor firm, but nevertheless performed 
a valuable scientific and economic function.  By the time the IEC was formed in the early 
twentieth century, electrical scientists understood perfectly well that standards were not 
exclusively technical matters, but rather technically oriented instances of diplomacy, with 
a heavy dose of international prestige and commercial power on the line.  
In addition to (and partially in response to) the industrial, engineering, and 
scientific institutions already discussed, governments in industrializing nations created 
institutions that contributed to the growth of industrial and scientific standardization.  
These institutions represent the clearest instance of the close links between standards and 
science, industry, and international politics.  In 1887, Germany established the first 
government institution dedicated to the production of standards through laboratory 
research.38  The success of the German Imperial Institute soon stimulated institutional 
imitators abroad, including the British National Physical Laboratory (founded in 1899) 
and the American National Bureau of Standards (“Bureau of Standards,” founded in 
1901).   
Ever since the creation of the American state in the late eighteenth century, 
Americans grasped that the establishment of standards was, in principle, essential for 
integrating the fragmented economy of the nascent Republic.  In both the Articles of 
Confederation and the 1789 Constitution, the Founders explicitly granted Congress the 
power to set uniform national weights, measures, and duties.  However, despite the 
urgings of leaders such as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and 
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John Quincy Adams to act on its Constitutional grant, Congress found it easier (and 
cheaper) to succumb to the inertia of local conventions, thus adhering to a policy of 
“laissez-faire standards.”  Only in the 1830s, when federal standards were implicated in 
the politically-charged issue of the collection of tariffs, did Congress establish an Office 
of Weights and Measures within the Treasury Department to help impose uniform 
customs and duties at the numerous American ports of entry.39    
Throughout the nineteenth century, the effectiveness of the Office of Weights and 
Measures was limited on a practical basis by insufficient funds and personnel, and on a 
philosophical basis by the predominant political preference not to interfere in the domains 
of commerce and entrepreneurship.  A major force behind Congress’s establishment of 
the National Bureau of Standards in 1901 was a desire to match the scientific capabilities 
of the national labs created in Germany, Britain, and other major commercial powers 
including Austria, France, and Russia.  The Bureau of Standards, like German Imperial 
Institute and British National Physical Laboratory before it, represented a mobilization of 
state power to control the direction of standardization and capture its benefits.   
At first, the American institution struggled to catch up with the quantity and 
quality of original research conducted by its German and British rivals.  Although one of 
the principal motivations behind the creation of the Bureau was to assist the American 
electrical industry, the early work of the Bureau, hamstrung by limitations to its budget, 
staff, and equipment, was limited to the comparison of instruments for weights and 
measures and testing instruments to measure heat, light, water, and electrical current.  In 
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its first decade, substantial resources also were devoted to surveys of standards and 
equipment used in each state of the Union as well as—in keeping with its mission as a 
national servant of science—technical assistance and product evaluations for purchases 
made by the federal government.  However, staff in the Bureau’s electrical division, 
under the direction of Edward B. Rosa, began to raise the quality and profile of the 
Bureau’s research on absolute units of measurement and accurate instruments needed to 
compare the variety of standards circulating among the international electrical 
community of the early twentieth century.  In 1910, the contributions of Bureau scientists 
helped establish new, more precise values for the international ampere, ohm, and volt.  
Congress, convinced by Bureau Director Samuel Stratton’s testimony that constant work 
would be required to maintain and refine these standards, agreed to appropriate $175,000 
to the construction of a new electrical laboratory for Rosa and his staff to continue their 
work.40  
As the Bureau of Standards began to establish its role in the early twentieth 
century, American engineers in the private sector recognized that they needed to take 
positive steps in order to control the character and direction of industrial standardization.  
Consequently, they followed the institutional examples of the Franklin Institute, the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science, and the International Electrical 
Congresses, and created standards through new and existing institutions.  To administer 
these institutions, they relied upon the strategic, technical, and administrative experiences 
                                                
40 Cochrane, Measures for Progress, 38-108; and Henry S. Pritchett, “The Story of the Establishment 
of the National Bureau of Standards,” Science, New Series, Volume 15, Number 373 (February 21, 
1902), 281-284. 
   
 45 
they learned from standardization efforts in industry, science, and government in the 
nineteenth century.  As they sought to apply these institutional lessons within a dynamic 
national and international industrial setting, engineers also struggled to define their own 
professional identities and niches.  Professionalization and standardization would operate 
hand-in-hand as engineers established their position in American industry. 
 
1.4  Standardization in American Professional Engineering Societies 
By the end of the nineteenth century, American engineers had created a number of 
national societies to help them accomplish their technical and professional goals.  
Through these societies, they developed professional group identities that included 
commitments to social responsibility and mutual cooperation as well as the objective 
application of scientific knowledge to advance material and social progress.  Engineers 
used their professional societies to infuse scientific and academic values—namely the 
pursuit of efficiency and a deference to trusted technical experts—into commercial 
engineering practice.41  The standardization activities within these societies provide a 
clear expression of the mix of social, scientific, and commercial values at the heart of the 
nascent engineering professions. 
While many engineers described their participation in professional societies in 
scientific or altruistic terms, these societies also provided platforms for engineers to 
advance a self-serving agenda: to consolidate their ability to control the trajectory and 
pace of technological development, and to elevate their own status over a wide variety of 
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competing workers from construction sites to the factory floor.  One example of their 
ambitions may be seen in the construction industry, where scientifically-trained engineers 
used technical standards to enforce boundaries between their own expert labor and that of 
lesser-trained workers.42  This mobilization of technical expertise into a source of power 
in the workplace was articulated most famously through the time and motion studies of 
Frederick W. Taylor and those who applied his theories of “scientific management” in 
Western Electric’s Hawthorne experiments in the 1920s and 1930s.43  Still, we should be 
careful not to interpret the rise of professional engineering—through individuals, their 
societies, and their technical standards—strictly as a site of power relations between 
engineers and their capitalist managers (on the one hand) and less-skilled laborers (on the 
other).44  Standardization illustrates how the values of efficiency and trust (or scientific 
status) also were key motivating factors within engineering societies that cut across the 
boundaries of industrial firms in capitalist America.   
The movement for industrial standardization was led at first by mechanical 
engineers who used professional societies like the Franklin Institute and, later, the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME, founded in 1880), as a forum for 
discussing concerns that were not restricted to one firm but rather shared across the entire 
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industry.45  American engineers pursued standardization through a number of national 
professional engineering organizations along specialized lines, including the ASME, the 
American Society for Civil Engineers (founded in 1852), the American Institute of 
Mining Engineers (founded in 1871), the American Institute of Electrical Engineers 
(AIEE, founded in 1884), and the Society of Automotive Engineers (founded in 1905).  
To illustrate the challenges facing those who wished to promulgate industry-wide 
standards on a voluntary basis, I will discuss only two of the many examples of early 
standardization initiatives that occurred within professional engineering societies.46  In 
both of these examples—the AIEE’s role in the development of standards for the 
electrical industry and the negotiation of specifications for the durability of steel rails for 
the railroad tracks within the American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM, established 
in 1898)—the proponents of standardization believed that technical specifications would 
be most effective only through widespread (if not universal) use.  To achieve such 
widespread adoption, engineers and corporate leaders needed to be convinced that their 





                                                
45 Sinclair, A Centennial History of the ASME, 46-60. See also James W. See, “Standards,” 
Transactions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 10 (1889): 542-575. 
46 Beyond these two examples and Bruce Sinclair’s work on mechanical engineering, the best 
analysis of the strategic importance of committee standardization in this era remains George V. 
Thompson, “Intercompany Technical Standardization in the Early American Automobile 
Industry,” The Journal of Economic History 14 (1954): 1-20.  
   
 48 
1.4.1 Elihu Thomson and the American Institute of Electrical Engineers 
The need for standardization—of nomenclature, machinery, and measurement—
had been firmly established since the initial stages of the electrical industry in the mid-
nineteenth century.  The appeal of standardization for engineers and executives in the 
American electrical industry stemmed from its potential to advance their respective 
technical and commercial interests.  Where engineers such as Charles Proteus Steinmetz 
at General Electric advocated standardization because it facilitated greater coordination 
and systematization, executives such as Chicago Edison boss Samuel Insull favored 
standardization because it helped to simplify factory operations and to reduce costs.47  
Much like standardization in other contexts in nineteenth century America, 
standardization in the American electrical industry could be a forum for conflict and 
rivalry.  The most public conflict from this era was the “battle of the systems” waged 
between Thomas Edison and advocates of direct current (on the one hand), and George 
Westinghouse and advocates of alternating current (on the other).  The battle took form in 
the late 1880s.  Edison had established a dominant position in the young electrical 
industry by devising complex systems that used direct current to provide lighting and 
power for factory machinery.  When Westinghouse challenged this position by 
introducing systems based on alternating current, Edison and his associates fought back 
with a nasty campaign of fear, uncertainty, and doubt that included the systematic 
execution of dogs as a supposedly “scientific” demonstration of the dangers of alternating 
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current.48  By 1893, two developments—one technological, one organizational—helped 
to resolve the battle.  The introduction of the rotary converter, a “gateway technology,” 
facilitated the use of alternating and direct current within the same system.  At the same 
time, Edison’s single-minded assault on alternating current could not withstand the 
financial pressures that forced Edison Electric to merge with Thomson-Houston into a 
new firm, General Electric, in 1892.  Having lost control of his electrical inventions, 
Edison subsequently followed his interests to newer inventive pursuits.49 
By the mid-1890s, according to the historian Thomas P. Hughes, technical 
relationships in the industry were characterized by a “spirit of flexibility and compromise 
among the various utility interests, and especially among the manufacturers.”50  Further, 
standardization in the electrical lighting industry was enhanced by strong social ties 
between leading individuals in the industry, ties that were nurtured in trade associations 
such as the Association of Edison Illuminating Companies and the National Electric 
Light Association as well as the industry’s leading technical society, the American 
Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE).51  Although the “savage” aspects of the AC/DC 
standards war captured headlines—and still attracts the attention of journalists, 
Hollywood filmmakers, and even performance artists over a century later—the decisive 
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factor leading to industry standardization was the concentrated nature of the industry, 
within which collegial relations and a “spirit of flexibility and compromise” could 
flourish.52 
The creation of the AIEE and its standardization initiatives illustrate the 
cooperative character and professional ideology of the social networks that sustained the 
industry.  The AIEE was created in 1884.  With the International Electrical Exhibition 
scheduled to be held in Philadelphia later that year (hosted by the Franklin Institute), 
American electrical engineers wanted to have a formal body in place to receive the scores 
of prestigious foreign electrical scientists expected to visit.  The founding members of the 
AIEE included the telegraph engineers Norvin Green (who was the society’s first 
president), Elisha Gray and Franklin Pope; telephone engineer-managers Alexander 
Graham Bell and Theodore Vail; the power engineers Edwin Houston and Edward 
Weston; and the lighting engineers Charles Brush, Thomas Edison, and Elihu Thomson.  
This roster of founders hints at two enduring characteristics of the AIEE in its first 
decades: close contacts with the business community, and the technical sophistication and 
elite status of the growing American electrical profession.53   
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While the International Electrical Congresses and (after 1901) the National 
Bureau of Standards were concerned primarily with fundamental questions such as 
consistent international units, AIEE committees created standards that reflected the 
practical concerns of industry, such as ratings and test requirements for electrical 
machinery.  AIEE committees also created an institutional basis for managing 
relationships with other institutions pursuing similar goals.  For example, the AIEE’s first 
standards activity began after an approach in 1885 from two trade associations, the 
National Telephone Exchange Association and National Electric Light Association, 
which sought support for their standard wire gauge.  In 1889, the AIEE formed its own 
Committee on Units and Standards, with Edison Electric consulting engineer (and later 
Harvard and MIT Professor) Arthur Kennelly as chairman.54   
In his history of professional electrical engineering, the historian A. Michal 
McMahon suggested that the AIEE’s standards work “held special meaning for the first 
generation of professional electrical engineers… the standards process suggested a social 
standard as well as a technical one.  It embodied the early electrical engineer’s cherished 
social value: coordinated activity.”  Elihu Thomson’s participation in electrical 
standardization amplifies this point.  Thomson was a teacher, inventor, and entrepreneur 
who became famous in the 1870s and 1880s through his innovations in arc-lighting and 
electric power systems.  Thomson and his friend Edwin Houston created Thomson-
Houston, an electrical firm that began to thrive in the mid-1880s and became part of the 
General Electric Company when it was founded in 1892.  Despite his commercial 
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successes, Thomson was at heart more interested in the worlds of invention and science 
than he was in the world of business.  He demonstrated little patience for the commercial 
tensions that gripped the electrical industry at the height of the “battle of the systems.”  
Rather than join in the public fracas surrounding direct and alternating current, Thomson 
instead dedicated himself to scientific and professional matters in the more urbane affairs 
of the AIEE and numerous other technical and scientific bodies.  Within the AIEE, he 
served as president in 1889 and 1890, was a member of the Standards Committee from its 
creation in 1898 until 1906, and promoted safety measures for electric lighting systems.  
From the 1890s through the latter decades of his career, Thomson was concerned with 
reputation, not riches; with intellectual achievement, not commercial predominance.55  As 
such, he was a vital figure in the AIEE’s efforts to develop useful standards for the 
electrical industry, as well as in its campaign to establish its reputation in the eyes of the 
American and international scientific communities. 
By 1906, the AIEE had achieved substantial success in its various standardization 
projects.  These were not primarily technical achievements: the formative innovations for 
the electrical industry had already occurred within private firms in the late nineteenth 
century.  Rather, the AIEE’s successes were institutional and diplomatic: it established a 
dominant presence in the national engineering community, forged ties with a wide variety 
of American technical societies and trade associations, cooperated in the establishment of 
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the National Bureau of Standards, and emerged as a powerful presence in international 
electrical standardization.56   
We can take the AIEE’s role in the organization of the 1893 and 1904 
International Electrical Congresses—both held as part of the World’s Fairs in those 
cities—as an indication of its rising institutional stature.  Even though the AIEE was not 
the chief organizer of the 1893 Congress in Chicago, it was able to set several items on 
the agenda.  AIEE representatives also won a symbolic victory for American engineers 
by securing international acceptance of “henry” (in honor of the American physicist 
Joseph Henry) as the international term for a unit of inductance.  Where previous 
international units—such as the ohm, volt, and ampere—had been named after some of 
the great European electrical scientists, the henry was the first international unit named 
after an American.  This and other successes in Chicago marked a “coming of age” for 
American electricians, and established the AIEE as a power bloc and peer with their 
colleagues (and rivals) from Britain, Germany, and France.57  By 1904, when the 
International Electrical Congress met again in the United States, the AIEE was the chief 
organizer for the sessions in St. Louis.  Its symbolic status in international electrical 
standardization was complete when Elihu Thomson, who was President of the 1904 St. 
Louis Congress, became the second President of the International Electrotechnical 
Commission upon the death of Lord Kelvin in 1908. 
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The AIEE’s standardization initiatives pushed it into an already crowded 
organizational field, where several other institutions were engaged in the cooperative and 
competitive social relations needed to establish uniform standards for nomenclature, 
designs, and components.  Since leading engineers from the most powerful firms in the 
industry—such as Steinmetz at GE and Charles Skinner at Westinghouse—were also 
influential members in the AIEE standards committees, the combination of the prestige of 
the AIEE and market power of the large firms aided the AIEE’s efforts to disseminate 
industry standards.  In this sense, the AIEE served as venue to enhance the power and 
status of concentrated electrical industries, and AIEE standards helped the dominant 
firms maintain control and police the boundaries of the electrical industry.58 
One of the AIEE’s most significant contributions to industry standardization was 
its creation of institutional rules and norms that sustained cooperation among specialized 
portions of the electrical industry.  The rules first appeared in a “Report of the Committee 
on Standardization” in the AIEE Transactions in 1899, and were subsequently revised in 
1902, 1905-07, and 1910-1913.  Comfort Adams, Arthur Kennelly, and Elihu Thomson 
were among the prominent electrical engineers who led this committee.  In 1913, the 
work of the Standards Committee was reorganized into six sub-committees: ratings, 
telegraph and telephone standards, railway standards, nomenclature and symbols, wires 
and cables, and rating and testing of control apparatus.  In 1916, in order to “crystalize 
[sic] the policy of the Standards Committee in its own activities, and in relation to similar 
committees of other engineering societies,” the AIEE published by-laws of its Standards 
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Committee.59  These by-laws were formulated through experience of the committee as 
well as through consultation with at least ten other societies including the British 
Engineering Standards Committee, whose secretary Charles le Maistre traveled from 
London to New York in May 1916 to assist the AIEE in revising its standardization 
rules.60   
The by-laws of the AIEE declared that the “Standards Committee shall consider 
and investigate all matters relating to units and standards appertaining to or applicable in 
electrical engineering and in the allied arts and sciences.”61  Rather than attempting to 
establish sole authority over electrical standardization, the AIEE by-laws emphasized the 
desirability of cooperation with other standards committees, and included provisions to 
distribute reports of the meetings of its Standards Committee to all cooperating 
committees.  Moreover, the AIEE welcomed objections from cooperating standards 
committees, and extended invitations to representatives of the objecting committees in 
order to discuss their differences.  By 1916, then, electrical standardization was as much 
a manifestation of administrative cooperation between engineering elites as it was a 
technical or strategic pursuit.  The AIEE Standardization Rules indicated a concerted 
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effort to extend the spirit of cooperation beyond the circle of elite electrical engineers, 
thus broadening the social network of the standards community. 
The AIEE quickly became the largest technical society in the United States, with 
7000 members in 1910.  In his study of a wide variety of engineering communities during 
this time period, Edwin Layton concluded that the AIEE was also the “most democratic 
and professional American engineering society.”62  McMahon also celebrated the AIEE’s 
status as a model technical society and standard-setting body: “AIEE engineers would be 
able to declare on the eve of World War I that their standardization efforts provided an 
ideal model of the cooperative spirit in action.”63  Although such favorable interpretations 
highlight the ideological and practical successes of the AIEE to establish the 
trustworthiness of its early standardization efforts, these interpretations also can obscure 
the conflicts, desire for prestige in the domestic and international spheres, and the drive 
for efficiency and rationalization that were all persistent features in electrical 
standardization during the second industrial revolution. 
 
1.4.2 Charles Dudley and the American Society for Testing Materials  
Where the AIEE’s standards activities illustrate how the values of professionalism 
helped to establish a new industry standards committee within a broader realm of 
powerful institutions, the creation of specifications for steel rails indicates the challenges 
inherent in finding common ground between rival firms in different industries.  The latter 
example is particularly important because it shows the development of cooperative 
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procedures between the steel industry and the railroad industry, two iconic industries in 
the emergence of a national economy in the nineteenth century and the notorious realm of 
uncompromising capitalists.   
Standardization was a necessary means for railroads to achieve regional and 
eventually transcontinental compatibility.  Historians and economists have noted the 
development of ad hoc standards (and government regulations) that were vital for this 
national expansion, including agreements for a standard width for railroad tracks and 
standard time.64  The wear and failure of steel and iron rails presented a different 
institutional problem for railroads, one that could not be solved by ad hoc agreements 
between different railroad carriers.  The major difference was that steel companies, not 
railroad companies, manufactured rails.  The quality of rails was a costly problem for 
American railroads and steel manufacturers in the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century.  It also provides one of the earliest examples of institutional innovations—more 
sophisticated and formalized than the ad hoc standardization for rail gauges—that 
facilitated industry-wide consensus standards at the crossroads of science and industry.  
The two industries lacked common terminology and criteria for evaluating rails: where 
engineers in the steel industry thought in terms of the shape and wear of rails, railroad 
men adopted a more chemically-oriented approach beginning in the late 1870s and 1880s.  
These problems were compounded by the sometimes acrimonious and uncooperative 
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relations between firms in the two industries, which were significantly less diplomatic 
and homogenous in comparison to the electrical engineers discussed above.65 
Beginning in the late 1870s, a chemist for the Pennsylvania Railroad named 
Charles Benjamin Dudley presented a series of papers to the American Institute of 
Mining Engineers and the American Chemical Society on the results of his chemical 
analyses of steel rails.  The main problem he addressed was an imbalance of 
information—in other words, the lack of reliable and consistent scientific basis upon 
which specifications for steel rails could be evaluated.  Although we recognize Dudley 
today as a pioneer in industrial research,66 his initial efforts to add scientific precision to 
these debates met with little success.  Dudley faced substantial institutional resistance: 
steel manufacturers worried that specifications were an “unnecessary annoyance and 
interference with their works and processes,” and railroad representatives were wary that 
the adoption of precise specifications would drive up the price of steel rails.67  Moreover, 
Dudley’s results, based on his laboratory tests, were highly problematic and caused much 
consternation among the professional engineers because they contradicted the operational 
experiences of railroad and steel firms.68  These troubles were ironic, given the emphasis 
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that Dudley placed on the need for reliability and accuracy in measurement and testing.  
Like many other men who sought to create objective technical knowledge in the 
nineteenth century, Dudley emphasized the moral character, skill, experience, and 
“sincere disposition” that were prerequisites for arriving at trustworthy results for testing 
iron and steel.69 
Dudley and several other chemical and metallurgical engineers continued their 
scientific investigations into the 1890s and beyond, but the eventual establishment of 
inter-industry specifications for steel rails owed more to the institutional innovations and 
diplomatic efforts of railroad engineers such as Dudley, Robert Hunt, and William R. 
Webster.  The contentious relationships between the railroads and their suppliers in the 
steel industry continued into the early 1900s, when Dudley assumed the presidency of the 
newly-formed American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM).  By appointing 
Dudley—a trusted scientist from the powerful Pennsylvania Railroad—as their president, 
the ASTM signaled a move away from dominance by steel manufacturers to a more 
balanced representation of interests.  As Steven Usselman emphasized in his account of 
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these events, Dudley’s professional standing and “unimpeachable reputation” helped to 
make ASTM a trusted forum for representatives from railroads and steel makers alike.70  
Dudley’s chief accomplishment, after many years of effort, was to bring together 
those who would be interested in industry standards to develop the standards jointly, even 
if the parties were rivals or had antagonistic relationships.  Dudley characterized these 
parties as producers and consumers—in this case, the steel manufacturers and the railroad 
companies who purchased their products.  In his 1903 presidential address to the ASTM, 
Dudley stated that the creation of specifications that would be accepted by both producers 
and consumers demanded that “all parties whose interests are affected by a specification 
should have a voice in its preparation.”71  Within two decades, this call for a 
representative process would become the foundational principle for American industrial 
standards. 
By 1906, the ASTM reached agreement on industry standards for rails, which 
were subsequently adopted in private contracts and negotiations between engineers who 
used the industry specifications either as a normative standard or a baseline for 
customized orders.  In Usselman’s assessment, “an entirely new approach to innovation—
one that emphasized cooperation, careful experiment by engineers, and controlled change 
that did not disrupt the economic equilibrium—had arrived.”72  The ASTM rapidly 
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expanded its operations, and by 1910 it had 1,270 members in 17 countries, and had 
published 28 standards covering a variety of technologies, such as steel rails and wheels, 
locomotive cylinders, copper wire, cement, and structural timber.73  Although the ASTM 
did not maintain its own laboratories, it served an important coordinating function for a 
variety of institutions—including private firms, academic laboratories, the National 
Bureau of Standards, and the United States Geological Survey—that conducted hundreds 
of thousands of tests on nearly all materials used by American companies and 
government agencies.74  Materials testing was one of the most important aspects of the  
industrial age, and the ASTM, an independent organization that relied on consensus 
procedures and a broad membership, quickly became the linchpin of testing in the public 
and private sectors.75 
Dudley was recognized by his contemporaries as the driving spirit behind this 
initial stage of growth.  Upon his death in 1909, the ASTM convened a special session—
unique in the early history of the ASTM—to memorialize Dudley and his contributions to 
the ASTM and to American industry more generally.  The eulogies included tributes to 
Dudley as a railroad man, chemist, metallurgist, mentor, and citizen—“a diplomat of the 
heart, a nobleman of Nature’s handiwork, a man of the broadest outlook and widest 
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perspective.”76  The fact that these plaudits came in the form of eulogies does not detract 
from the importance of Dudley’s accomplishments.  Instead, they reinforce the notion 
that individuals who were trusted and respected by their peers were essential to the 
establishment of trusted institutions that could set industry-wide standards.  Indeed, 
Dudley deserves recognition as the architect of industry standardization’s seminal 
institutional innovation—the “consensus principle”—in which businessmen with 
different needs and interests came together to work together and forge a mutually-
agreeable solution. 
Through these committees, industry standardization embodied a pragmatic 
approach in which the application of engineering values found widespread application 
within and between American industrial firms.  According to Usselman, Dudley’s 
success with the ASTM was an important example of how “engineers and engineering, as 
embodied in the process of negotiated specifications, acquired an almost mystical 
appeal.”77  Through the efforts of Dudley and his colleagues in the electrical standards 
community, we can see that this “mystical appeal” was hard earned.  In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, standards and specifications were created 
through a contested and power-laden process.  The ability of men like Dudley to 
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surmount the technical and organizational obstacles to shared specifications accounts for 
this ascension to mystical status.   
Dudley’s role in the creation of the ASTM also suggests something of a turning 
point in the history of precision measurement and standardization in industrial practice. 
Dudley, like the prestigious group of electrical engineers in Britain, established standards 
by virtue of their scientific approach and personal reputation—or, as Graeme Gooday has 
argued, their moral standing.  In the context of American industry in the early twentieth 
century, moral standing was not by itself enough to obtain widespread agreement over 
standards and specifications.  In a highly charged commercial environment, impartial 
bureaucratic institutions such as the ASTM and AIEE—more so than any one 
individual—became established as sources of trusted technical information.  Standards 
were the clearest form of objective technical knowledge produced by these groups.  
Standards thus represented the institutionalization of trust, something that could be 
accomplished only after a consensus among professional scientists and engineers had 
been forged. 
 
1.5  Conclusions 
Standardization facilitated efficiencies and productivity gains across the 
boundaries of individual firms.  The institutions that Americans created to advance the 
goals of industry standardization were not built by powerful, profit-minded, and 
unpopular capitalists such as John Rockefeller or Jay Gould.  Instead, these institutions 
were led by elite engineers such as Elihu Thomson and Charles Dudley who were widely 
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respected among their peers and loyal to the collaborative values of the nascent 
engineering professions.  Our canonical histories of technology and business explain how 
standardization was pursued within firms though hierarchical management structures and, 
to a lesser extent, disseminated between firms through specifications articulated in 
procurement contracts by a dominant company.  However, in industries that lacked such 
overwhelmingly dominant firms, common specifications were established not through 
market power but instead through trusted institutions that were created and maintained by 
men whose status stemmed from their status among their peers in science and industry.  
Elihu Thomson and Charles Dudley helped to create legitimate bodies where engineers 
could cooperate to exchange information and solve common technical problems.  In this 
sense, we should remember Thomson and Dudley not only for their achievements in 
science and business, but also for their institutional entrepreneurship that facilitated 
collective action across the boundaries of science and industry. 
The creation of standards in the AIEE and ASTM are but two examples of a 
broader pattern in which new institutions generated consensus standards for the core 
industries of the second industrial revolution.  The different histories and foundations of 
the two institutions—the former a professional engineering society, the latter dedicated 
explicitly to producing technical specifications—indicate the diversity that existed among 
the dozens of standard-setting initiatives that took shape in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  Within this diversity, however, there existed common threads: a 
respect for scientific and engineering talent and experience; the quest to devise orderly 
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and rational solutions; the importance of cooperation, even in the midst of intense 
competition; and the need for trusted and impartial organizations. 
The standard-setters of the American second industrial revolution primarily were 
professional engineers who were dedicated to working with their colleagues in a 
collaborative spirit.  Through their activities in engineering societies and standards 
committees, their work reveals their divided loyalties to the cooperative values of 
engineering and the application of technical knowledge for profit.  The characteristically 
American resistance of government control over industry in general, and technical 
standards in particular, led engineers to forge collaborative relationships in the private 
sector.  By disseminating objective—or rather consensually produced—technical 
information, these groups helped to reduce inefficiencies in technical design and business 
transactions.  These collaborations were vital tools that provided stability for the 
technological and economic advances that were at the core of the second industrial 
revolution.   
Despite their successes, these new institutions found themselves duplicating work 
and even generating conflicting standards for the same technologies.  The quest for 
stability in a technologically complex national economy soon led engineers to seek new 
organizational solutions where representatives from a variety of standard-setting 
institutions could negotiate inter-industry and national standards.  These new solutions—
born of a mix of efficiency-minded cooperation, commercial power dynamics, and 
leadership by trusted elites—are the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: From Engineering Standards to American Standards, 1910-1930 
 
2.1  Introduction 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, elite electrical, chemical, and 
mechanical engineers formed new institutions that slowly and painstakingly began to 
publish standards for a national industrial economy.  Practical and ideological dimensions 
of standardization operated hand-in-hand.  By the 1920s, the most prominent advocates 
of standardization were professional men whose careers spanned the boundaries of 
science, business, and politics: men such as Herbert Hoover, the famous mining engineer, 
Secretary of Commerce, and President of the American Institute of Mining Engineers 
who was elected President of the United States in 1928; and Albert Whitney, a safety 
advocate, insurance industry consultant, Caltech mathematics professor, pioneer in the 
field of actuarial science, and Chairman and longtime Executive Committee member of 
the American Engineering Standards Committee.  
The ideas of these two men, both of whom were instrumental in the growth of 
industrial standardization in the United States, provide a good way to introduce the blend 
of values and beliefs at the core of the movement for industrial standards.  Hoover 
personified the inspiration that this movement drew from the experience of World War I.  
Through the public-minded application of the principles of rational and scientific inquiry, 
Hoover believed that he and his fellow engineers could improve industrial performance 
and thus contribute to the creation of a more harmonious industrial and social order.  To 
counter the wasteful tendencies of competitive industrial capitalism, Hoover used his 
political status to encourage professional engineers to eliminate unnecessary variety, to 
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simplify industrial practice, and to pursue cooperative relations in the public and private 
sectors.1   
In contrast to Hoover’s political and engineering approach, Whitney sought to 
provide a sound philosophical basis for the standardization movement, most notably in a 
widely circulated 1924 essay entitled “The Place of Standardization in Modern Life.”  
Whitney, like Hoover and other advocates of industrial standardization, defended 
standardization from critics who feared that it would produce a dull and mediocre world.2  
Whitney’s outlook was more optimistic:  
Standardization is thus the liberator that relegates the problems that have 
already been solved to their proper place, namely to the field of routine, 
and leaves the creative faculties free for the problems that are still 
unsolved. Standardization from this point of view is thus an indispensable 
ally of the creative genius.3 
 
In Whitney’s worldview, this liberatory essence of standardization could be generalized 
far beyond the realm of engineering.  “In a very real sense,” he continued,  
all the conservational forces of civilization are within the field of 
standardization, institutions, customs, laws, literature, and other forms of 
art, science—they all involve the fixation of advances which have been 
made into a better understanding of the world, and such advances are in 
turn points from which to make fresh advances.4 
                                                
1 Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922); Ellis 
W. Hawley, “Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an ‘Associative State,’ 
1921-1928,” American Historical Review 61 (1974): 116-140. 
2 One critic—an economist at the War Trade Board writing in 1919—objected to standardization 
on aesthetic as well as economic grounds. See Homer Hoyt, “Standardization and its Relation to 
Industrial Concentration,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 82 (1919): 
271-277. 
3 Albert Whitney, The Place of Standardization in Modern Life (Washington, DC: Central Executive 
Council, Inter American High Commission, 1924), 5. This essay was reprinted in a 1928 special 
issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 137 (1928). Dozens of 
articles—mostly but not unanimously supportive of standardization—also appeared in this 
volume. 




For Hoover and Whitney, standardization had clear potential for influencing the 
direction and character of society; but society first would have opportunities to direct the 
character of standardization.  They agreed that the key to capturing the benefits of 
standardization while avoiding its pitfalls was a matter of control.  The key questions, 
then, were: Who would control standardization?  How would they do it?  What would be 
the social and economic consequences?  
In the United States, the most influential response to these questions came from 
professional engineers who were advocates of an ideology of voluntary cooperation.  The 
leaders of the nation’s largest and most influential engineering standards committees 
came together to create a national federation of standards organization in the wake of 
World War I.  This federation, the American Engineering Standards Committee (AESC, 
founded in 1918) was the first institution dedicated explicitly to cooperation between 
industry standards bodies on a national scale.  To accomplish such ambitious goals, the 
leaders of the AESC sought to establish the legitimacy and effectiveness of their 
organization through practical and rhetorical campaigns of cooperation with other 
organizations—including professional engineering societies, trade associations, and 
government bureaus—that also exercised jurisdiction over technical standards.5  By the 
late 1920s, buoyed by the success of their efforts, the spokesmen of the AESC argued 
that their organization represented a form (and even a model) of industrial self-
government.  Theirs was not an implementation of a radical socialist or technocratic 
                                                
5 In my use of the concept of “jurisdiction,” I follow Andrew Abbott’s discussion of jurisdiction as 
a process where different groups seek to exert control over work. Andrew Abbott, The System of 
Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
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agenda; instead, it was an attempt to apply the principles of participatory democracy 
within a new sphere, in order to transcend the constraints and limitations of existing 
forms of state regulation. 
 
2.2 Creation of the American Engineering Standards Committee, 1910-1922 
In the United States, engineering standards committees were first formed in 
groups such as the American Institute for Electrical Engineers (AIEE, founded in 1884) 
and the American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM, founded in 1898), and 
multiplied quickly in the first decade of the twentieth century.  By World War I, over 100 
private organizations—including engineering societies, trade associations, and 
international bodies—were creating and disseminating standards that were intended for 
use in American industrial production.  In several cases, however, this proliferation of 
standards committees ironically began to undermine their underlying purpose of 
providing greater cooperation and organization.  This confusion was especially acute in 
technologies where four or five different committees issued different standards, for 
example in electrical machinery, screw threads, and pipe threads, without any systematic 
or formal channels of communication or coordination.6 
Beginning in 1910, members of several engineering societies began to discuss 
how an alliance of standards work between the national engineering societies would be a 
                                                
6 Comfort A. Adams, “Industrial Standardization,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 82, Industries in Readjustment (1919): 292-6; Bruce Sinclair, A Centennial History of 




“most desirable thing.”7  There was less agreement, however, on who would control the 
alliance and how much authority it would have.  These discussions started when Henry 
Hess, an engineer active in mechanical and automotive standards work, met with the 
leaders of the British Engineering Standards Committee (BESC) in 1910.  The BESC, 
founded in 1901, was a body designed to unify standardization efforts in British 
government and private industry.  Convinced that Americans would benefit by following 
the British example, Hess initiated a series of discussions with representatives of the 
other major American engineering societies that would take eight full years before a 
national alliance of American standard-setters was formed.  Throughout this period, 
American engineers looked to the BESC as a model and especially to Charles Le Maistre, 
the Secretary of the BESC, for advice for setting up a national standardization committee 
as the British had done.8 
Hess first gained support for his initiative from Calvin Rice, Secretary of the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME, founded in 1880).  Hess—who in 
1911 was appointed as Chairman of the ASME’s committee on Joint Engineering 
Standards—then began to correspond early in 1912 with Comfort A. Adams, Secretary of 
the AIEE Standards Committee.  He outlined an ambitious vision, calling for the creation 
of a “Joint Engineering Standards Committee” (similar to the British committee he 
                                                
7 Henry Hess to Calvin W. Rice, quoted in Clifford B. LePage, “Twenty-Five Years—the American 
Standards Association (1. Origins),” Industrial Standardization (1943): 318. 
8 For an appraisal of the BESC (renamed British Engineering Standards Association in 1918), see 
Charles Le Maistre, “Summary of the Work of the British Engineering Standards Association,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 82 (1919): 247-252. On the career and 
influence of Le Maistre—who also served as the general secretary of the International 
Electrotechnical Commission—see JoAnne Yates and Craig Murphy, “Charles le Maistre: 
Entrepreneur in International Standardization,” paper presented at the Business History 
Conference, June 2007.  
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discovered in 1910) that would transmit copies of ongoing standards work between the 
various member societies and, moreover, serve as a point of contact for an international 
committee to facilitate the exchange of information between national committees.9  
Adams was enthusiastic in his response, although he cautioned Hess about the 
administrative hurdles that would face such a comprehensive plan.  Remarking on the 
troubles that the International Electrotechnical Commission faced, Adams warned that it 
would be “a very tedious and difficult matter to get such an international organization 
into successful operation.”10 
Despite widespread enthusiasm for an alliance of engineering standards 
committees, progress was slow.  In 1916, Arthur Kennelly (Chairman of the AIEE 
Standards Committee and Professor of Electrical Engineering at Harvard University and 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) renewed the initiative.  In a letter to Hess, 
Kennelly proposed that the four major national engineering societies (the AIEE, the 
ASME, the American Society for Civil Engineers (ASCE, founded in 1852), and the 
American Institute of Mining Engineers (AIME, founded in 1871)) send representatives 
from their respective Standards Committees to create a “standing federated Engineering 
Standards Committee,” which would share equally in the meeting costs and rotate the 
chairmanship on an annual basis.  Kennelly hoped that this institutional design would 
avoid rivalries and tensions between the four professional societies.  “The main idea,” 
                                                
9 Henry Hess to F. L. Hutchinson, quoted in Clifford B. LePage, “Twenty-Five Years—the 
American Standards Association (1. Origins),” 318. 
10 Comfort A. Adams to Henry Hess, quoted in Clifford B. LePage, “Twenty-Five Years—the 
American Standards Association (1. Origins),” 319. 
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Kennelly concluded, “is that no one society shall seek to dominate the situation, but that 
each should endeavor to assist all the others.”11   
By the end of the year, the idea finally began to bear fruit: the first meeting of the 
Joint Conference Committee on American Engineering Standards occurred on December 
29, 1916, with Comfort Adams as chairman.  Representatives from the four engineering 
societies asked a fifth society, the ASTM to join them to create a permanent American 
Engineering Standards Committee (AESC).12  The Joint Committee immediately 
considered the advantages of asking American government officials to appoint 
representatives to the AESC, and authorized Comfort Adams, who had already spoken to 
government officials about the initiative, to continue his discussions with the Director of 
the Bureau of Standards and the Secretaries of War and Navy.  Adams had already 
established collegial relations with Paul Agnew and Edward Rosa from the Bureau of 
Standards, and found his correspondents at the Departments of War and Navy—Colonel 
Warren R. Roberts and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, respectively—willing to follow the 
Bureau’s lead.   
With the five engineering societies and three government departments committed 
to collaboration, the main obstacles facing the newly-formed AESC were structural and 
procedural: what would be the constitution and by-laws of the new group?  What about 
                                                
11 Arthur Kennelly to Henry Hess, quoted in Clifford B. LePage, “Twenty-Five Years—the 
American Standards Association (1. Origins),” 321. Charles le Maistre, “Standardization,” AIEE 
Transactions 35 (1916): 489-500; and Comfort A. Adams, “National Standards Movement—its 
Evolution and Future,” in Dickson Reck, ed. National Standards in a Modern Economy (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1956).  
12 The AESC changed its name to the American Standards Association (ASA) in 1928, then to the 
United States of America Standards Institute (USASI) in 1966, and then to its present name, the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 1969. 
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its classifications for standards, and the form of its committees and subcommittees?  Most 
importantly, what would be the relationship between these new procedures and the 
various existing procedures in place at the founder societies?   
These questions took almost two years to settle.  Adams later recalled, “What 
happened during those two years would be a long, but very interesting story, if it were 
related in full… fear and jealousy, as well as ignorance, were the chief obstacles which 
had to be overcome during two years of the hardest kind of work for the relatively small 
group that carried the load.”  Agnew commented wryly that the five societies engaged in 
“endless discussions” and “innumerable drafts of constitutions and methods of 
procedure” before they finally approved the AESC Constitution and Rules of Procedure 
in 1918.13   The main problem was a fear—articulated most sharply by Edgar Marburg of 
the ASTM—that the new collective organization would usurp the prestige and authority 
of the member societies.  The ASTM was especially sensitive to this fear because, unlike 
the other four founders, they were primarily a standards-setting organization, and not a 
professional engineering society.  Even after two years, this jurisdictional conflict was 
not completely resolved, but instead, deferred and therefore destined to resurface time 
and again as a fundamental problem.  
Although the tenuous balance of power would be a persistent problem for the 
AESC, it was clear from the start that this was not to be an endeavor led by the federal 
government.  This was the fundamental difference between the United States and in 
European countries, whose industrial standardization efforts were financed and organized 
                                                
13 P. G. Agnew, “Twenty Years of Standardization,” Industrial Standardization (1938): 229; and 
Comfort A. Adams, “How the AESC Was Organized,” Industrial Standardization (1938): 237-8. 
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by governments.14  American government agencies were unwilling to lead, but were 
eager to join the enterprise as equal partners.  The early involvement of the Departments 
of War and Navy highlights the importance of standardization during the nation’s 
unprecedented mobilization for World War I.  Working on behalf of the Naval 
Consulting Board (created in July, 1915) the automotive engineer Howard Coffin led the 
first efforts to enlist over twenty engineers from the leading professional societies to find 
the most efficient means for preparing American industry for war.  Coffin and his fellow 
engineers sought to aid their country through the systematic application of scientific 
knowledge and bureaucratic expertise—an ideology that would achieve its most public 
expression through Bernard Baruch’s War Industries Board and Herbert Hoover’s 
oversight of the provision of food for eleven million Belgian refugees.15  
Although Coffin used his time in Washington to bring together the leaders of the 
major American engineering societies—and even used the occasion to promote industrial 
standardization—the war only served to provide a boost for the initiative started by Hess, 
Kennelly, and Adams.  Indeed, Paul Agnew later argued that the “British influence” was 
far more influential as an inspiration for the AESC than anything that “came out of 
Washington or even from civilian engineers’ stays in Washington.”16  Rather than 
                                                
14 Jay Tate, “National Varieties of Standardization,” in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Competitive Advantage (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 442-473. 
15 Robert D. Cuff, The War Industries Board: Business-Government Relations During World War I 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 15-30. See also Ronald C. Tobey, The 
American Ideology of National Science, 1919-1930 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 
xii, 3-96. 
16 Paul G. Agnew, “Historical Memoranda to H (for Mrs. Moffett), 9/3/48, in P. G. Agnew, 
Historical and Policy Papers (New York: American Standards Association, 1920-1952), 335. [My 
assumption is that “H” is Vice Admiral G. F. Hussey, Jr. (USN Ret.), who succeeded Agnew as 
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providing some sort of organizational or ideological template for industrial 
standardization, the lasting legacy of public-private cooperation during the war was that it 
demonstrated the benefits made possible by coordinated action and civic voluntarism to 
scientists, engineers, government officials and the general public.17 
The first meeting of the AESC took place in New York on October 19, 1918.  
Comfort Adams was elected as Chairman, and the ASME volunteered the services of 
Clifford B. LePage as acting secretary.  LePage stayed on until 1919, when Agnew began 
work as the AESC’s full-time secretary.  Agnew continued in that role until 1947, and his 
influence during this long tenure was the single most important factor in shaping the 
development of the AESC and American consensus standardization. 
Given their formative roles in the AESC, the career paths of Adams and Agnew 
warrant a closer look.  Comfort Avery Adams (b. 1868, d. 1958) was a talented scientist, 
respected teacher, and accomplished administrator.  His career in science began with his 
undergraduate studies in mechanical engineering at Case Institute of Applied Science, 
where he was a laboratory assistant for Albert Michelson and helped design the apparatus 
used in the famous Michelson-Morely ether drift experiment.  After graduating from 
                                                                                                                                            
Secretary of the American Standards Association in 1948.] Agnew’s recollection is consistent with 
Henry May’s insight that fundamental changes in American society were well under way before 
the beginning of the World War. Henry May, The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First 
Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917 (New York: Knopf, 1959).  
17 In contrast to the AESC, the National Research Council (NRC) was formed to respond to 
military needs during World War I. The NRC, focused more on research (As opposed to 
standardization), grew rapidly in the 1920s, but lost most of its funding in the 1930s. On the NRC, 
see Robert H. Kargon, “Introduction,” in Robert H. Kargon, ed., The Maturing of American Science 
(Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1974), 1-29. For a more 
general analysis, see Theda Skocpol, et al, “Patriotic Partnerships: Why Great Wars Nourished 
American Civic Voluntarism,” in Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter, eds., Shaped by War and 
Trade: International Influences on American Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), 134-180. 
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Case in 1890, he worked as an engineer at Brush Electric Company before joining the 
engineering faculty at Harvard University in 1891.  He was promoted to professor in 
1906, served as Dean of the School of Engineering in 1919, and held prestigious chairs in 
Engineering from 1914 until his retirement from Harvard in 1936.  
Additionally, Adams was active outside the academy in both the private and 
public sectors.  Throughout his tenure at Harvard and for twenty years after his 
retirement, Adams kept in close touch with a broad cross-section of industry through 
consulting activities with over a dozen different private firms.  His service in government 
began during World War I, when he was the chair of the Welding Committee of the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation and a member of the General Engineering Committee of 
the Council of National Defense.  After the war he concentrated on facilitating 
cooperative action in the private sector, simultaneously serving as founder and first 
president (1919) of the American Welding Society, a twenty year member of the Boiler 
Code Committee of ASME, chairman of the AIEE Standards Committee (1910-1920), 
AIEE president in 1918, and, as noted above, first chairman of the AESC in 1918 and 
1919.  Later in his life he received tremendous acclaim from his peers, including election 
to the National Academy of Science (1930), lifetime achievement medals from the 
American Welding Society (1927) and AIEE (1944), and the prestigious Edison Medal in 
1956.  He was, in short, an archetype of the new professional engineer that emerged in 
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the early twentieth century, one whose career spanned the boundaries of industry, 
academia, and, in times of need, government.18 
Where Adams’ career is remarkable for its breadth across distinct sectors of 
American society, Agnew’s career is distinguished by the depth of his experiences and 
commitment to industrial standardization chiefly through one organization, the AESC.  
Agnew (b. 1881, d. 1954) earned a Master’s degree from the University of Michigan in 
1902, and, after teaching high school physics for three years, joined the staff of the 
Bureau of Standards in 1906.  At the Bureau, he performed research and published 
several important papers on electrical instrumentation and measurement methods.  His 
work was strong and original enough to earn him a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University 
in 1911.19  
Agnew’s interest in industrial standardization blossomed during World War I, 
when he was the technical assistant to the Bureau of Standards Chief Physicist Edward B. 
Rosa as well as a liaison between the Bureau of Standards and the War Industries 
Board.20  (Agnew later provided important assistance for the federal government during 
the Second World War, as an emissary between the government, military, and industry in 
                                                
18 Vannevar Bush, “Comfort Avery Adams,” in Biographical Memoirs 38 (New York: Columbia 
University Press of the National Academy of Sciences, 1958), 1-16.  
19 P. G. Agnew, “A Study of the Current Transformer with Particular Reference to Iron Loss,” 
Bulletin of the Bureau of Standards, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1911). Other publications included P. G. Agnew, “A Device for Measuring the Torque of 
Electrical Instruments,” Bulletin of the Bureau of Standards, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1911); P. G. Agnew, W. H. Stannard, and J. L. Fearing, “A System of 
Remote Control for an Electric Testing Laboratory,” Scientific Papers of the Bureau of Standards, No. 
291 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1916); and P. G. Agnew, “A New Form of 
Vibration Galvanometer,” Scientific Papers of the Bureau of Standards, No. 370 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1920). 
20 P. G. Agnew, “The Work of the Bureau of Standards,” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 82 (1919): 278-288. 
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the development of American War Standards used by the armed services.)  Agnew’s 
involvement with the AESC began in 1919, when he represented the Bureau of Standards 
in discussions of the inclusion of government departments and trade organizations within 
the AESC.  Agnew left the Bureau to join the AESC in 1919, probably tempted in part by 
a salary increase of at least $1,000.21  His service as AESC Secretary spanned from 1919 
to 1947, a period in which his staff grew from three to eighty-five people.  After leaving 
this position, he continued to serve as a consultant for the organization until 1952.  Given 
this outstanding commitment to standardization, it is easy to see why one author went so 
far as to call Agnew “Mr. Standards.”22 
Agnew maintained a personal interest and involvement in almost every aspect of 
the AESC’s operations.  Agnew served as the public face of the AESC by promoting the 
cause of standardization in business publications, academic conferences, and in testimony 
to Congress.  At the same time, Agnew was deeply involved with a vast range of topics 
related to standardization, from the technical details of electrical, photography, and 
building standards to the philosophical, financial, and legal dimensions of industry, 
government, and international standardization.  He also led the creation of ratings, 
certifications, and quality standards for consumer products such as clothing, bedding, and 
                                                
21 At this time, restrictions on salaries severely impeded the Bureau’s ability to attract and keep 
talented scientists.  According to Rexmond Cochrane, “industry paid close to twice the Bureau 
salary at every level of training and experience.”  Agnew would have earned between $2,240 and 
$4,000 a year after over ten years at the Bureau; his 1921 salary at the AESC was $5,000. Rexmond 
C. Cochrane, Measures for Progress: A History of the National Bureau of Standards (Washington, D.C.: 
U. S. Department of Commerce, 1966), 223; and Work of the American Engineering Standards 
Committee (Year Book) (New York: American Engineering Standards Committee, 1921), 13. 
22 S. P. Kaidanovsky, “Personalia: Dr. P. G. Agnew,” Standards World 1 (1949): 113-114. 




food.23  He represented Americans in efforts to create international alliances for 
standardization, including the International Standards Association in the late 1920s, a 
series of meetings with Latin American countries in the late 1920s, and was a “dominant 
figure” in the negotiations that led to the establishment of the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) in 1946.24  With few exceptions, he was present at every 
meeting of the AESC main committee and, through his role as minute-taker, generated its 
documentary history and served as the scribe of its institutional memory.  Agnew 
struggled with physical illness throughout his life, but, with the assistance of his wife 
Ethna M. Heebner and his staff at the AESC, functioned as the backbone and voice of 
American industrial standardization.25  His colleagues recognized his decades of service 
with the first ASA Standards Medal in 1951. 
Agnew’s enduring contribution to industrial standardization came not only from 
his formidable technical and administrative accomplishments, but, most significantly, 
from the spirit in which he carried out his work.  Agnew was deeply and sincerely 
committed to the cooperative vision embodied in multilateral standardization, and was 
one of the most articulate spokesmen for the social benefits and philosophical 
justifications for standardization.   
                                                
23 The American Home Economics Association joined the AESC in 1929. See “Home 
Engineering,” The New York Times (March 7, 1929), 17; “Standardized Bedding,” The New York 
Times (April 1, 1929), 19; and P. G. Agnew, “The Movement for Standards for Consumer Goods,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 137 (1934): 60-69. For tributes to 
Agnew’s formative role in standards for photographic equipment and consumer goods, see Paul 
Arnold, “American Standards in Complementary Industries,” and Irwin D. Wolf, “Consumer 
Goods Standards—the Retailer’s Viewpoint,” both in Reck, ed., National Standards in a Modern 
Economy. 
24 Kaidanovsky, “Personalia: Dr. P. G. Agnew,” 113-114. 
25 Agnew’s ideas survive in accessible form thanks to the effort of his wife, who presented a 
collection of some of his papers to The Johns Hopkins University library as a gift in 1959. 
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Agnew argued that the AESC’s cooperative method of developing standards, 
which he called the “consensus principle,” compared favorably to the common law and 
statute law methods of establishing regulations: it was quicker and more flexible than the 
common law method, yet retained the authority of statue law without being burdened by 
its bureaucratized nature and autocratic tendencies.  An illustration that accompanied 
Agnew’s 1925 article “How Business is Policing Itself” revealed his cutting critique of 
existing forms of rulemaking.  At one side of the illustration (credited to Emmett 
Watson), a bespectacled lawyer is reading from one of a mountain of legal books.  His 
oratory is failing to hold the attention of the judge and a clerk, both of whom are asleep.  
In the middle of the illustration, a young, well-dressed businessman flees the courtroom, 
briefcase in hand, and moves toward a boardroom.  He is joined there by two colleagues, 
one who is offering a match to light the young businessman’s cigar, the other who is 
intently reading a document that the three men appear to share.  The caption tells us that 
“The business man is turning from the courts with their numberless laws and intricate 
procedure to boards and reforms of his own choosing.”26    
                                                




Figure 2.1: “…from the courts… to reforms of his own choosing.” 
Source: P. G. Agnew, “How Business is Policing Itself,” The Nation’s Business 
 
As practiced in the technical realm of standardization, the consensus principle 
meant that “controversial matters usually are threshed out, often with the aid of research, 
until a solution, and not merely a compromise, is reached.”27  As such, Agnew recognized 
with apparent relish that, in the standards-setting process, “the human difficulties are 
usually much more serious than the technical ones.”28  If the work needed to ensure the 
                                                
27 P. G. Agnew, “Standardization,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Fourteenth Edition (1940); reprinted as 
“Standards in Our Social Order,” Industrial Standardization (1940), 7. Emphasis added. Agnew 
frequently drew this distinction between an adversarial compromise and an integrative solution, 
where solutions often were reached through the use of technical evidence.  
28 P.G. Agnew, “Standards in Our Social Order,” 6. One eulogy noted Agnew’s strong feelings for 
this process: “To him the procedure which makes it possible for all groups to have a voice in the 
development of the standards under which they operate represented democracy in action… Dr. 
Agnew loved the standardization movement and the organization for which he worked. He also 
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creation of industry and national standards had more in common with diplomacy than it 
did with laboratory science or factory engineering, then Paul Gough Agnew was its most 
skilled and longest-serving diplomat.  
 
2.2.1 Legitimacy Through Participation: the Growth of the AESC 
Although the AESC consistently used terms such as “consensus,” “compromise,” 
and “cooperation,” we should not interpret this rhetoric to mean that the growth of the 
AESC occurred in a frictionless or uncontested way.  And although Adams and Agnew 
were two of the key figures in the “relatively small group that carried the load” during the 
early years of the AESC, their efforts could succeed only through the participation of 
other professionals who labored to create industrial and national standards.  For the 
AESC, consensus and legitimacy were the consequences of a strategy to keep their 
organization intact and relevant to industrial practice.  This strategy entailed countless 
hours of deliberation and debate among hundreds of engineers, managers, and executives, 
many of whom needed to be convinced of the benefits that could follow from cooperative 
standardization. 
In the first meeting of the AESC, Chairman Comfort Adams suggested a radical 
increase in membership—from the five founders to, eventually, up to one thousand 
organizations—that would be necessary if the AESC was to achieve a truly national and 
                                                                                                                                            
loved a good fight on its behalf.” Eulogy for Paul Gough Agnew prepared by the American 




comprehensive scope.29  Although this was at the time unimaginable for most 
participants, expansion began immediately and Adams’ vision became reality within only 
a few decades.  The first steps toward expansion took place after the first meeting, when 
the AESC invited the Departments of Commerce, Navy, and War to join the AESC.   
By 1919, AESC leaders decided that the admission of additional technical 
societies, trade associations, and insurance groups was desirable for two reasons.  First, 
given the absence of government financing, the AESC needed to generate more income 
so it could sustain its operations.  Second, AESC leaders saw it could enhance its 
legitimacy through broader and more inclusive membership.  The AESC reported an even 
balance in its first annual report in 1920, a positive balance of just over $1,000 on 
January 1, 1921, and a surplus of nearly $6,000 at the end of 1921.  Despite this growth, 
the 1921 Annual Report warned that the group’s current income was not sufficient for it 
to accomplish all the work before it.  Forging industrial standards was labor-intensive and 
costly work, where thousands of dollars needed to be spent on travel, meetings, 
correspondence, and maintaining an office in New York.  To meet these rising costs—
costs that would surely increase as the organization endeavored to take on more work—
the 1921 Annual Report noted the establishment of a committee on ways and means to 
                                                
29 AESC Minutes, 18 Jan. 1919, page 3. Plans for the AESC to play a part in international 
standardization (along the lines of Henry Hess’s initial idea in 1910-11) were articulated in 
principle, but delayed in practice until an unsuccessful attempt to create an International 
Standards Association in 1926 and, more successfully, the International Organization for 
Standardization in 1946.  
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address the problem.30  These fund-raising efforts show that, before technical proposals 
could even be discussed, standardization first required campaigns of persuasion to secure 
support for their work.   
One fundraising tactic was introduced as an institutional innovation in 1922, when 
the AESC created a class for individual firms called “sustaining members.”  Sustaining 
members of the AESC agreed to pay a fee that was determined in proportion to the gross 
annual revenues of the firm.  In exchange, the member would become a subscriber to an 
extensive AESC “information service” that included a full list of standards—over 2,000 
in number—approved by standardization bodies both in the United States and abroad.  
This information was disseminated in periodic bulletins.  The AESC believed that better 
and more complete information was not only “necessary as a basis of sound work,” but 
also a vital “basis for that cooperation which is essential to real standardization.”  This 
was a good way for firms that lacked the personnel or funds to become full AESC 
members to benefit from AESC activities.  The initiative met with immediate success: 
228 companies joined as sustaining members in 1923.  By the end of 1924, the AESC had 
received over $27,000 from sustaining memberships, making it the greatest single source 
of income for the organization (member dues generated $20,000).31   
                                                
30 Of the group’s income in 1921, 70% (just over $17,000) came from dues, with the remainder 
coming from corporate and individual gifts. Work of the American Engineering Standards Committee 
(Year Book), (New York: American Engineering Standards Committee, 1921), 11.  
31 AESC Minutes, 14 May 1918,  page 1; American Engineering Standards Committee Year Book (New 
York: American Engineering Standards Committee, 1924), 17-18, 56-57; American Engineering 




For the AESC to claim it was producing truly national standards, the second 
concern about the group’s size and legitimacy was paramount.  The links between 
inclusiveness and legitimacy became evident from the start.  The AESC’s first major 
project, initiated in December 1919, was to bring some order to industrial safety practices 
and regulations that sprang up in the 1910s out of a dizzying array of jurisdictions, 
including state regulatory bodies, manufacturers, insurance companies, and safety 
organizations.  The task of developing safety standards within the AESC occurred after 
the Bureau of Standards, prompted by the National Safety Council, sponsored two 
conferences in 1919 on the standardization of safety codes.  The Bureau of Standards did 
not see itself as an appropriate forum for the establishment of safety codes.  Its budget—
already insufficient for it to perform its core mission—was controlled by Congress, 
which was unwilling to allocate further funds for something that industry could 
accomplish by itself.  Further, private firms viewed safety codes promulgated by the 
Bureau as unwelcome federal regulation, and had no enthusiasm for lending more power 
to the Bureau.  Consequently, the Bureau handed the task to the AESC, which it 
perceived to be the only organization capable of fostering cooperation between 
representatives from industry and government.  However, when the AESC began its 
work, it was immediately besieged by protests from industrial executives who 
complained that the organization was “entirely too undemocratic and narrow in its set-up 
to be entrusted with so important a program.”32  
                                                
32 Mark Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor, and Business in the Building of American Work Safety, 
1870-1939 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 103; P. G. Agnew, “Twenty-
 
 86 
The AESC’s response to this critique was to continue to welcome participation 
from additional groups.  By 1920, representatives from the five founding societies and 
three government departments had been joined by over a dozen trade associations, six 
technical professional societies, ten insurance or safety groups, and the Departments of 
Agriculture and the Interior.  At this time, twenty-two projects were underway to create 
safety codes for such diverse areas as aviation, ladders, lightning protection, machine 
tools, mechanical refrigeration, and industrial sanitation.33  To help manage the 
organizational complexity involved in the standardization of safety codes and other areas 
of industrial practice, particularly in areas where substantial effort to create standards 
already existed, the AESC established a National Safety Code Committee (chaired by 
Sidney J. Williams of the National Safety Council) as well as a General Correlating 
Committee for Mining Standardization (chaired by E. A. Holbrook from the Department 
of the Interior).34  Agnew maintained personal involvement by serving as Secretary for 
both committees. 
The AESC grew rapidly during its first few years.  This rapid expansion testifies 
to the promotional abilities of AESC members and their allies, whose campaign for 
standards found widespread support throughout American industry.  The adoption of 
dozens of AESC safety codes by state governments, insurance companies, and 
                                                                                                                                            
Five Years—the American Standards Association (2. Development of the ASA),” Industrial 
Standardization (1943): 322.  
33 For a list of the organizations participating in AESC projects, see Annual Report of the American 
Engineering Standards Committee, (New York: American Engineering Standards Committee, 1920), 
11. 
34 For an assessment of mining standardization (including an address by Agnew), see Proceedings 
of the Third National Standardization Conference of the American Mining Congress (Washington, DC: 
American Mining Congress, 1923). 
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manufacturers further indicates the success of the these early efforts.35  By 1921, 
representatives from 179 organizations and companies (or “cooperating bodies”) were 
involved in 79 AESC projects, with another 70 companies providing additional financial 
support.36   
                                                
35 See P. G. Agnew, “The National Safety Code Program,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 123 (1926): 51-54; P. G. Agnew, “Twenty Years of Standardization,” 232-
233; “States Curb Loss of Life by Using American Standard Safety Codes,” Industrial 
Standardization 6 (1935): 266-270; and Leslie Peat, “The Place of Safety Codes in the Industries,” 
Safety Engineering 70 (1935): 173-174. 




Figure 2.2: Number of AESC Standardization Projects, 1919-1924.  




2.3  The AESC and Herbert Hoover’s Associative State  
The growth of the AESC and its establishment as a legitimate forum depended not 
only on its internal changes, but also on its external relationships, especially with the 
United States federal government.  A consideration of these external relationships helps 
to establish the significance of the AESC within the broader context of American 
political and economic history.  To accomplish this, we need look no further than “the 
engineering method personified,” Herbert Hoover.37  In general, historians regard Herbert 
Hoover’s role in American economic history—epitomized by his inadequate response to 
the Great Depression that occurred during his presidential administration—as a “tragic 
failure.”  However, as revisionist accounts from historians such as Ellis Hawley and 
David Hart have shown, this caricature overlooks Hoover’s ideological and 
organizational contributions during his tenure as Secretary of Commerce from 1921 to 
1928.38  
Hawley coined the term “associative state” in 1974 to refer to Hoover’s broad 
cooperative program, but he noted that Hoover and his associates used labels such as 
“progressive democracy” or the “American system” to capture the social and political 
character and distinctiveness of their approach.  Hoover’s “associative vision” was 
                                                
37 “Engineering method personified” is an accolade from Morris L. Cooke, quoted in Layton, The 
Revolt of the Engineers, 179. 
38 See Hawley, “Hoover and the Vision of an ‘Associative State’”; and Ellis W. Hawley, “Three 
Facets of Hooverian Associationalism: Lumber, Aviation, and Movies, 1921-1930,” in Thomas K. 
McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective: Historical Essays (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1981), 
95-123. Hart’s work is particularly attentive to the enduring institutional and ideological 
significance of Hoover’s vision of cooperation between public officials and individuals in private 
industry. See David M. Hart, Forged Consensus: Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the 
United States, 1921-1953 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); and David M. Hart, 
“Herbert Hoover's Last Laugh: The Enduring Significance of the ‘Associative State’” Journal of 
Policy History 10 (1998): 419-44. 
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nothing short of a comprehensive diagnosis of and response to the problems of American 
industrial society.  Hoover advanced a sharp critique of the institutional superstructure of 
the American political economy in the first decades of the twentieth century, casting as 
villains the power-hungry trusts in private industry and inefficient bureaucrats in the 
government.  Not content to fill the role of social critic, Hoover also pointed a way 
forward.  His version of progressivism consisted of a social philosophy centered on a 
plan to harness “American individualism” to increase industrial efficiency, social 
harmony, and American power in the international arena.   
Hoover, like his contemporaries in America and abroad, was deeply moved by the 
unprecedented mobilization of national resources during World War I.  Hoover’s 
personal experience in the reconstruction of post-war Europe established his public image 
as a compassionate and competent administrator, and convinced him of the benefits that 
could flow also from cooperation during peacetime.  Moreover, the experience provided a 
clear indication that if such cooperation were to occur, it would have to draw on 
individuals and firms in the private sector.  The opportunity to put these lessons into 
practice presented itself in the early 1920s, when Hoover and a group of like-minded 
associationalists opportunistically “moved into the policy vacuums opened by Warren 
Harding’s willingness to recruit and defer to the nation’s ‘best minds.’”39 
The new cooperative ethos was articulated clearly and prominently in the 1921 
report Waste in Industry, composed by the Committee on Elimination of Waste in 
Industry that was appointed by Hoover in his capacity of President of the Federated 
                                                
39 Hawley, “Three Facets of Hooverian Associationalism,” in Regulation in Perspective, 99-100. 
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American Engineering Societies.  The preface and Hoover’s own foreword to Waste in 
Industry boasted that the report represented “the combined effort of about eighty 
engineers and their associates”—an exemplar of coordinated and applied expertise, 
“carefully planned and rapidly executed” in only five months.  After identifying the 
sources and causes of waste, the report outlined recommendations for every branch of 
civil society: management, labor, owners, the public, trade associations, and government.  
Standardization in various guises—in factory equipment and production, through trade 
associations, and with the assistance of government—featured prominently in the 
recommendations.  The report also spoke of “the duty of the engineer” to use his skills 
and social standing to overcome economic conflict and eliminate waste in industry.  The 
report used a rhetorical strategy—which became increasingly common in the 1920s—that 
utilized estimates of millions and in some cases billions of dollars that could be saved 
through simplification, standardization, and the elimination of waste.40  Although it did 
not fully accomplish its lofty goals, Waste in Industry was a landmark of engineering 
analysis and organizational prescriptions for American social problems.41   
As the historian of engineering Edwin Layton has explained, Hoover, unlike 
many of his contemporary reform-minded engineers, did not view engineers as the 
vanguard of a new social order.  Instead, Hoover believed that the engineer’s civic 
orientation and skills in planning, organization, and rational thought made him an ideal 
                                                
40 See for example Stuart Chase and F. J. Schlink, “A Few Billions for Consumers,” The New 
Republic (December 20, 1925): 153-155;  and Stuart Chase and F. J. Schlink, “A Few Billions for 
Consumers,” The New Republic (January 6, 1926), 180-182; and Ray M. Hudson, “Organized Effort 
in Simplification,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 137 (1928): 1-8. 
41 Federated American Engineering Societies, Waste in Industry (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1921), 
vi, ix, 33. See also Layton, Revolt of the Engineers, 189-205.  
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candidate for working as a facilitator and prime mover within the associative machinery 
that would both celebrate and enhance his vision of “American individualism.”42 
Historians have sketched in great detail the associative machinery that Hoover 
built in pursuit of this vision during his tenure as Secretary of Commerce.  For example, 
the Bureau of Standards more than doubled in size under his leadership and became the 
home of two new divisions—the Building and Housing Division and Division of 
Simplified Practice—whose purpose was to assist the “sick industries” identified in 
Waste in Industry.  Hoover also made some headway with his vision beyond his own 
Department, and was able to bring the Patent Office and the Bureau of Mines under his 
influence.  He also established associative programs in areas such as power and waterway 
development, aviation, transportation, unemployment planning, child welfare, and 
emergency health services.  In all, Hoover’s efforts reached nearly 400 committees and 
private associations.43 
Cooperative institutions in general, and trade associations in particular, played a 
key role in Hoover’s associative vision.  In the early 1920s, a number of business 
professionals and regulators sought to establish the legitimacy of trade associations by 
drawing distinctions between legal trade association activities and the illegal and 
anticompetitive actions of trusts and cartels.  Two studies published in the early 1920s—
one in 1922 by Federal Trade Commission lawyer Franklin D. Jones and a second in 
1925 by the National Industrial Conference Board (a group created by industry leaders in 
                                                
42 Layton, Revolt of the Engineers, 192. 
43 Hawley, “Hoover and the Vision of an ‘Associative State,’” 121-139. 
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1916)—described the historical, legal, and economic dimensions of trade associations.44  
Both of these books justified cooperation within trade associations by distancing these 
organizations from earlier incarnations of business associations, namely the trusts and 
cartels that had attracted the contempt of the public and the unwelcome scrutiny of 
government lawyers emboldened by the Sherman Act.   
As with the rhetoric of “simplification” and “consensus” advanced by Hoover and 
the AESC (respectively), the importance of language in shaping public perceptions 
emerged as a primary concern for these proponents of trade associations.  The books 
published by Jones and the National Industrial Conference Board both emphasized that 
“cooperation” in trade associations should not be conflated with the trusts, pools, cartels, 
monopolies, and the harmful collusive behavior of the vilified captains of industry.  
Rather than restricting production or fixing prices, the proponents of trade associations 
argued that they engaged in a variety of legal activities, including the dissemination of 
research on cost and accounting methods, the sharing of trade statistics and credit 
information, cooperative advertising, cooperative industrial research, and the 
standardization of products, nomenclature, and practice.  
Advocates of trade associations could draw on a sound legal basis for this 
rhetorical distinction.  Hoover was a key figure in this legal and public relations 
campaign.  A 1922 exchange of letters between Secretary of Commerce Hoover and 
Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty, reprinted as an appendix in Franklin Jones’s book 
                                                
44 Franklin D. Jones, Trade Association Activities and the Law: A Discussion of the Legal and Economic 
Aspects of Collective Action Through Trade Organizations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1922); National 
Industrial Conference Board, Trade Associations, Their Economic Significance and Legal Status (New 
York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1925).  
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Trade Association Activities and the Law, brought some clarity to the legal status of 
business cooperation in trade associations.  The “informal” and “tentative” exchange 
clarified the legality of trade association activities that stopped short of suppressing 
competition or inflating prices, and encouraged the AESC and trade associations to 
“further and extend standardization activities.”45  In its 1924 Annual Report, the AESC 
happily noted the correspondence between Secretary Hoover and Attorney General 
Daugherty and declared, “Fortunately it is everywhere recognized that standardization is 
a legitimate and constructive association activity.”46 
In two cases decided in June 1925, the U. S. Supreme Court validated this shift 
toward a more favorable view of trade associations.47  For the Taft Court, the issue boiled 
down to the need for businesses to collect, share, and analyze information in an 
increasingly complex world.  In earlier eras, this accumulation of knowledge of prices, 
production, and stock was lumped together with price-fixing and, once the Department of 
Justice began to enforce the Sherman Act of 1890, considered to be in violation of 
antitrust laws.  With the Supreme Court rulings of June 1925, standardization and other 
exchanges of statistics and economic data found new, legally stable, footing.48 
                                                
45 AESC Year Book (1923), 6. 
46 AESC Year Book (1924), 18. 
47 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. 
v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925). 
48 See William H. Becker, “American Wholesale Hardware Trade Associations, 1870-1900,” The 
Business History Review 45 (1971): 179-200; Louis Galambos, Cooperation and Competition: The 
Emergence of a National Trade Association (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 80-101; 
William J. Barber, From New Era to New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Economists, and American Economic 
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In drafting his opinions for the 6-3 majorities in both cases, Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone asked his friend Herbert Hoover for help in examining the role that trade 
associations played in promoting economic stability.49  Hoover must have been delighted 
to oblige and further establish his central role in the increasingly favorable view of 
business in the New Era.  Stone’s opinion in the Maple Flooring case denied that the 
exchange of information by itself constituted a price-fixing arrangement: “Competition 
does not become less free merely because the conduct of commercial operations becomes 
more intelligent through the free distribution of knowledge of all the essential factors 
entering into the commercial transaction.”50  As one contemporary assessment concluded, 
“Intelligence, the Supreme Court declared, is not necessarily a crime.”51 
Thus by 1925, we can see a harmonization between the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of antitrust law on the one hand, and, on the other, Hoover’s vision of the 
importance of private sector cooperation in the reduction of industrial waste.  The 
combined effect of Hoover’s policy entrepreneurship and the Court’s newly relaxed 
attitude settled the legal status of cooperation, provided the trade associations with a 
defense from allegations of anti-competitive conduct, and helped them to frame their 
actions in the cooperative ideology of industrial simplification, economic efficiency, and 
social stability.  The only remaining legal questions surrounding trade associations 
concerned the fixing of prices.  Since technical standardization in the AESC never 
                                                
49 Carrott, “The Supreme Court and Trade Associations, 1921-1925,” 335. 
50 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 583. 
51 Gilbert H. Montague, “New Opportunities and Responsibilities of Trade Associations as a 
Result of Recent United States Supreme Court Decisions,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political 
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broached the dangerous topic of prices, the process of setting standards remained safe 
from antitrust prosecution.52  Agnew commented on this happy aspect of his 
organization’s history in 1951: “In the 32 years in which ASA has been in existence, no 
question or suspicion of violation of anti-trust laws has been raised in connection with 
ASA operations, conferences, or committees.”53  
Despite the clear conceptual links between Hoover’s engineering vision in the 
early 1920s and the consensus-building activities of engineers in the AESC at the same 
time, the extensive historical literature on Hoover and his associative initiatives 
completely neglects the AESC.  This omission is surprising: not only did the AESC 
embody and advance Hoover’s associative vision in a very clear way; Hoover also took a 
personal interest in the AESC, and maintained correspondence and personal relationships 
with AESC Chairmen and its Secretary Agnew.  Secretary Hoover’s personal 
involvement with the AESC illustrates his favorable view of the group’s standardization 
work.  Although Hoover did not appear to take a special interest in standardization when 
he was president of the American Institute of Mining Engineers in 1920 (when it was a 
founding member of the AESC), he was an important ally in the AESC’s efforts to 
rationalize and coordinate industrial standardization. 
                                                
52 Trade associations became the object of controversy once again during the National Recovery 
Administration; but collaborative standardization remained uncontroversial and has only 
rarely—and indirectly—been the focus of antitrust scrutiny. See Simon N. Whitney, Trade 
Associations and Industrial Control: A Critique of the N. R. A. (New York: Central Book Company, 
1934), 32-60; American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1935 
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53 P. G. Agnew, “Policy Questions Concerning the Proposed Congressional Charter for the 
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The early stages of Hoover’s relationship with the AESC indicates his clear sense 
for how the AESC would fit into his program of waste reduction through simplification 
and standardization.  In March 1921, Agnew met with Hoover to discuss the possibility 
for government support of the AESC in an official yet “quasi-governmental” relationship 
with the Department of Commerce, to be administered through the Bureau of Standards. 
Following the meeting, Agnew optimistically drafted a Congressional joint resolution for 
Hoover’s consideration.  Through the draft resolution, Agnew hoped Congress would 
formally authorize representatives from government departments to participate in AESC 
committees, authorize appropriations from the Treasury Department to the AESC to 
support its standardization work, and mandate the use of AESC specifications as “the 
basis for Government purchases of materials, apparatus, and supplies,” so long as such 
actions would not create disadvantages for the government.54  It was a bold fundraising 
pitch and attempt at policy entrepreneurship on Agnew’s part, but did not succeed as he 
had hoped.  In his response, Hoover expressed appreciation for the sentiment behind this 
proposal and acknowledged the importance of the AESC’s work.  However, Hoover 
stated his characteristic preference to channel voluntary cooperation through a particular 
department—his department—instead of pursuing such a broad Congressional mandate.55   
Acting on this ideological preference, Hoover discussed the AESC’s role in 
subsequent months with the AESC Chairman, A.A. Stevenson.  Records from AESC 
                                                
54 P. G. Agnew to Herbert Hoover, March 31, 1921, Hoover Commerce Papers, AESC 1921 Folder, 
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meetings in 1922 document increasing levels of cooperation, starting with a meeting in 
Washington in early 1922 between AESC Chairman Stevenson, Chairman-elect Albert 
Whitney, Secretary Hoover, Bureau of Standards Director Samuel Stratton, and Chief of 
the Division of Simplified Practice A.W. Durgin.  At the March 9, 1922 meeting of the 
AESC main committee, the AESC approved measures to appoint formal liaisons between 
the Division of Simplified Practice and the AESC in order to coordinate their efforts “as 
specific cases arise.”  Stevenson was appointed as the AESC’s representative for work 
with the Department of Commerce.  In turn, Durgin would work “as Mr. Hoover’s 
representative” at the New York AESC offices as the Liaison Officer for the Bureau of 
Standards and Federal Specifications Board, an organization that was responsible for 
setting inter-agency specifications within the government.56 
Secretary Hoover personally addressed his kindred spirits and admiring 
colleagues at the AESC main committee meeting of June 15, 1922.  Hoover noted that 
the government “can lend a certain prestige” to help overcome the hesitancy of some 
manufacturers and trade associations in joining the work of collaborative standardization.  
He also urged the AESC to continue to move the engineering profession to reduce 
industrial waste through standardization and simplification, which were in his mind 
essential aspects to protect “the standards of living and wages in this country” from 
sliding back to pre-war levels.  Following his brief address, he and the forty-odd 
engineers at the meeting discussed some responses to a survey that, at Hoover’s request, 
had been sent to hundreds of organizations and companies to solicit ideas and targets for 
                                                




simplification and standardization—an example of the bottom-up style of work 
encouraged by the AESC.57   
We can discern two important threads—one rhetorical, one practical—within the 
alliance between the AESC and Hoover’s Department of Commerce as it developed 
throughout the 1920s.  Hoover and the AESC shared compatible visions of the respective 
roles of engineers, private industrial firms, and government agencies.  They also assumed 
that they, as engineers, were key players in a movement to increase industrial efficiency 
as a way of protecting their ideal of the American way of life.  The legitimacy of this 
movement stemmed from its combination of grass-roots voluntarism with a sophisticated 
institution that could coordinate a wide range of private initiatives, manage disputes 
within their ranks, and provide the leadership necessary to convert this voluntarism into 
effective public policy.58 
By the mid-1920s, AESC engineers, led by their Secretary Paul Agnew, promoted 
their organization in academic conferences and in the trade and popular press as a 
successful instance of industry self-governance and voluntary cooperation.59  These 
publications demonstrate the ease with which AESC partisans could appropriate and 
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mobilize associationalist rhetoric to justify their organization’s work.  The AESC also 
used its annual reports (called Year Books) to publicize government involvement.  Each 
Year Book contained a section on “Government Cooperation” that detailed projects and 
committees sponsored or co-sponsored by government departments and celebrated 
examples of AESC standards in use by various government departments.60   
This rhetoric of cooperation also had a substantive basis in the work of the AESC.  
By 1922, the AESC main committee contained representatives from Departments of War, 
Navy, Agriculture, Interior, and Labor, while representatives from numerous other 
departments (including the Post Office and Department of the Treasury) participated in 
AESC projects.  By 1926, the AESC reported that “one or more arms of the government 
are cooperating in nearly all projects.”  Significantly, however, Congress refused to 
authorize government departments to pay the customary $500 membership fee—an 
indication of Congress’s continued reluctance to dedicate federal funds in support of 
industrial standardization.61 
The most important—and contested—area of interaction between the AESC and 
the federal government was with the Bureau of Standards.  On the surface, the respective 
missions of the AESC and Bureau of Standards appeared to be complementary: where the 
Bureau of Standards was concerned primarily with scientific research for fundamental 
standards and units for weights and measurement, the AESC worked to establish 
                                                
60 See for example Work of the AESC (1921), 7-8, 32; and AESC Year Book (1923), 2.   
61 In 1924-25, representatives from the Bureau of Standards were involved in 67 of the AESC’s 212 
projects in progress; only the ASTM was involved in a comparable portion of the AESC’s work. 
AESC Year Book (1925), 54; AESC Year Book (1926), 5-6. In its Year Books, the AESC consistently 
noted Congress’s refusal to release membership fees for government participation. See for 
example AESC Year Book (1924), 17; and Annual Report of the AESC (1920), 6. 
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agreement around consistent standards for applications in industrial production.  The co-
existence of the two groups was facilitated by personal relationships in the shape of the 
formal liaisons and informal meetings and correspondence described above.  To a great 
extent, both organizations benefited from mutual cooperation.  The AESC provided an 
avenue for the Bureau to extend its influence beyond its modest size, and in return the 
AESC benefited from the technical expertise and political legitimacy carried under the 
banner of the Bureau and the Department of Commerce.62 
These complementary missions were sustained by a rhetoric of cooperation, such 
as in Agnew’s publications and in the AESC and ASA Year Books that emphasized 
productive and positive aspects of the relationship.  The public rhetoric of cooperation, 
however, cleverly obscured the persistent tensions and jurisdictional conflicts at the 
boundaries of the AESC and the Bureau of Standards in the 1920s and beyond.  “The two 
organizations engaged in a sometimes awkward but almost always outwardly civil dance 
of ostensible mutual support,” summarized sociologist Marc Olshan.  “But it was a dance 
in which the AESC increasingly took the lead.”63 
The establishment of the industrial safety code program within the AESC in the 
early 1920s illustrates how the AESC constructed itself as a more competent and—
ironically—more legitimate authority in industrial standardization than the Bureau of 
Standards.  Industrial safety codes were, at heart, an organizational and political problem.  
Like the situation with pipe fittings and ratings for electrical machinery in the early 
                                                
62 For a broader account of the Bureau of Standards in the 1920s, see Cochrane, Measures for 
Progress, 220-298. 
63 Marc A. Olshan, “Standards-Making Organizations and the Rationalization of American Life,” 
The Sociological Quarterly 34 (1993): 319-335. 
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1900s, a variety of organizations—including state commissions, safety groups such as 
Underwriters’ Laboratories, the National Safety Council, the American Mining Congress, 
and federal authorities such as the Bureau of Standards—issued a variety conflicting and 
overlapping codes.  The safety rules published by the Bureau of Standards in 1914 and 
1915 were particularly irritating for industry executives, who resisted what they 
perceived as an unwarranted encroachment of federal regulators.  Given this lack of 
support, and the lack of resources to enforce its safety codes, the Bureau of Standards 
realized by late 1919 that it had lost the jurisdictional struggle.  The AESC was in a better 
position to gain the support of industry and, together with representatives from 
government, develop a set of consensual (rather than adversarial) safety codes.64 
The victory of the AESC was a tacit acknowledgment of the AESC as a more 
suitable institutional mechanism for achieving public policy goals.  Rather than struggle 
within the existing discourse of progressive regulation, where regulators sough to protect 
the public from the evils of industry through adversarial rules, the AESC safety code 
program is one indication of a broader shift toward an associative style of political 
economy.  This new style featured an idealized method of rulemaking that followed from 
the participation and consent of all interested parties, including those that would be 
subject to regulations.  Agnew’s 1926 summary of the safety codes program captures this 
shift toward inclusivity: “Thus, the work of drawing up national safety codes is in the 
hands, jointly, of those who are responsible for the administrative and legal aspects of the 
problems involved, of those who have to face the technical, industrial and financial sides 
                                                
64 Cochrane, Measures for Progress, 121-2; M. G. Lloyd, “The Safety Code Work of the Bureau of 
Standards,” Industrial Standardization (1933): 203-206. 
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of the problems, and of those who have to face the hazards to life and limb.”65  This 
cooperative style provided industry executives with the opportunity to dilute regulations 
that might otherwise have been difficult or costly to implement, but this was a palatable 
compromise for federal policymakers in business-friendly context of the 1920s.   
Organized labor had a limited role in this process, even if the AESC was slightly 
more accommodating to labor than the typical industrial capitalist of the 1920s.  Labor 
representatives did take part in the development of many safety codes, as evidenced by 
the participation of John P. Frey (who was vice president of the American Federation of 
Labor) on the Committee on the Foundry Code—despite the objection of the committee 
chair, W. H. Barr.  By 1921, the objections of several executives to labor participation led 
the AESC Chairman A. A. Stevenson to craft a solution: union representatives would 
serve on safety code committees, not as representatives of a particular union but instead 
under the flag of the U. S. Department of Labor.  According to Agnew, this compromise 
was tenable enough to allow the committee to proceed with its work while avoiding the 
greater underlying tensions between capital and labor.  With this procedural compromise, 
Agnew recalled in 1949, “the union had the substance of representation but not the form.”  
The Department of Labor joined the AESC as a Member Body the next year (in 1922), 
and the informal arrangement to allow labor participation remained intact until the late 
1930s, when the ASA changed its rules to allow direct representation of labor interests in 
all sectional committees.66  On the whole, the AESC’s concern with labor was limited to 
                                                
65 Agnew, “The Safety Code Program,” 52.  
66 P. G. Agnew, “Labor Representation and Membership in ASA,” XX 766, April 20, 1949, 
Historical and Policy Papers, 483-485. 
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a paternalistic concern with worker safety, and the safety code committees reveal the 
extent to which business interests dominated standardization in the AESC.67  The social 
consequences of technical standardization for workers on site and on the factory floor 
seem to have been far beyond the concern of the elite engineers and executives in the 
AESC.68  
 
2.4  The AESC: Structure, Process, and Ideology  
The AESC, encouraged by the support of Hoover and the rulings of the Supreme 
Court, pursued a course of organizational expansion that brought trade associations into 
the group of engineering societies and government departments.  Expansion meant a 
diffusion of power, which the AESC chose to organize along technological and 
professional lines.  Amidst this diffusion of power, the affiliations of the men elected to 
lead the AESC may be taken as an indication of the group’s nexus of power and prestige.  
Of the four AESC Chairmen elected in its first ten years, two were representatives from 
the AIEE (Comfort Adams in 1918-1919 and Charles Skinner in 1925-1927), one was 
from the ASTM (A.A. Stevenson in 1920-1922), and the other was from the National 
                                                
67 In this sense, the AESC is a good example of Gabriel Kolko’s conception of “political 
capitalism,” which he defined as “the utilization of political outlets to attain conditions of 
stability, predictability, and security—to attain rationalization—in the economy.” Gabriel Kolko, 
The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books [1967], 1963), 3. 
68 For closer analyses of some of the implications of standardization for labor, see Amy Slaton, 
Reinforced Concrete and the Modernization of American Building, 1900-1930 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2001); Gregory J. Downey, Telegraph Messenger Boys: Labor, Technology, 
and Geography, 1850-1950 (New York: Routledge, 2002); and Amy Slaton and Janet Abbate, “The 
Hidden Lives of Standards: Technical Prescriptions and the Transformation of Work in America,” 
in Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht, eds., Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas 
Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 95-144. 
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Safety Council (Albert Whitney in 1922-1924).  Beneath the political and symbolic 
power of chairmanship, however, the nitty-gritty work required to agree on standards 
occurred within specialized committees.  A brief description of the organization’s 
structure and process helps illustrate how power was distributed and exercised across the 
various units—the member bodies, main committee, sectional committees, and 
sponsors—of the organization.  A closer look at the AESC also shows how its underlying 




Figure 2.3: Structure of the AESC.  




The original AESC member bodies were the five founding societies and, after the 
first meeting, the Departments of War, Navy, and Commerce.  As noted above, 
membership grew from these original eight organizations to twenty-four in 1927.69  
Member bodies designated up to three representatives to serve on the main committee, 
which identified itself as “solely an administrative and policy-forming body, [which] 
does not concern itself with technical details.”70  
The actual work of creating standards began with a request from an organization 
or coalition of organizations (known as a sponsors) upon which the main committee 
would seek to ensure that all interested parties were aware of and invited to participate in 
the initiative.71  Sponsorship entailed administrative duties, but, in this context, did not 
carry the financial obligations that we, in more recent times, have come to associate with 
the word sponsorship.  Sponsors did not necessarily have to be one of the AESC member 
bodies—for example, the American Society of Refrigerating Engineers sponsored the 
safety code committee for Mechanical Refrigeration, but was not a member of the AESC.  
                                                
69 These additional sixteen member bodies were: the American Electric Railway Association; the 
American Institute of Architects; the American Mining Congress; the American Railway 
Association—Engineering Division; the Association of Steel Manufacturers; the Electric Light and 
Power Group (consisting of the Association of Edison Illuminating Companies and the National 
Electric Light Association); the Fire Protection Group (consisting of the Associated Factory 
Mutual Fire Insurance Companies, the National Board of Fire Underwriters, the National Fire 
Protection Association, and Underwriters’ Laboratories); the Gas Group (consisting of the 
American Gas Association, the Compressed Gas Manufacturers’ Association, and International 
Acetylene Association); the National Electrical Manufacturers’ Association; the Panama Canal; 
the Safety Group (consisting of the National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters and the 
National Safety Council); the Society of Automotive Engineers; the Telephone Group (consisting 
of the Bell Telephone System and the United States Independent Telephone Association); the U. 
S. Department of Agriculture; the U. S. Department of the Interior; and the U. S. Department of 
Labor. 
70 Annual Report of the American Engineering Standards Committee (1920), 5. A member body paid 
$500 for each representative it placed on the main committee. 
71 See “Rules of Procedure (Revised October, 1920),” Annual Report of the American Engineering 
Standards Committee (1920), 7-8. 
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The sponsor led the development of the standard within one of the AESC sectional 
committees, which were organized along industry lines.72 
This delegation of technical work achieved two goals.  First, it reduced complex 
discussions to manageable proportions and prevented the main committee of the AESC 
from becoming embroiled in technical disputes where they lacked experience.  Second, it 
assigned technical discussions to qualified experts, and ensured that groups participated 
only in projects where they had a direct interest.  Agnew used a political metaphor to 
describe this aspect of the process: “Each of these sectional committees… is essentially a 
miniature industrial legislature organized upon a subject basis instead of upon a 
geographical basis.”73 
This federation of “industrial legislatures” was an organizational strategy as well 
as a manifestation of an associative political philosophy.  In a 1926 article published in 
The New Republic entitled “A Step Toward Industrial Self-Government,” Agnew argued 
that this method of standardization had “all the directness and vitality of elementary local 






                                                
72 In 1921, the sectional committees were organized into the following groups: A. Civil 
Engineering and Construction; B. Mechanical Engineering; C. Electrical Engineering; D. 
Automotive; E. Transportation; G. Ferrous Metals and Metallurgy; H. Non- Ferrous Metals and 
Metallurgy; K. Chemical Industry; L. Textile Industry; M. Mining; O. Wood Industry; P. Pulp and 
Paper Industry; X and Z. Miscellaneous (safety, symbols, general purpose combustion or testing, 
terminology, film).  
73 P. G. Agnew, “Work of the American Engineering Standards Committee,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 137 (1928): 13-16. 
 
 109 
We do not leave to Congress, or to the vote of 110,000,000 people, the 
decision whether a bridge shall be built in the city of Oshkosh. We leave it 
to the people of Oshkosh, who will walk over it and ride over it, and who 
will have to pay for it. Why should not the very limited groups directly 
interested in each of the innumerable industrial problems with which they 
are faced, themselves solve these problems through coöperative effort?74 
 
The AESC put this principle of self-government to work through its sectional 
committees.  Sectional committees were responsible for the detailed, technical work that 
went into the formulating of a particular standard.  The makeup of particular sectional 
committees was at times controversial, since the main committee of the AESC reserved 
the right to approve the personnel of any given committee.  In order to ensure that a 
sectional committee was “authoritative and adequately representative,” the main 
committee required committees dealing with commercial standards to maintain a balance 
of “producers, consumers, and general interests.”  No one of these groups could form a 
majority on a sectional committee without the consent of the other two groups.  Safety 
code committees required an even broader distribution of representatives, including 
manufacturers, employers, employees, governmental bodies, technical specialists (such as 
unaffiliated or academic experts), and insurance representatives.75  This requirement 
would be lifted—in the name of greater flexibility and autonomy of sponsors and 
member-bodies—when the AESC was reconstituted as the ASA in 1928. 
During the work of the sectional committee, a proposed standard was referred to 
as a “Recommended Practice” or “Tentative Standard.”  When a sectional committee 
                                                
74 P. G. Agnew, “A Step Toward Industrial Self-Government,” The New Republic (March 17, 1926), 
95. 
75 “Rules of Procedure, Revised June 15, 1922,” American Engineering Standards Committee Year 
Book (New York: American Engineering Standards Committee, 1923).  
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finished its work, it would submit the proposed standard to the AESC main committee.  
The main committee’s role was judicial, not technical.  The main committee did not 
examine the technical content of the proposed standard.  Instead, it only checked to see if 
the sectional committee followed a fair and representative process that addressed the 
concerns of all interested parties—in short, to verify the legitimacy of the “industrial 
legislature.”  This separation of function was summarized in the “Method of Work” 
section of the 1920 Annual Report:  
Each industry, or branch of industry, is wholly autonomous in its 
standardization work, the function of the Main Committee being merely to 
assure that each body or group concerned in a standard shall have 
opportunity to participate in its formulation.76 
 
Once a sectional committee reached consensus around a Tentative Standard, it 
submitted it to the main committee for a vote.  If 90% of the votes were in favor, the 
specification would be published by the AESC as an “American Standard.”77  This 
division of technical and judicial labor was reinforced when the AESC Constitution and 
Procedure were redrafted in 1928.  The revised Procedure began with these words: 
 
101. A national standard implies a consensus of those substantially 
concerned with its scope and provisions. A chief function of the American 
                                                
76 Annual Report of the American Engineering Standards Committee, 1920 (New York: American 
Engineering Standards Committee, 1920), 5-6. 
77 In 1919, Comfort Adams summarized the entire process with admirable brevity: “Standard 
assigned by main committee to sponsor body. Sponsor body appoints a thoroughly 
representative sectional committee, subject to approval of main committee. Sectional committee 
prepares standard and submits to sponsor body which then submits the standard with its 
approval to the main committee. The standard is then published by the sponsor body and labeled 
‘American Standard.’” Adams, “Industrial Standardization,” 298. In its “Rules of Procedure,” the 
AESC “requested that cooperating bodies do not use the term ‘American Standard’ in their 
publications except in connection with a standard that has received approval of the Main 
Committee as such.”  Work of the American Engineering Standards Committee (Year Book ), (New 
York: American Engineering Standards Committee, 1921), 17.  
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Engineering Standards Committee is the judicial one of determining 
whether a national consensus has been reached.78 
 
A qualitative political judgment—“the consensus of those substantially 
concerned”—thus became enshrined as the leading principle of the AESC.  To become an 
“American Standard,” a technical specification would first have to pass through this 
political process and judicial test.  By creating separate spheres for the “technical” and 
the “judicial,” the AESC tenuously charted a course that preserved the authority of 
members while simultaneously setting conditions that would ensure that the expert 
consensus would not be dominated by one powerful actor.  This division of “technical” 
and “judicial” tasks was an important step in addressing the reservations of member 
societies, such as the ASTM, that were eager to preserve their own authority to set 
standards.   
The AESC leaders also recognized that it needed to remain flexible in its methods 
and especially in the periodic revision of established standards.  From the beginning, the 
AESC Constitution included provisions for the revision of American Standards.  In the 
1919 version of the Constitution, such revisions were not permitted until three years after 
the completion of the original standard.  By 1922, however, the three-year requirement 
was dropped in favor of a clause that allowed revisions to standards on a case-by-case 
basis, “at such intervals as shall be agreed upon by the Main Committee and the Sponsor 
                                                
78 “Procedure (Revised to March 8, 1928),” American Engineering Standards Committee Year Book  
(New York: American Engineering Standards Committee, 1928), 68. 
 
 112 
or joint Sponsors.”79  Agnew later compared this flexibility in the AESC procedures 
favorably to the “rigidity of legislative enactment.”  One of his dearest convictions was a 
philosophical and social assumption that was at the heart of the AESC enterprise: 
technical experts, once confronted with clear and objective evidence, could move quickly 
to make the right technical decisions, unencumbered by the bureaucratic weight of 
government regulation or the legislative process.  He had no doubt that technical experts 
working in a collaborative process would not allow standardization to detract from the 
progress of technology.  “The danger of stagnation lies,” he concluded, “not in the use of 
standards, but in taking a fixed mental attitude, instead of keeping the mind receptive to 
new ideas.”80  
From the preliminary discussion that began in the early 1910s through the first 
decade of the AESC’s existence, its most significant controversies grew out of conflicting 
visions over the strength of the AESC vis-à-vis its member societies.  Agnew later 
referred to this tension as the “states’ righters versus federalists” controversy.  Adams, 
Agnew, and other AESC leaders advocated a strong central body with the power to 
resolve conflicts between members.  Some representatives—particularly those from the 
ASTM—protested that the AESC should be a weak central body, thus preserving the 
authority of the member bodies and their standards committees.  This tension was at the 
heart of persistent struggles within the AESC process, and became the key point of 
                                                
79 “Constitution of the American Engineering Standards Committee (Revised August 16, 1919),” 
Annual Report of the AESC (1920); “Rules of Procedure (Revised February 14, 1922),” Work of the 
AESC (Year Book) (1921). 
80 Howard Coonley and P. G. Agnew, The Role of Standards in the System of Free Enterprise: a study 
of voluntary standards as alternative to Legislative and Commission control. Prepared by Request of the 
Temporary National Economic Committee (New York: American Standards Association, 1941).    
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contention as the AESC underwent significant reforms and reconstituted itself as the 
American Standards Association in 1928.81  
  
2.4.1  The AESC Becomes the American Standards Association, 1928-1929 
The momentous changes of 1928 were driven by three factors: the increased 
interest in standardization from industry executives, the rapid growth of standardization 
in trade associations, and the need to maintain flexible procedures in order to sustain the 
strength of the AESC in the face of organizational competitors.  The AESC had already 
taken a step to bring more executives into the fold when, at the request of a 1925 
Conference of Industrial Executives, the AESC formed an Advisory Committee of 
Industrial Executives.82  Executives assumed an even greater role in 1928, during a 
fundamental reorganization of the management of the AESC that culminated in the 
reconstitution of the AESC as the American Standards Association (ASA).83  As part of 
                                                
81 See Agnew, “Twenty Years of Standardization,” 230-232; Adams, “How the AESC Was 
Organized,” 237-8; and AESC Year Books between 1920 and 1928. Resistance from the “states’ 
righters” (led by ASTM representatives) continued at least into the late 1940s, as evidenced by a 
testy exchange of letters in 1947 over procedural matters between Agnew and his longtime 
colleague C.L. Warwick, Executive Secretary of the ASTM. P.G. Agnew, “Letter to ASTM, 
9/10/47 – ASA Policy in the Initiation of Projects (BD 244),” in Paul Gough Agnew, Historical and 
Policy Papers (American Standards Association, Inc., 1920-1952), 564-573.  
82 This committee was composed of five executives, including a vice-president of New York 
Edison and the presidents of U.S. Steel, Consolidated Gas Company of New York, The Delaware 
& Hudson Company, and General Electric. American Engineering Standards Committee Year Book 
(New York: American Engineering Standards Committee, 1926), 4. 
83 In July 1928, the AESC main committee voted unanimously to support the proposed reforms. 
The proposal was then submitted to the thirty-seven Member Bodies, whose unanimous 
approval was announced in November 1928. “Scientific Events: The American Standards 
Association,” Science, New Series, Vol. 68, No. 1751 (July 20, 1928), 53; and “The American 
Standards Association,” Science, New Series, Vol. 68, No. 1768 (November 16, 1928), 473-474. 
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this reorganization, the AESC main committee was dissolved, with its functions divided 
into two new groups: a Board of Directors and the Standards Council.   
This change was richly rewarded.  The Board of Directors consisted of twelve 
executives who were selected by AESC member bodies to assume the administrative and 
financial responsibilities of the AESC main committee.  The creation of the Board of 
Directors reflected a rising awareness of managers and executives of the importance of 
standardization, including “purchasing, production, accounting, inspection, service, sales, 
and in every other department of manufacturing organizations.”84 The ASA announced in 
1929 the creation of an Underwriters’ Fund to support the expanded scope of the 
organization.  A finance committee, led by AT&T vice president Bancroft Gherardi and 
Bethlehem Steel vice president Quincy Bent, was appointed to solicit contributions from 
industrial firms.  They found immediate success: in 1929 alone, this fund was responsible 
for adding $74,000 to the ASA’s annual income of $54,000, and in 1930 announced that 
they had obtained the means to increase their budget by $500,000 over the next three 
years.85 
The remaining procedural duties of the AESC main committee were assumed by 
the newly created Standards Council that, like the main committee it replaced, consisted 
                                                
84 American Standards Year Book (New York: American Standards Association, 1929), 7. 
85 “Unity of Standards Sought by Industry,” The New York Times (July 10, 1929), 50; “Plan to 
Enlarge Standards Work,” The New York Times (January 5, 1930), N21; William J. Serrill, 
“President’s Report,” American Standards Year Book (New York: American Standards Association, 
1930), 9-10.  Serrill noted the contributions of the following companies in 1929, which funded the 
addition of several engineers to the ASA staff to support safety code work, electrical 
standardization, and mechanical standardization: Aluminum Company of America, American 
Telephone and Telegraph, Bethlehem Steel, Consolidated Gas, Detroit Edison, Ford Motor 
Company, General Electric, General Motors, Gulf Oil, Public Service Corporation of New Jersey, 
Standard Oil Corporation of New Jersey, U.S. Steel, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing 
Company, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company. 
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of up to three representatives from each member body.86  The new ASA Constitution 
enumerated the jurisdiction of the Standards Council: 
The functions of the Council shall be to formulate rules for the 
development of standards and for the constitution of committees; to 
approve, on behalf of the Association, such standards as it may find to be 
supported by a consensus, affirmatively expressed, of those substantially 
concerned with the standard; but not to formulate standards.87 
 
With its functions divided between the new Board of Directors and Standards Council, 
the AESC Main Committee was dissolved.  
                                                
86 “Standards Group to Broaden Scope,” The New York Times (July 8, 1928), 40; “Scientific Events: 
The American Standards Association,” Science, New Series, Vol. 68, No. 1751 (July 20, 1928), 53-
54. 




Figure 2.4: Structure of the ASA.  




The 1928 reorganization also reflected recognition of the prominence of trade 
associations within the AESC and in industrial standardization more generally: of the 350 
organizations participating in AESC activities in 1928, almost 300 were trade 
associations.88  This shift in the composition of the AESC from technical and engineering 
societies toward trade associations indicates that standardization was not only an 
important technical concern; it was also widely recognized as a vital activity for running 
a successful business.  One symbol of this shift came with the election of William J. 
Serrill, a representative of the Gas Group (a coalition of trade associations), as AESC 
Chairman in 1928.  After the change from AESC to ASA, Serrill became ASA President 
and Standards Council Chairman until 1930.   
The most visible symbol of the shifting membership of the organization was the 
group’s new name, adopted in 1928: the American Standards Association (ASA).  By 
removing “engineering” from the title of the organization, the ASA indicated a major step 
in its evolution, moving away from a committee to harmonize engineering standards 
toward a broader and more inclusive association of all industrial standardization in the 
United States.  The 1929 American Standards Year Book noted that a good example of 
this change was the initiation of committees to set standards in areas such as household 
goods, although it hastened to add that the ASA “limits itself strictly to those fields in 
which engineering methods apply, not concerning itself in any way with questions of 
style or personal taste.”89  This and other forays into consumer standards made standards 
engineers a target for satire, as Herbert Hoover later recalled: “At that time [the 1920s], 
                                                
88 “Standards Group to Broaden Scope,” The New York Times (July 8, 1928), 40. 
89 American Standards Year Book (1929), 7. 
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the humorists sought to drown us in laughter over possible standardized women’s hats. 
But in time we managed to sustain the conviction that we were wholly allergic to matters 
of style, for those vagaries were offspring of joy, not of engineering.”90  
Procedures for the development of American Standards also changed markedly in 
1928, further reflecting the organization’s flexibility and willingness to accommodate the 
needs of its member organizations.  In 1928, the reconstituted ASA outlined four distinct 
methods that could be used to create American Standards: the Sectional Committee 
Method, Existing Standards Method, Proprietary Standards Method, and General 
Acceptance Method.  Of these four, only the Sectional Committee Method was in use 
before 1928 in the AESC.  The only change to this method under the ASA rules provided 
greater freedom for the sectional committee, which could choose either to retain its 
affiliation with a sponsor body or, instead, report directly to the Standards Council.  
                                                
90 Herbert Hoover, “The Crusade for Standards,” in Dickson Reck, ed., National Standards in a 
Modern Economy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 3. Hoover continued, “we even helped 





Figure 2.5: ASA Sectional Committee Method After 1929.  





Figure 2.6: ASA Existing Standards Method After 1929.  




The adoption of the Existing Standards Method was the most evident outcome of 
the power struggle between the AESC and its member bodies.  The ASA would approve 
standards through the Existing Standards Method if the submitting body could 
demonstrate it had obtained an industry consensus on its own.  Although not advertised 
as such, the adoption of the Existing Standards Method was an acknowledgment of the 
need to recognize the autonomy of powerful member societies, namely the ASTM, which 
had consistently opposed the construction of the AESC as a strong central body.  By the 
late 1920s, the ASTM sponsored somewhere between one-third to one-half of the 
standards under development in the AESC, making it the most productive constituent in 
the AESC federation.  The Existing Standards Method enabled the blessing of ASTM (or 
other standard-setting bodies deemed to be sufficiently representative) standards as 
American Standards, while avoiding the costs (and redundancies) of convening a 
sectional committee to gauge consensus.  In other words, it was a political solution to a 
jurisdictional dispute, justified in the rational language of administrative efficiency.  
The remaining two, less controversial, new methods were introduced to create 
other options for a more flexible and streamlined process.  Standards developed through 
the Proprietary Method would be approved if its sponsor could demonstrate the support 
of “a consensus of those substantially concerned with its development and use.”  The 
General Acceptance Method for standards provided a venue for “simple projects” 
developed in the industry or academic conferences that became commonplace in the 
1920s, or other non-exclusionary or ad hoc fora that did not merit the effort or cost 
required to organize a sectional committee.  The new ASA rules also permitted greater 
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flexibility in the revision of existing American Standards.  Finally, the new ASA 
Procedure stated that the Standards Council was responsible for gauging the consensus 
obtained by a standard developed through each of the new methods of standardization.  
Any controversies over judicial decisions taken by the Standards Council could be 
appealed on a case-by-case basis, where each appeal would be presented by the ASA 
Secretary, Paul Agnew.91  
 
 
Figure 2.7: ASA Organization Chart, 1946. This representation of the ASA, taken from 
a 1946 promotional brochure, is essentially unchanged from 1929.  




                                                
91 American Standards Year Book (1929), 8, 83-87.  
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When the reorganized American Standards Association was announced in 1928, 
Science reported accurately that the changes were approved by unanimous votes, first of 
the AESC main committee and then of all thirty-seven member bodies.92  Although this 
spectacle of unanimity was vital for advancing the cooperative goals of the group, it also 
reveals the extent to which the leaders of industrial standardization kept their dirty 
laundry out of the public view.  Records from AESC and ASA meetings and some frank 
historical recollections from Agnew and other ASA officials indicate that the ASA’s 
harmonious public self-representation intentionally obscured heated internal disputes.  In 
1938, Agnew recalled how J.A. Capp, longtime ASTM representative and head of the 
AESC Rules Committee from 1921-1925, declared at one point that the name “American 
Standards Association” would be “adopted only over his dead body.”  Capp later relented 
and in fact seconded the motion for adoption of the reorganization plan—which passed 
with the unanimous vote that was duly noted in Science, The New York Times, and the 
1929 American Standards Year Book.93 
The new Constitution and Procedure were not the result of effortless and 
harmonious consensus.  Instead, they represented structural and procedural compromises 
that were forged to keep intact the power and prestige of member societies while at the 
same time establishing the legitimacy of the ASA.  Confident in the flexibility and 
                                                
92 “Scientific Events: The American Standards Association,” Science, New Series, Vol. 68, No. 1751 
(July 20, 1928), 53; and “The American Standards Association,” Science, New Series, Vol. 68, No. 
1768 (November 16, 1928), 473-474. 
93 Agnew, “Twenty Years of Standardization,” 232. These sorts of public acknowledgments of 
controversy are unusual in professional engineering societies. As Edwin Layton noted in his 
history of the American engineering profession, “It is considered bad form to publicize the inner 
workings of engineering societies.” Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social 
Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve 
University, 1971), 15. 
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durability of the ASA federation, and ever reliant upon political metaphors to explain the 
significance of his cherished institution, Agnew drew a comparison to the increasing 
formality in the written rules created in the early decades of the American republic.  He 
wrote, “the AESC corresponds to the government under the Articles of Confederation; 
the American Standards Association as reorganized in 1928 corresponds to our national 
government under its present constitution.”94  This comparison reveals as much about 
Agnew’s perception of the organization’s maturity as it does about Agnew’s view of the 
role and characteristics of the American national government in the first half of the 
twentieth century. 
 
These institutional and ideological changes provided the foundation for the ASA 
to succeed in its struggle with the National Bureau of Standards over jurisdiction of 
industrial standardization in the United States.  Between the 1920s and the 1940s, many 
American policymakers thought that the National Bureau of Standards could promote 
technical innovation in small businesses by functioning as a clearinghouse for industrial 
research.  This vision never came to pass.  As the AESC (and later ASA) grew in size, 
power, and stature in the 1920s and 1930s, the Bureau of Standards, attacked by critics 
and crippled by the reduced budgets of the Depression years, never attained the 
prominence in industrial affairs that its advocates envisioned.  By the 1950s, in the 
assessment of historian Thomas Lassman, this vision of a progressive and active Bureau 
                                                
94 Agnew, “Twenty-Five Years—the American Standards Association,” 323.  
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of Standards had failed to become reality, and the Bureau of Standards retreated from the 
realm of industrial standardization in order to serve military patrons.95 
The ASA continued to grow during the Depression, even as circumstances took 
their toll on the members of the ASA and the money they could dedicate toward creating 
American Standards.96  The ASA grew steadily throughout the 1930s and, by the early 
1940s, emerged as an important source of cooperation and expertise for the coordinated 
mobilization of the military and American industry for World War II.  In the years 
immediately following World War II, the ASA—and the consensus principle that it 
embodied and promoted—continued to flourish.97 
 
Year Member Bodies Participating Organizations American Standards 
1923 23 235 48 
1928 36 350 111 
1945 96 650 1507 
Table 2.1: Membership, Participation, and Products in the AESC and ASA.  
Sources: American Engineering Standards Committee Yearbook, 1924; American 
Standards Association, “Voluntary Standards,” 1946. 
 
In response to yet another round of internal and external pressures to reform, the 
ASA reconstituted itself into the United States of America Standards Institute in 1966.  
This name was short-lived: in 1969 the group once again reformed itself and adopted its 
present name, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).  Beyond its new name, 
ANSI’s reforms of 1969 also included structural and procedural changes, including the 
                                                
95 For assessments of the problems at the National Bureau of Standards in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, 
see Thomas C. Lassman, “Government Science in Postwar America: Henry A. Wallace, Edward 
U. Condon, and the Transformation of the National Bureau of Standards, 1945-1951,” Isis 96 
(2005): 25-51; and Cochrane, Measures for Progress, 299-356. 
96 “Group Hears of Gain in Standards Work,” The New York Times (December 1, 1932), 38. 
97 For assessments of the vitality of the ASA and affiliated industry standardization groups in the 
1940s and 1950s, see Reck, ed., National Standards in a Modern Economy.  
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redefinition of processes for creating American National Standards.  ANSI introduced a 
regime of accreditation, under which it would examine organizations to ensure that their 
procedures were in line with the core ANSI consensus principles and methods.98  This 
system of accreditation, seen today as an obvious and natural way to distribute fairly the 
work of creating thousands of technical standards, should be recognized as the latest 
manifestation of the federalist tensions between the AESC and its member bodies that 
first surfaced in the “endless discussions” and “innumerable drafts of constitutions and 
methods of procedure” that Henry Hess, Comfort Adams, Paul Agnew, and their 
colleagues began to articulate in 1910. 
 
Figure 2.8: ASA Intensity of Participation, 1928-1945.  
Source: American Standards Association, Voluntary Standards, 1946. 
 
                                                
98 Carl F. Cargill, Open Systems Standardization: A Business Approach (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Paladin Consulting, 1997), 159-167. The three methods used by ANSI—the canvass method, the 
Accredited Organization method, and the Accredited Standards Committee method, bear a close 




Figure 2.9: ASA Approved Standards and Safety Codes, 1928-1945.  
Source: American Standards Association, Voluntary Standards, 1946. 
 
2.5  Conclusions 
Throughout the twentieth century, scientists, engineers, and technical 
professionals emerged as powerful players in American political, economic, and social 
affairs.  In many cases, the increasing tendency for policymakers to defer to technical 
professionals has been imprecisely and anachronistically disparaged as “technocratic.”99  
Historians often trace the origins of the so-called technocratic influence to the early 
twentieth century, specifically to Thorstein Veblen’s advocacy of a “Soviet of 
technicians” and the radical reform agenda of engineers such as Morris L. Cooke who 
                                                
99 Hugh Richard Slotten, Radio and Television Regulation: Broadcast Technology in the United States, 
1920-1960 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); and Barber, From New Era to 
New Deal, 13-15. 
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worked to apply the engineering method to realms such as education and government.100  
In this interpretation, Howard Scott’s group “Technocracy, Inc.” is treated as one of 
many manifestations of a broader technocratic trend that led to the predominance of 
technical judgments in political, economic, and social policy.  Thus we are led to believe 
that technocracy is the polar opposite of democracy, and decisions made by technical 
experts must by definition violate principles of democratic participation.101 
We should resist the impulse to view engineers in the standardization process as 
the heirs of Veblen or the foot soldiers of technocracy.102  Far from being proponents of 
technocracy, AESC engineers—Agnew chief among them—articulated a distinctive 
vision of democratic control in a society increasingly defined by industrial technology 
and reliant on technical experts.  Agnew not only envisioned and promoted a method for 
establishing industry consensus around technical specifications; he also advanced a 
critique of majority-rule democracy in the industrial age.  Unlike radical reformist 
engineers such as Morris Cooke and Charles Steinmetz, and unlike the advocates of 
Technocracy, Agnew did not justify participation in the standardization process solely on 
the basis of expertise.  Instead, he framed participation in the standardization process as a 
function of interest.  This distinction helps us to understand the prevalence of democratic 
metaphors and analogies in his writing and in the formal procedures of the AESC.   
                                                
100 See Thorstein Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1921); and 
Layton, Revolt of the Engineers. 
101 On technocracy, see William E. Akin, Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat 
Movement, 1900-1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). For a sharp analysis of the 
inadequacies of this technocratic/democracy dichotomy, see Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: 
Science Advisors as Policymakers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), especially 15-18. 
102 For one interpretation that builds upon Veblen to see standardization as “subversive to the old 
order,” see Janet Knoedler and Anne Mayhew, “The Engineers and Standardization,” Business 
and Economic History 23 (1994): 141-151. 
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Agnew believed that anyone with an interest or stake in a given technology 
should have a voice in the standardization process, even if he was not a dues-paying 
member of the AESC or ASA.  For Agnew, participation in the standards process had 
more in common with local government—recall his discussion of the hypothetical bridge 
to be built in Oshkosh—than it did with an exclusive, rational, and efficiency-minded 
Soviet of technicians.  His vision of democratic control over industrial technology 
included government officials, but the “industrial legislature” transcended the authority 
of those officials and the government interests they represented.  They participated not as 
ultimate authorities, but rather as equal partners in a cooperative enterprise.  Agnew’s 
implicit claim, then, was that cooperative rulemaking in the AESC was, in its limited 
sphere, more democratic than control by elected legislatures. 
This process valued the judgment of experts more than that of non-experts.  
Agnew openly acknowledged this fact, which was an essential component of claims to 
legitimacy and competence given the cooperative values of the 1920s.  He also frankly 
admitted the limitations of the “coöperative method,” such as a lack of organization that 
prevented important groups from participating fully in the consensus process, the 
“frequent short-sighted jockeying for immediate commercial advantage,” and the 
“endless jealousies and bickerings” between competing interests.  Agnew was 
nonetheless as enthusiastic about the cooperative method as he was critical of existing 
modes of democratic governance: “experience in diverse fields has amply shown that the 
[cooperative] method combines many of the advantages of the common-law and the 
statutory-law methods… while it avoids many of the limitations and abuses that have 
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grown up about the legislative process.”103  Critics of the AESC, most notably Lyman 
Briggs (Director of the National Bureau of Standards from 1933-1945), lamented “the 
output in quantity [of the AESC and ASA] has not been all that some of its friends had 
hoped.”  These shortcomings stemmed from the diverse points of view that, because of 
the inclusive requirements in AESC procedures, sectional committees needed to reconcile 
before agreeing on a standard.  Nevertheless, Briggs concluded “This procedure, while 
painful and sometimes slow, is nevertheless fundamentally sound.”104 
Agnew was aware of the radical “social engineering” proposals, such as Veblen’s, 
that called on engineers to take a greater role in the control of industrial society.  In his 
1926 New Republic article, he addressed the suggestion whether “the standardization 
movement is a step toward the ‘industrial parliament’ which enthusiastic prophets 
proclaim is about to supplant, or at least to supplement, our existing legislative 
machinery.”  Agnew expressed interest in such speculation, but declared that “the 
movement must continue to develop along conservative lines… the movement is 
evolutionary and not revolutionary.”105 
                                                
103 Agnew, “A Step Toward Industrial Self-Government,” 95. Agnew and his colleagues persisted 
in this promotion of voluntary standards as a viable alternative to control by legislature and 
common law rule. See Howard Coonley and P. G. Agnew, “The Role of Standards in the System 
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Place of Standardization in Modern Life.” 
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Administration. Such sweeping plans for industrial control seem counter to ASA ideal of private 




Agnew’s comments provide two points of departure for evaluating his ideas in the 
context of 1920s America.  First, advocates of industrial standardization explicitly linked 
their activities with the scientific authority and evolutionary theories that had become so 
influential among professionals in the early twentieth century.  Agnew frequently situated 
the creation and growth of the AESC within an evolutionary trajectory.  In the first stage, 
individual companies set standards.  In the second stage, associations and government 
bureaus set group standards.  The third stage consisted of standardization on a national 
scale; the fourth, standardization on an international scale.  Agnew noted that the number 
of interested individuals and organizations increases from one stage to the next, as do the 
difficulties and importance of their work.  In this classification, two or more stages 
develop simultaneously.  The AESC, as a national organization, fit clearly into the third 
stage in the evolution of industrial standardization, following and building upon the first 
and second stages, and serving as a gateway and foundation to the fourth and final stage 
of international standardization.106 
Second, the evolutionary path of industrial standardization could only occur 
through the work of professionals who strove to reconcile the needs and objectives of 
bureaucratic organizations.  As such, the AESC was a typical example of the effort that 
went into building the “organizational society” that emerged in the early twentieth 
century.107  The AESC’s success stemmed in part from its compatibility with the vision 
                                                
106 See for example P.G. Agnew, “Standards in Our Social Order,” 3. This evolutionary 
classification also appeared in numerous editions of the AESC Year Books, which indicates that 
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107 Louis Galambos, “Recasting the Organizational Synthesis: Structure and Process in the 
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of the most powerful American engineer and statesman of the 1920s, Herbert Hoover.  
The historian Edwin Layton nicely summarized Hoover’s vision for the engineer in the 
new industrial society: “The engineer need not draw up a blueprint for the rebuilding of 
society, nor would he be its new ruler.  His contribution, in Hoover’s view, was to bring 
about cooperation between the great economic groups.”108  The evidence in this chapter 
shows how precisely Hoover’s associative ideology aligned with the activities of the 
AESC, and how Hoover’s policy entrepreneurship provided legal and ideological support 
for the AESC. 
In the early twentieth century, standardization was not merely a technical 
challenge.  It was also an organizational and ultimately political challenge—something 
that Agnew and his fellow engineers understood very clearly.  It was a process of 
negotiations between a variety of powerful institutions, including private firms, 
government bureaus, and private groups such as professional engineering societies and 
trade associations.  This history provides no support for the caricature of standardization 
as an uncontroversial or rational technocratic process.  Instead, the AESC process—
despite its prevailing rhetoric of “consensus”—was contested and labor-intensive at every 
step. 
The legitimacy of American standards was function of the efforts of the AESC 
and ASA to make the standardization process open to all interested parties.  Their 
emphasis on an inclusive and deliberative process foreshadowed the claims of critics such 
as Jürgen Habermas and Sheila Jasanoff in the latter decades of the twentieth century.  In 
                                                
108 Layton, Revolt of the Engineers, 192.   
 
 132 
their theoretical and historical work, Habermas and Jasanoff emphasized the ways that 
the legitimacy of technical and political decisions could be achieved only through open 
and inclusive discursive procedures.  In light of their work, we may sympathize with 
Agnew’s claim that the AESC’s “cooperative method” captured the essence of 
deliberative democracy in a technological age.109 
We may also draw a significant historiographical lesson from this close look at 
engineers such as Comfort Adams and Paul Agnew and their activities in the AESC.  An 
acknowledgment of the important activities of these engineers serves as a supplement to 
the historiography of industrial engineering that focuses on radical reformist engineers on 
one hand and loyal corporate engineers on the other.110  Adams, Agnew, and the AESC 
help paint a richer picture of the connecting tissue of industrial development.  The work 
of these engineers is significant because of their contributions to industry that were not 
restricted to one particular firm.  In this sense, they fit into the tradition of mechanics and 
consulting engineers in the nineteenth century whose efforts and talents were felt across 
the boundaries of firms, government agencies, professional societies, and industry 
groups.  Dedicated as they were to the cooperative development of technology, Adams, 
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Agnew, and their fellow standard-bearers are historically significant as institution-
builders, administrators, liaisons, and consultants—in short, as agents of inter-
organizational knowledge and expertise.111  Scholarly appraisals of standardization 
frequently note that a successful standard is invisible: without much notice or 
controversy, successful standards seamlessly become a part of daily life.  Judging from 
the lack of historical notice of the Adams, Agnew, and the institutions they built, it is fair 
to conclude that the same observation applies to standard-setters as well.   
                                                
111 Business historians have recently begun to emphasize these inter-organizational themes with 
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Chapter 3: The “Engineering of the Present”: Standardization in the Bell System, 
1876-1956 
 
3.1  Introduction 
In the Second Industrial Revolution, standardization was more than a technical 
practice and an organizational strategy; it was an ideology, a way of extending rational 
control over a complex technological world.  In the first two chapters, I showed how 
American engineers created collaborative institutions in the private sector—“industrial 
legislatures”—as alternatives to government control over industrial standardization.  In 
some cases, however, industry standards did not emerge from the consensus process, but 
instead as a result of the market power of a single firm.  The history of the Bell 
Telephone System provides the best example of this style of de facto standardization.  
Accordingly, this chapter examines the development the American telephone industry 
from its initial commercial stages to the emergence of AT&T as the parent company of 
the mature monopoly Bell System.  Standardization was not simply a consequence of 
monopoly; instead, standardization first emerged as a strategy to create, justify, and 
sustain monopoly control. 
“System architecture,” a relatively recent concept that I borrow from computer 
science, illuminates the importance of standardization within the design and construction 
of the AT&T telephone network.  According to a standard definition, system architecture 
refers to the “fundamental organization of a system embodied in its components, their 
relationships to each other and the environment, and the principles guiding its design and 
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evolution.”1  In the American telephone industry, this “fundamental organization” 
emerged between the 1880s and the 1920s as the consequence of strategies implemented 
by four AT&T system architects: Edward J. Hall, Theodore N. Vail, John J. Carty, and 
Bancroft Gherardi.   
The early history of the Bell System also serves as a starting point for the 
principal theme of the remaining chapters of this dissertation: the standardization of 
network architectures for telecommunications and computing in the Second and Third 
Industrial Revolutions.  By reinterpreting the history of the Bell System from the vantage 
point of standardization, I argue that a single, interconnected American 
telecommunications network was the result of Bell strategies to exert complete control 
over the nation’s telephone industry.  By the early 20th century, Hall and Vail had 
overseen the creation of the monopoly Bell System that was led by a parent company, 
AT&T, and consisted of the manufacturing subsidiary Western Electric, the Long Lines 
long-distance department, and the dozens of regional operating companies.2  As President 
of Southern Bell (1894-1909) and Vice-President of AT&T (1887-1914), Hall negotiated 
the extension of AT&T administrative and technical standards throughout regional and 
                                                
1 This definition is literally a standard, issued jointly by the American National Standards 
Institute and the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and therefore a product of the 
sort of cooperation described in the previous chapters. The standard is described in 
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the American Telephone Industry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Robert W. 
Garnet, The Telephone Enterprise: the Evolution of the Bell System’s Horizontal Structure, 1876-1909 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); and Neil H. Wasserman, From Invention to 
Innovation: Long-Distance Telephone Transmission at the Turn of the Century (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1985).  
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local systems.3  Theodore Vail, in his second term as AT&T President (1907-1919), 
further extended Hall’s vision on a national scale as he presided over the creation of a 
monopoly telephone system, which he famously described as “One System, One Policy, 
Universal Service.”  In short, the structure of the Bell System followed the strategy of a 
standardized network architecture. 
Once this monopoly system architecture was firmly established by the mid-1910s, 
Carty and Gherardi took charge of the relations between the whole and the parts.  As the 
only two men to hold the position of AT&T Chief Engineer between 1907 and 1938, 
Carty and Gherardi both oversaw engineering throughout the Bell System—the 
“engineering of the present” in AT&T President Henry B. Thayer’s phrase.4  In addition 
to the challenges they faced in the creation of an integrated Bell System, Hall, Vail, 
Carty, and Gherardi also faced critical system problems outside the boundaries of their 
company, including rivalries with competing firms and tensions with regulators in a 
variety of jurisdictions.5  Standardization was also a most useful strategy for confronting 
these problems.  Under Gherardi’s leadership, AT&T engineers learned that they could 
effectively patrol the limits of AT&T’s control in consensus standards committees 
described in the first two chapters, such as the American Institute for Electrical Engineers 
(AIEE) and the American Standards Association.  By participating in these groups and 
                                                
3 Kenneth Lipartito, The Bell System and Regional Business: The Telephone in the South, 1877-1920 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 141-148. 
4 Henry B. Thayer, “The Development of Development and Research,” Bell Telephone Quarterly 4 
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Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 14-17, 22, 79-80, 
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influencing their standards, AT&T engineers found new ways to attack critical problems 
that they could not solve from within the Bell System.  
It is my view that the strategy overseen by Hall, Vail, Carty, and Gherardi stands 
as the most successful execution of a standardization strategy in all of American history.  
For nearly a century, AT&T used standards to build a “universal” system architecture and 
maintain system momentum in the face of competition, regulation, and technological 
change.  Momentum and monopoly, however, came at a cost: because of its scale and 
scope, AT&T developed a style of incremental innovation that made it difficult for the 
company to incorporate radical innovations into the system architecture.  By the second 
half of the twentieth century, when the technological foundations of the 
telecommunications industry began to shift toward electronic components and new forms 
of transmission, this conservative strategy would prove to be fatal for the Bell System.  
By taking standardization as a primary vantage point, this chapter shows that the 
architecture of the Bell System did not only address internal technical and economic 
concerns; this network architecture also suited an explicitly political purpose, one in 





                                                
6 For the general claim that choices in network architecture have significant social and political 
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3.2  Edward Hall and Theodore Vail: Standardizing the Bell System, 1877-1913 
Between 1877 and 1913, Bell managers applied the principles of standardization 
in four different realms: technical and administrative control in their company, 
competition with independent phone companies, dealings with state and national 
regulators, and the image of their company as a member of civil society.  In 1877, at the 
founding of the Bell Telephone Company,7 there were no standards in any recognizable 
sense of the term.  Telephone technology was in an early experimental phase, and 
telephone systems were administered by a handful of scattered entrepreneurs who 
licensed the Bell patents and were on their own to finance, build, and sell telephone 
service.  This situation began to change in the 1880s, when Bell managers began to 
articulate and impose a vision of centralized control and interconnection.   
Administrative standardization preceded and facilitated technical standardization.  
As Bell managers sought to establish the competitive and technical status of their 
company, they found that standardization could help them to define and redefine the 
scope of their control, and to integrate functions of manufacturing, engineering, and 
administration on a local and regional scale.  Theodore Vail articulated the Bell ideology 
of centralized control most clearly with his slogan of “One System, One Policy, 
Universal Service.”  This slogan neatly captured the ideology of standardization that 
drove the company’s technological and administrative strategy.  By 1913, the Bell 
                                                
7 The Bell Telephone Company was incorporated in 1877, and kept that name until 1879. From 
1879 to 1880 it was the National Bell Telephone Company, which was reincorporated as the 
American Bell Telephone Company (1880-1899). The American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company was incorporated as a long-distance firm in 1885, and became the parent company for 
the Bell interests on December 31, 1899.  See Garnet, The Telephone Enterprise. 
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System had developed into a regulated monopoly, in charge of a horizontally and 
vertically integrated telephone enterprise with a coast-to-coast scope.  
 
The first American telephone networks were built by local entrepreneurs who 
licensed the telephone patents of the Bell Telephone Company.  These systems were not 
interconnected: licenses were geographically exclusive, and it was initially impossible to 
place a call from one city to another.8  One consequence of decentralization was 
considerable diversity in early telephone systems, particularly in complex components 
such as switchboards.  Between 1877 and 1881, up to five different manufacturers 
supplied telephone equipment to Bell licensees.  By 1880, in an effort to minimize the 
technical confusion that resulted from this diversity, the Bell Company hired salaried 
traveling agents who shared information about common problems between licensees.  
Although these efforts brought some uniformity to the various Bell licensees, there was at 
this point no overarching strategy to impose standardized equipment or procedures.9  
Beginning in 1881, Bell managers led by Theodore N. Vail and Gardiner Hubbard 
took a significant step toward reducing this heterogeneity by consolidating manufacturing 
within one firm, Western Electric.  The transition to a single manufacturer—a crucial first 
step in the creation of a “Bell System” (although it was not envisioned as such at the 
time)—was complete by 1883.10  Still, this move toward vertical integration did not 
                                                
8 Smith, The Anatomy of a Business Strategy, 12, 162; Garnet, The Telephone Enterprise, 15-17. 
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automatically guarantee the standardization of technical components.  Even when 
standards did exist, they were difficult to enforce across the diffuse operating units of 
Western Electric and the Bell licensees.11  However, as telephone switching and 
transmission technologies became increasingly sophisticated and complex, Bell managers 
found that the standardization of hardware and procedures was a vital means for 
maintaining their position in the industry.  Accordingly, they took new steps to centralize 
the technical and administrative aspects of their sprawling company.12 
Centralization occurred through the efforts of managers at American Telephone 
and Telegraph (AT&T).  Founded in 1885, AT&T functioned as the unit responsible for 
long distance telephony before becoming the parent company for all the Bell interests in 
1899.  Historians have focused on the loading coil as a breakthrough technology for long 
distance transmission,13 but they have also shown that the loading coil was one of a long 
line of administrative and technical efforts that had been underway since the 1880s to 
integrate local telephone systems into regional and national systems.  Long-distance 
transmission, as historian Robert MacDougall argued, also served as a “symbol and 
                                                                                                                                            
Nation Transformed By Information: How Information Has Shaped the United States from Colonial Times 
to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 89-90.  
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spectacle of integration and consolidation” that was more valuable for organizational and 
political purposes than it was for generating revenue or meeting consumer demand.14 
Edward J. Hall and Theodore Vail—the founding general manager and president 
(respectively) of AT&T—are the two executives most closely associated with this trend 
toward interconnection that would as Hall argued “promote uniformity of methods” 
across the Bell licensees and throughout American telephony.15  This promotion of 
uniformity was neither smooth nor simple.  Hall, as President of Southern Bell (1894-
1909) and AT&T Vice-President (1887-1914), believed that administrative integration 
and technical standardization were vehicles for simplifying the tasks of management 
while simultaneously pushing operators of local systems to adopt better technology.  The 
social and technical aspects of Bell’s enterprise, therefore, were two sides of the same 
coin—and, in Hall’s eyes, both aspects of the business would benefit the centralization of 
authority through standardization.16  
Many Bell operating companies resisted the Vail/Hall push for centralization and 
standardization, sometimes out of a desire to remain autonomous, other times due to 
concerns about the cost of standardization.17  Anxious to avoid adversarial confrontations 
with the local companies—and lacking the financial power or administrative machinery 
                                                
14 Robert MacDougall, “Long Lines: AT&T’s Long-Distance Network as an Organizational and 
Political Strategy,” Business History Review 80 (2006), 298. 
15 Edward J. Hall to Theodore N. Vail, 12 May 1885, quoted in Garnet, The Telephone Enterprise, 78. 
See also Smith, The Anatomy of a Business Strategy, 127-133. For a summary of Hall’s vision and 
contributions, see Lipartito, The Bell System and Regional Business, 116-168; and Garnet, The 
Telephone Enterprise, 75-99. 
16 Garnet, The Telephone Enterprise, 37, 70-73, 87-89; Smith, The Anatomy of a Business Strategy, 57-
60; and MacDougall, “Long Lines,” 305-307. 
17 MacDougall, “Long Lines,” 303-309. There was also a vigorous debate among Bell executives 
about the degree to which centralization and standardization should be imposed. See Garnet, The 
Telephone Enterprise, 83-99; and Lipartito, The Bell System and Regional Business, 116-124. 
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to enforce compliance with standards—Hall and telephone engineer John J. Carty sought 
out venues to establish standards through a cooperative process.  During the 1880s and 
1890s, engineers from a number of Bell licensees met under the auspices of the National 
Telephone Exchange Association in order to develop technical specifications that took 
into account the operational experiences culled from their everyday work.  Managers and 
engineers used these conferences to blend local and regional approaches into a national 
style of telephone engineering.  In these conferences, Bell engineers established baseline 
specifications which could then be adopted on a voluntary basis and adapted by 
companies who, if circumstances warranted, would adjust the specifications to meet local 
conditions.18   
Hall and Carty pursued a similar cooperative strategy in the 1890s and early 
1900s as they championed functional specialization in order to establish uniformity on a 
national scale.  These reforms made it easier for employees with experience in particular 
tasks (such as switchboard equipment, network operations, accounting, and auditing), to 
undertake the slow and steady work of identifying and implementing standard practices 
across the Bell operating companies.  One important example of this process was the 
introduction and gradual adoption of a new accounting system that generated more 
uniform financial information, which made analysis easier both for managers and 
investors.19  Like the process of technical standardization, the introduction of accounting 
standards occurred not by dictate but instead through consultation and consensus with the 
                                                
18 Garnet, The Telephone Enterprise, 92-99; Lipartito, The Bell System and Regional Business, 66-81, 
162-3; and MacDougall, “Long Lines,” 303-307. 
19 Garnet, The Telephone Enterprise, 96-103. 
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licensees.  After all, the licensees would be forced to bear the costs of introducing new 
methods and retraining or recruiting people to manage it.20 
It was in this methodical, iterative, and cooperative manner that the principles of 
standardization came to assume a central place in the creation of an integrated Bell 
system at the turn of the twentieth century.  From manufacturing to long-distance to 
accounting, standardization had proven to be a flexible and dependable strategy for 
reforming and remaking the technological and business activities of Bell licensees in a 
way that suited the ideology of a unified national system.  At the same time, leaders such 
as Hall and Vail used standards to protect their companiy from external threats.  During 
the 1890s and early 1900s, the major threat came from the so-called “independent” 
telephone companies.  After the original Bell patents expired in 1893 and 1894, 
entrepreneurs around the country began to build competing networks to compete with the 
Bell licensees.  Their business strategies diverged substantially from the Bell companies: 
whereas the Bell companies tended to serve high-density populations (business customers 
or urban residential customers), many independents concentrated on smaller towns and 
rural areas, and were able to offer cheaper service than Bell.  In several cases, the two 
networks occupied the same territory, but refused to exchange calls.  This strategic 
impasse created a vivid symbol of this era of “dual service”—customers who were forced 
to keep two phones so that they could talk to subscribers of the different networks.21  
                                                
20 Garnet, The Telephone Enterprise, 112-126. 
21 See Milton Mueller, Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection, and Monopoly in the Making of 
the American Telephone System (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 54-96; and David Gabel, 
“Competition in a Network Industry: the Telephone Industry, 1894-1910,” The Journal of Economic 
History 54 (1994): 543-572. On the independent companies, see Charles A. Pleasance, The Spirit of 
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At first, non-interconnection was a rational business strategy.  Vail and the Bell 
executives already understood from their long-distance initiatives that interconnection (or 
“intercommunication,” in the preferred terminology of Bell executives at the time22) was 
a key to control in the competitive telephone industry.23  The Bell leadership recognized 
that by refusing to connect with independent networks, their competitors could not offer 
their customers the ability to place a call to any member of Bell’s larger base of 
subscribers.24  While many subscribers did not have the practical need or financial means 
to make long-distance calls, the potential to make long-distance calls was in many cases a 
decisive factor for consumers, thanks in large part to the efforts of AT&T engineer 
Thomas Doolittle and Edward Hall.25 
Clearly, interconnection in itself was not undesirable; rather, for Bell’s business 
model to work, it was essential that Bell managers controlled the terms of 
interconnection.  As they recognized this basic fact of the competitive telephone industry, 
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Industry,” The Journal of Economic History 49 (1989): 329; and Lipartito, The Bell System and Regional 
Business, 116-130. 
   
 145 
Bell and AT&T managers experimented with new ways to marginalize their competitors 
and leverage their subscriber base.  Once again, Edward Hall was a leader in the effort to 
unify and systematize Bell control, and, once again, the logic of standardization featured 
prominently in several new tactics devised to extend Bell managerial control over 
American telephone networks in the face of independent competition.  
Between 1895 and 1907, Bell executives used a variety of tactics to extend their 
control over the American telephone industry.  One tactic was to continue to build out 
new portions of their network by adding toll lines and exchanges.  A second tactic was 
the outright purchase of independent competing firms.  Both tactics utilized existing 
technical standards to integrate new networks with existing Bell networks.26  These 
tactics, however, were not in themselves enough to vanquish their competition: the 
growing demand for telephony meant that independent companies also continued to 
flourish: between 1902 and 1907, the independents operated more public exchanges than 
Bell companies, and Bell companies had marginally more subscribers than independent 
companies (51.2 percent and 48.8 percent, respectively).27  Another tactic championed by 
Hall, sublicensing, proved to be more successful for compromising with the independents 
and extending Bell control.  Sublicensing gave independent companies access to Bell 
technology, standards, and financial assistance, while simultaneously preventing them 
from competing directly against Bell networks or combining with other independents—
                                                
26 Two additional tactics that attracted unfavorable contemporary and historical scrutiny were 
price competition and public relations campaigns against independent companies. See Mueller, 
Universal Service, 69-80; and Gabel, “Competition in a Network Industry.” 
27 In 1902, there were 3,005 Bell exchanges, compared to 3,400 independent exchanges. By 1907, 
there were 4,889 Bell exchanges, compared to 5,400 independent exchanges. Mueller, Universal 
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thus preserving the competitive advantage of AT&T’s long-distance capabilities.28  
Finally, Hall also promoted Bell’s high technical standards to municipal and state 
regulators, convincing them that quality of service was a more important regulatory 
concern than other issues such as rates, profits, and the presence of competition.  By 
framing high-quality telephone service as an important public benefit, Hall and his 
colleagues used regulatory endorsement of Bell’s technical standards as a competitive 
tactic and barrier to entry.29 
 Each of these tactics help us to recognize that a national, “universal” telephone 
system emerged in the early twentieth century as a compromise strategy between the 
totalizing goals of standardized control on the one hand, and the inescapable conditions 
of local variation and competition on the other.  By 1907, the overall consequence of this 
strategy was that Bell technical standards gradually were implemented on a systematic 
and widespread basis, both in Bell networks as well as in independent sublicensee 
networks—but their creation and adoption occurred through a negotiated process where 
consensus was a dominant value.30   
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Where Hall succeeded with his vision of standardization and control on a regional 
scale with Southern Bell, Theodore N. Vail, in his second term as president of AT&T 
from 1907 to 1919, extended Hall’s vision throughout AT&T on a national scale.31  By 
continuing the policy of sublicensing, Vail ensured that Bell’s technical standards would 
be implemented on a broader scale, which put Bell managers in a better position to 
control the technological direction of the telephone industry.32  Accordingly, we need to 
recognize that standardization was not simply a consequence of monopoly control; 
standards and standardization also were used as a competitive strategy to achieve this 
monopoly status. 
To reap the efficiency gains promised by standardization and centralization—and 
under intense financial pressure to eliminate excessive diversity in equipment and 
personnel—Vail moved quickly to streamline the technical operations of the Bell System.  
In 1907, Vail named John J. Carty, previously chief engineer of New York Telephone 
(the largest operating company in the country) to be the AT&T’s Chief Engineer.  Carty 
closed down labs in Chicago and Boston and brought the Bell System technical 
operations under the centralized control of his Engineering Department, located in New 
York.  The Engineering Department became the intermediary between the licensee 
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companies and Western Electric, and the latter entity was designated as the sole site for 
the design and standardization of equipment.  Like other efforts to create more uniformity 
and centralization throughout Bell’s administrative and financial operations, Carty’s 
consolidation of engineering departments built upon earlier initiatives that sought to 
reconcile the ideal of standardization with the realities of local control and variation.33 
It is in this context that Vail introduced his slogan that defined the modern Bell 
System: “One System, One Policy, Universal Service.”34  Although “Universal Service” 
eventually became shorthand for government policies to extend telephone service to all 
Americans, the phrase originally drew the rhetorical distinction between the reality of 
“dual service” (or non-interconnection) in the competitive era and Vail’s post-1907 
ambition for Bell to assume complete control over American telephony.35  Scholars have 
interpreted this slogan in a variety of ways, referring to it as the largest public relations 
campaign of its kind, a manifestation of Vail’s civic values and administrative 
experience, a response to competition, and even an element of the Bell strategy of public 
indoctrination.36  
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We should add to this list that Universal Service was the most comprehensive and 
successful standardization strategy in the history of American telecommunications.  It 
was a public articulation of the ideology of standardization that was cultivated in the 
1880s and 1890s and, by the first decades of the twentieth century, resulted in the 
creation of the modern Bell System.  This ideology of standardization suggested that the 
administrative, political, and technological aspects of the telephone business were 
inseparable—and the best way to oversee all three aspects was for AT&T to assume total 
control, free from competition and in consultation with national regulators.  “Universal 
Service” was Vail’s rhetorical masterstroke that folded the principles of standardization 
and centralization into the image and successful construction of AT&T as a regulated 
monopoly. 
The notion of Universal Service provides the best example of how Vail and his 
colleagues persuaded regulators to appreciate the value of an interconnected monopoly 
telephone system, one that operated more like a common carrier or public utility than one 
of several firms in a competitive market.  Torn between their desire to preserve 
competition and simultaneously promote interconnection, twenty six state regulatory 
commissions passed laws that mandated interconnection between Bell and independent 
networks between 1904 and 1913.37  In 1913, Vail’s public relations campaign finally 
succeeded on a national scale, when Nathan Kingsbury, AT&T’s Vice President of 
Advertising and Publicity, came to an agreement with federal regulators that the best 
political solution was to endorse Bell control over a single interconnected telephone 
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network.38  Federal regulation thus emerged as the preferred alternative to “cutthroat” 
competition on the one hand and to antitrust prosecution on the other.  Cooperation, not 
competition, would provide the best way forward.  This political settlement cemented the 
structure of the American telephone industry that would remain intact until the 1980s.   
 
3.3  Bancroft Gherardi and Consensus Standardization in the Monopoly Bell 
System, 1913-1938 
 
Standardization continued to be a sustaining ideology of the Bell System as it 
developed momentum as a regulated monopoly in the 1910s and 1920s.  AT&T’s leading 
advocate of standardization during this period was its Vice President and Chief Engineer, 
Bancroft Gherardi.  From the 1910s to his retirement in 1938, Gherardi was the premier 
architect of the AT&T standardization strategy.  This approach had its basis in extensive 
technical studies of existing practice, and promoted common (if not universal) system-
wide standards.  Like his predecessors Hall and Carty, Gherardi struggled to reconcile the 
drive for uniformity with the technological and financial constraints faced by local 
licensees.  And also like Hall and Carty, Gherardi drew on his reputation and technical 
abilities to persuade, cajole, and command engineers in the Bell System to continue to 
standardize the system. 
Gherardi (1873-1941) began his career as a telephone engineer in 1895, testing 
and inspecting cables for the Metropolitan Telephone and Telegraph Company of New 
York.  Gherardi, who earned a bachelor’s degree from Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute and 
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two graduate engineering degrees from Cornell, quickly earned a strong reputation for his 
thorough technical investigations of cables and standards of transmission.  In 1900 he 
was promoted to head the newly-formed Traffic Engineering Department of the New 
York Telephone Company, and continued his rise one year later when he was named 
Chief Engineer of the New York and New Jersey Telephone Company.39 
Gherardi moved to New York during a period of rapid technological and 
organizational change for the New York and New Jersey Telephone Company, which 
grew from 30,000 telephones in 1901 to over 110,000 in 1906.  Gherardi was particularly 
adept at working within the constraints of a large, complex, and relentlessly expanding 
technological system.  He very quickly adapted to the systematic Bell approach to solving 
problems within this dynamic context, and demonstrated his abilities in a number of 
projects, including extensive studies of telephone traffic, the creation of new floor plans 
for central offices, experiments to test cable durability and safety, and the creation of 
technical standards for switchboard components and signal transmission.40  
Through these efforts to enhance the efficiency of Bell operations, Gherardi 
earned the trust of his supervisor, John J. Carty.  Gherardi proved his worth to Carty on a 
number of occasions, including the collaboration between the two men to supervise the 
first commercial application of Pupin’s loading coils in New York in 1902.  As Carty 
                                                
39 Gherardi earned a B.S. in 1891 from the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, and an M.E. (1893) and 
M.M.E. (1894) from Cornell University. See Oliver E. Buckley, “Bancroft Gherardi, 1873-1941,” 
National Academy of Science Biographical Memoirs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), 
157-177; and “Bancroft Gherardi Dies; Phone Pioneer, 68,” The New York Times (August 16, 1941).  
40 “Bancroft Gherardi,” The Sibley Journal of Engineering 20 (1906): 241; and “List of Some Items of 
Scientific and Engineering Work Done by Mr. Bancroft Gherardi,” July 20, 1932, Box 1133, 
“Gherardi, Bancroft – Biography – 1873-1941,” AT&T Archives, Warren, New Jersey. 
   
 152 
rose into the upper echelons of the Bell System, so did Gherardi.41  When Vail 
reorganized the corporate structure of the Bell companies in 1907, he selected a new set 
of experienced and technically proficient executives, including Walter S. Gifford, Frank 
B. Jewett, and Henry B. Thayer, to lead the way forward.  Vail’s selection of Gherardi as 
Carty’s right-hand man (with the title of Equipment Engineer of AT&T) has gone almost 
unnoticed by historians, but Gherardi’s long and successful career as the overseer of 
standardization in the Bell System further confirms Vail’s reputation for hiring the right 
men for the job.42 
Gherardi was promoted in 1909 to AT&T Engineer of Plant Development and 
Standardization, responsible for these areas throughout the entire Bell System.  In this 
capacity, Gherardi worked closely with Carty and Jewett, a Ph.D. physicist who Carty 
brought to New York to serve as a research manager in the consolidated Engineering 
Department of Western Electric in New York.43  This triad formed an effective 
partnership as they guided the technological operations and trajectory of the Bell System 
over the next thirty years.  As system architects, their major organizational challenge was 
to harmonize the ongoing efforts of the various technical departments in the Bell System, 
which included Long Lines, Western Electric’s manufacturing and engineering 
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departments (the former in Chicago, the latter in New York), and the twenty-odd 
operating companies around the country.   
Because of the technological and social difficulties in the standardization process, 
complete system-wide harmonization proved nearly impossible.  For the manufacture of 
equipment to meet specific standards, the relationship between AT&T and Western 
Electric was more or less clear: AT&T gave the orders, Western Electric carried them 
out.44  In contrast, AT&T management found it much more difficult to command the 
technical activities of the regional operating companies.  Much to the frustration of 
Western Electric engineers, AT&T displayed more tolerance and understanding when the 
operating companies resisted the standard practices and equipment recommended by 
AT&T and manufactured by Western Electric.  Western Electric engineers interpreted 
this treatment as a double standard, and resented the implication that their status was 
lower in comparison to the independence of the AT&T management in New York and the 
relative autonomy of the regional operating companies.   
One example of this resentment was visible at a 1915 conference of Bell System 
engineers—the first such system-wide technical summit.  A recurring point of 
controversy at this conference was the Bell System’s use of condensers, devices used to 
store energy in the transmission process.  Where the AT&T specifications (in 1915) 
called for Western Electric to manufacture condensers with a minimum capacity of five 
hundred volts, operating companies routinely used older equipment that was not up to 
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this standard.  E. B. Craft, an engineer at Western Electric, complained that even though 
AT&T engineers were “making efforts to persuade the associate companies to live up to 
these requirements… the associate companies are not prepared at all times to meet with 
or agree with the A. T. & T. Company… especially when it touches their pocket-book as 
much as it does on this condenser proposition.”45  
For the operating companies, upgrading to the new standards was a costly and 
time-consuming process.  Consequently, AT&T executives and engineers continued to 
prefer voluntary cooperation to outright dictate or coercion.  As the Western Electric 
engineer J. L. McQuarrie summarized in 1915, “it is not the policy of the A. T. & T. 
Company to use force in compelling the associate companies to follow their standards.  I 
think their policy is to set up their cases in such a manner that the associate companies 
will see for themselves that that is the thing they ought to do.”46  Gherardi had stated as 
much in 1912: “In applying transmission standards, it must be recognized that they 
cannot be considered as hard and fast rules which must be followed in all cases… in other 
words, to attain the standards might necessitate expenditures not warranted.”47  Carty, 
aware of these financial constraints on system-wide innovations, responded by pursuing 
low-cost solutions.  In 1916, he boasted that the improvements to transmission—
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particularly the vacuum tube-powered repeater—would “be accomplished without 
requiring any Associated Company to spend one dollar—no, not one cent, in 
reconstructing any subscriber’s station.”48  
On the other hand, Western Electric was required to follow AT&T standards more 
closely—thus producing a situation where their autonomy was circumscribed far more 
than that of the operating companies.  This disparity fostered a simmering resentment 
among Chicago-based Western Electric engineers, a reaction to their subordinate status to 
the engineering executives in New York.  At one point during the 1915 conference, one 
of the Chicago-based engineers went so far as to suggest that AT&T should move its 
headquarters to Chicago—a comment that drew applause from the audience.  After the 
applause subsided, the conference’s chairman H. F. Albright left no doubt about who was 
really in charge by noting their absence: “It looks as if we did not have enough conferees 
present,” he responded meekly.  “We should have Mr. Carty and Mr. Gherardi here.”49   
Changes in AT&T’s corporate organization between 1918 and 1920 further 
consolidated the power of these two men, and propelled Gherardi in particular into a 
commanding role over standardization throughout the Bell System.  During World War I, 
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organizers of a two-day conference in New York in December, 1916 where technical 
representatives of the Bell System discussed recent developments in telephone transmission. 
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when Carty and Jewett directed their attention (and the research efforts of their 
subordinates) to the war effort, Gherardi stayed in New York as Acting Chief Engineer of 
AT&T.  Vail retired as AT&T President on June 18, 1919 and was replaced by his 
protégé and close friend, Western Electric President Henry Thayer.  Gherardi was named 
Chief Engineer of AT&T the same day.  In 1920 Gherardi was promoted again, this time 
to Vice President of AT&T, and held both titles until his retirement in 1938.50   
Gherardi took over as Chief Engineer just as the Engineering Department was 
split into two new departments—the Operations and Engineering Department and the 
Development and Research Department.  The purpose of this reorganization, according to 
Thayer, was to allow Bell engineers to “differentiate in our work between the engineering 
of the present and the engineering of the future.”51  Under this new regime, Carty and 
Jewett turned to the engineering of the future, first in the Development and Research 
Department and later with Bell Labs, while Gherardi directed the engineering of the 
present within the Department of Operations and Engineering.52  The breadth of 
Gherardi’s responsibilities was staggering: he directed a staff of hundreds of engineers 
who were collectively responsible for developing engineering methods, operating plans, 
                                                
50 Buckley, “Bancroft Gherardi,” 165-166; “Scientific and Engineering Work Done by Mr. Bancroft 
Gherardi,” AT&T Archives. On Carty, Jewett, and AT&T research during World War I, see Reich, 
The Making of American Industrial Research, 180-1. 
51 See Henry B. Thayer, “The Development of Development and Research,” Bell Telephone 
Quarterly 4 (1925): 6; “Centralizing Bell System Researches,” Science, New Series, Vol. 79, No. 2051 
(April 20, 1934): 366-367; and “Notes on Recent Occurences: Bancroft Gherardi Retires as A.T.&T. 
Vice President and Chief Engineer after a Distinguished Career of 43 Years of Bell System 
Service,” Bell Telephone Quarterly 17 (1938): 139-144.  
52 Historians have paid much more attention to research and development in the Bell System, 
presumably due to the elite status of Bell Labs in American industrial research. See for example 
Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research; and Fagen, ed., A History of Engineering and 
Science in the Bell System: The Early Years. 
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and methods for analyzing and comparing different types of service.  Further, Gherardi’s 
staff was responsible for advising the technical staffs of the other units of the Bell System 
(including Western Electric, the regional operating companies, and the Long Lines 
division) as well as for the overall technical coordination of the System.   
Standardization was Gherardi’s primary means of managing complexity.  In his 
view, standards were much more than simple technical prescriptions.  They documented 
years of experimentation, and provided a record of the technical know-how and 
organizational capabilities of thousands of individuals who worked for the Bell System.53  
Many standards originated or matured through face-to-face discussions in system-wide 
conferences, an organizational innovation favored by Carty, Jewett, and Gherardi that 
were designed to overcome the coordination problems posed by distance and diversity.54  
The administrative consolidation of Bell local and regional operating companies under 
Vail and Thayer greatly facilitated communication among the system’s engineering elite 
                                                
53 Once a technology or process was deemed to be a Bell System Standard (or “AT&T Standard”), 
it was promulgated through a publication series by the Department of Development and 
Research, commonly known as “D&R Bulletins.”  Along with General Engineering Circulars and 
other forms of communication, the D&R Bulletins distributed the latest technical information to 
engineering departments at all of the Bell operating companies. Fagen, ed., A History of 
Engineering and Science in the Bell System: The Early Years, 638 (especially note 159). See also 
Buckley, “Bancroft Gherardi,” 166-167; and Harold S. Osborne, “Abstract of Discussion of 
Osborne Paper on Standardization in the Bell System,” American Standards Association Bulletin 
(October, 1931), 27-28. 
54 The proceedings of the first such conference are Western Electric Company, Manufacturing and 
Engineering Conference, Chicago, Illinois, May 24-28, 1915. I am grateful to Louis Galambos for 
bringing this rich source to my attention. For Galambos’ own interpretation of some of this 
meetings, see Louis Galambos, “Theodore N. Vail and the Role of Innovation in the Modern Bell 
System,” Business History Review 66 (1992): 114-117. 
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by reducing the number of engineering departments in the Bell System—further 
underlining the point that administrative centralization made it easier to set standards.55  
These administrative strategies led to a healthy and diverse program of 
standardization throughout the 1920s.  By 1929, AT&T had created standards for an 
astonishing variety of functions, including telephone plant design, underground cables, 
raw materials, manufacture, distribution, installation, inspection, and maintenance of new 
equipment, business and accounting methods, non-technical supplies (such as office 
furniture, appliance, janitors’ supplies, cutlery, and china), and provisions for safety, 
health, and even sleet storms.56  
As in the initial phase of his career in New York, Gherardi again excelled within 
the context of a rapidly expanding and evolving system.  During his tenure as Chief 
Engineer between 1920 and 1938, the number of telephones in Bell System grew from 
7.7 million to over 19 million.  With the rapid expansion of telephone service, the 
explosive growth of radio transmission, and the introduction of television technology, the 
                                                
55 See Garnet, The Telephone Enterprise, 137-144; and Brooks, Telephone, 133. Consolidation also 
made it easier for the Bell companies to create an “appearance of uniformity” in their advertising 
campaigns. See Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul, 56, 86-7. 
56 Harold S. Osborne, “The Fundamental Role of Standardization in the Operations of the Bell 
System,” American Standards Association Bulletin (September, 1931), 3; and O. C. Lyon, 
“Standardization of Non-Technical Telephone Supplies,” American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, Plant and Engineering Conference of the Bell System, New York City, December 6-10, 
1920, Section IV, 97-103. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, a number of AT&T engineers—
including Gherardi himself—published comprehensive overviews of the Bell System and the 
important role of standardization. See J.N. Kirk “The Need for Standardization of Design, 
Construction and Maintenance Practices in Telephone Work and the Effect upon Service,” (AT&T 
Information Department, 1921); Harold S. Osborne, ”Standardization in the Bell System,” Bell 
Telephone Quarterly 8 (1929): 9-28; Harold S. Osborne, ”Standardization in the Bell System—II,” 
Bell Telephone Quarterly 8 (1929): 132-152; Bancroft Gherardi and Frank B. Jewett, “Telephone 
Communication System of the United States,” Bell System Technical Journal 9 (1930): 1-100; and 
Frank B. Jewett, “Some Fundamentals in Standardization,” Bell Telephone Quarterly 17 (1938): 17-
27. 
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1920s and 1930s were exciting times to be on the front lines of electrical communication.  
Gherardi thrived in the midst of this era of rapid change and was a key member of the 
AT&T technical community during this period.  For example, he played a leading role in 
AT&T’s opening of trans-Atlantic radio telephone service in January, 1927, served on the 
Board of Directors of Bell Labs, served on the editorial board of the Bell System 
Technical Journal, and co-authored essays on “Telephone Progress” for the annual 
editions of the Encyclopedia Americana between 1923 and 1936.57  
During his tenure as Chief Engineer, Gherardi developed a characteristic style of 
implementing changes within the existing Bell System architecture.  His first step was to 
carefully research and study existing operations.  His second step was to design a 
comprehensive plan for change.  His third step was to slowly introduce new methods and 
equipment—standardized, of course, to the greatest extent possible that local conditions 
would allow.  His final step—one that could easily be blended with a first step of a new 
project—involved ongoing study to evaluate the system-wide impact of changes.   
A brief discussion of the Bell System’s transition from manual to mechanical 
switching—Gherardi’s first and perhaps most significant project as Chief Engineer—
illustrates his style of system architecture.  The independent inventor Almon Strowger 
invented the first mechanical switch in 1891, but Bell experts did not see a way to 
integrate the device into their operations, and declined to buy or even license Strowger’s 
patent.  In the subsequent decades, Bell officials kept a close eye on Strowger’s device 
                                                
57 On the trans-Atlantic radio connection, see Bancroft Gherardi, “Voices Across the Sea,” North 
American Review 224 (1927): 654-661. On Gherardi’s role in AT&T’s explorations of radio 
technology, see Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research, 170-238.  
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and developed their own “panel type” mechanical switch, but declined to introduce any 
sort of mechanical switching into the telephone network before 1920.  In his study of 
AT&T’s transition from manual to machine switching, Kenneth Lipartito explained this 
reluctance by pointing to the difficulties and uncertainties of introducing a new 
innovation in a system context.  Many factors, including conflicts over the efficacy and 
economy of machine switching technology as well as AT&T’s sunk cost in its existing 
“techno-labor system,” convinced AT&T managers to pursue incremental innovations 
within the existing paradigm of manual switching.  Only when they faced successive 
crises of system growth and labor shortages due to the American mobilization for World 
War I did Bell engineers decide to embrace machine switching and invest in the new 
technology.58   
Gherardi, promoted to Chief Engineer in 1919, was the prime mover behind this 
deliberate transition to machine switching.  Gherardi preferred the term “machine 
switching” to “automatic switching,” given the misleading connotations of the latter term: 
the equipment and processes for switching telephone calls were anything but automatic.59  
Gherardi first presented to Carty a study on technological and human aspects of machine 
switching in 1917.  Upon his promotion to Chief Engineer in 1919, Gherardi made a 
formal recommendation on the subject to the AT&T leadership.  His recommendation 
                                                
58 Kenneth Lipartito, “When Women Were Switches: Technology, Work, and Gender in the 
Telephone Industry, 1890-1920,” The American Historical Review 99 (1994): 1074-1111; Venus 
Green, “Goodbye Central: Automation and the Decline of ‘Personal Service’ in the Bell System, 
1878-1921,” Technology and Culture 36 (1995): 912-949. 
59 Carty endorsed Gherardi’s suggestion to use the term “machine switching” instead of 
“automatic switching” at a 1916 conference. Carty, “Universal Service,” Telephone Transmission, 
14. 
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called for the gradual replacement of manual switching, noting that significant obstacles 
needed to be overcome, including negotiating with the Automatic Electric Company to 
use the patents for the Strowger switch, engineering the production of panel switches at 
Western Electric, educating the engineers at regional operating companies, and 
convincing the general public to change their dialing habits.60 
Gherardi’s recommendation was approved, and, as Chief Engineer, he became 
personally responsible for implementing the plan.  His emphasis on standardization made 
the technological basis for a transition to machine switching possible and affordable, as 
well as time consuming and labor intensive.  The standardization and coordination of the 
various components of the machine switching system was a daunting task.  As early as 
1920, Western Electric had added five buildings to its Hawthorne Plant (with plans to add 
three more), and Gherardi and AT&T engineer Harry Charlesworth claimed that AT&T 
and Western Electric had combined to make “three thousand new piece parts involving 
some thirty-six thousand manufacturing and inspecting operations,” including new 
working drawings, manufacturing methods, new tools and machinery, testing gauges, and 
the shipment of factory-assembled switch frames that would facilitate their installation 
throughout the Bell System.  Thanks to sufficient planning and coordination, Gherardi 
and Charlesworth promised that the introduction of the new machine switching system 
would “be carried on in the usual Bell way, that is, in an economical and orderly manner, 
                                                
60 See Bancroft Gherardi and Harry P. Charlesworth, “Machine Switching for the Bell System,” 
Telephone Review 2, Supplement (April, 1920): 1-12; “Scientific and Engineering Work Done by Mr. 
Bancroft Gherardi,” AT&T Archives; and Green, “Goodbye Central,” 939-941. 
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without inconvenience to the subscriber, and without derangement or interruption of 
service.”61   
The first mechanical exchange opened in Omaha in December 1921.  The signal 
event of this transition was the “cutover,” the moment when manual switches were 
terminated and calls began to be routed through machine-operated switches.  The 
transition to the new mechanical system demonstrated the soundness of Gherardi’s 
extensive preparations: in addition to the new equipment installed in the central offices, 
Bell engineers updated 378 private branch exchange switchboards, and substituted 
thousands of new dial telephones for obsolete handsets.62  In addition to the equipment, 
which cost around $2 million, the supervisors of the Omaha station retrained one hundred 
employees without, the district manager hastened to add, firing a single employee.63 
AT&T engineer A. E. Van Hagen described in great detail the detailed operations 
of the cutover in an April 1929 article.  He wrote, “Does a cutover have any drama? For 
the casual observer, no….  But to the men and women engaged in the work, there is all 
                                                
61 Gherardi and Charlesworth, “Machine Switching for the Bell System,” 11-12.  
62 On Gherardi’s and AT&T’s preparations for the transition to machine switching, see Bancroft 
Gherardi, “Remarks on Machine Switching Cutovers,” R. F. Estabrook, “Machine Switching 
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the thrill that a First Night at the theatre has for the cast—and more.”64  Because studies 
indicated that traffic was at its lightest point late on a Saturday night, the Omaha cutover 
occurred at the midnight hour.  Van Hagen wrote, “one notices that every operator is 
dressed in her ‘Sunday best.’”  He continued,  
At the main frame downstairs, men are stationed at close intervals. Cords 
run behind the heat coils. At a word over the telephone from the 
Dispatcher, the man in charge signals to his lieutenants who in turn pass 
the word to the men to “PULL. TAKE IT EASY.” As each man takes hold 
of the cord at the bottom of the bay and pulls, a barrage of heat coils 
comes flying from the frame. Goggles or a visor protect the eyes of each 
man… In all the years that they have worked in that office their problem 
has been to maintain service, but with a rip they have torn out all the heat 
coils and there are no subscribers connected with that office.65 
 
In Omaha, Gherardi and Jewett personally gave the order to “cut em over” at 
11:59 pm on the night of December 10.  With this command, the Omaha exchange began 
to route calls through machine switching equipment that followed commands issued by 
subscriber dial telephones.  The Omaha World-Herald reported that “for the first time 
since 1893, the operating room of the old telephone building was quiet and deserted.”  
                                                
64 A. E. Van Hagen, “The Dial Office ‘Cutover,’” Bell Telephone Quarterly 8 (1929): 96. 
65 Van Hagen, “The Dial Office ‘Cutover,’” 101-102. 
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Figure 3.1: Manual Switching Room and Personnel 
Source: Bancroft Gherardi and Frank B. Jewett, “Telephone Communication System of 
the United States,” Bell System Technical Journal 9 (1930): 14.  
Courtesy of AT&T Archives and History Center. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Machine Switching Room and Equipment. 
Source: Bancroft Gherardi and Frank B. Jewett, “Telephone Communication System of 
the United States,” Bell System Technical Journal 9 (1930): 26.  
Courtesy of AT&T Archives and History Center. 
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With the Omaha exchange up and running, Gherardi, Carty, and Jewett conducted 
cost studies to estimate when the change to machine systems would be economical, the 
situations where it would not, and the amount of time it would take for machine systems 
to pay for themselves.66  Based on these studies, Gherardi proceeded gradually and, 
characteristically, did not force change too quickly: by the time he retired in 1938, almost 
half of all American telephone subscribers were still relying on female operators to 
switch their calls manually.67 
Insofar as it contained technical, economic, and social dimensions, the transition 
to machine switching demonstrates Gherardi’s general attitude toward management.  
Throughout his career, Gherardi was a paradigmatic “organization man,” a thoughtful 
professional who combined the tools of engineering and management and led American 
business into a thoroughly industrial and bureaucratic era.68  Gherardi articulated this 
organizational worldview in his AIEE President’s Address in 1928: 
The conquest of nature on a large scale must be done by those who can 
use organizations of men. The modern engineer should have as great a 
capacity for human management, cooperation and for dealing with others 
as the men in politics, religion and other professions which are devoted 
primarily to the study of man.69 
 
 Gherardi amply demonstrated his own “capacity for human management” as 
Chief Engineer of AT&T.  Gherardi built his leadership style around clear and open lines 
                                                
66 Bancroft Gherardi, “Engineering Considerations,” in American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, Conference to Discuss Economy and Efficiency in Operation, Shawnee, Pennsylvania, 
October 18-25, 1922, 200. 
67 Buckley, “Bancroft Gherardi,” 169-70.  
68 Oliver Buckley was more effusive: “Bancroft Gherardi was a great engineer… one of the  most 
eminent engineers of his time.” Buckley, “Bancroft Gherardi,” 157. 
69 Bancroft Gherardi, “Civilization and the Engineer,” Bell Telephone Quarterly 47 (1928): 581. 
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of communication with engineers throughout the Bell System.  In his first years as Chief 
Engineer, Gherardi held a number of conferences and meetings for technical 
representatives of all departments in the Bell System.  Transcripts from these conferences 
show that Gherardi was one of the most charismatic, insightful, and vocal participants in 
discussions, always ready to exercise his moderator’s prerogative to have the final word 
at the close of each session as well as at the conclusion of the conference.70  Gherardi 
self-consciously nurtured the values of “morale and team-work,” and consistently 
emphasized the importance of a “company-as-a-whole” attitude among AT&T 
employees.  In accordance with this systematic outlook, Gherardi maintained close 
contact with the operating companies, and routinely canvassed their engineering staff for 
comments and criticisms on existing Bell standards.71   
This collaborative leadership style seems to have won Gherardi nearly universal 
respect and trust, although there are hints of some displeasure at Gherardi’s authoritative 
demeanor.  In 1957, Gherardi’s biographer (and Bell Labs president) Oliver Buckley 
wrote, “Some there were who considered him overcritical and even dictatorial, but others 
                                                
70 See for example AT&T, Plant and Engineering Conference of the Bell System, [1920]; AT&T, 
Conference to Discuss Economy and Efficiency in Operation [1922]; and Bancroft Gherardi, 
“Summary,” in Telephone Transmission, 137-138. 
71 See for example AT&T, Conference to Discuss Economy and Efficiency in Operation [1922], 121, 171, 
194-5. Gherardi kept a close eye on ways to improve and maintain throughout the system, 
including measures that brought employee representatives into closer contact with management. 
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local and regional systems. 
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close to him found beneath a somewhat austere exterior a warm, good-natured friend with 
a lively sense of humor and deep-seated human kindness.”72  
Gherardi advocated a more efficient approach to industrial production, and found 
a community of like-minded engineers and executives in technical societies and 
standards-setting organizations such as the AIEE and the American Standards 
Association.  Gherardi and his fellow AT&T engineers participated tentatively in these 
groups before World War I, but increased their commitment as the industrial 
standardization movement gained strength in the 1920s and into the 1930s.  Why?  What 
did Gherardi and the AT&T engineers do in these committees, and why did they think 
industry standardization was important?  To understand how efficiency concerns, power 
dynamics, and relations of trust informed Gherardi’s and AT&T’s attitudes toward 
standardization, we need to follow AT&T engineers beyond the boundaries of the Bell 
System and into these industry standards committees.   
 
3.4  Standardization Across the Boundaries of the Bell System  
As we learned in the previous chapter, the size and stature of the national 
movement for industrial standardization blossomed during the 1920s.  Standards 
advocates such as Paul Gough Agnew and Herbert Hoover frequently pointed to the 
benefits of participation in standard-setting organizations, such as the American 
                                                
72 Buckley, “Bancroft Gherardi,” 172. Gherardi was a tall and athletic man who used his energy 
and stature to enhance his intellectual authority. One wonders if a comparison to the leadership 
style of Lyndon Johnson would be apt. 
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Engineering Standards Committee (AESC), that brought together engineers and 
representatives from different walks of industrial life.   
Throughout its early history, AT&T was reluctant to collaborate openly in 
technical societies and industry groups.  To the contrary, AT&T leaders recognized that 
their competitive advantages flowed from the company’s premium on secrecy and patent 
protection.  These attitudes, however, began to change in the years before World War I.  
One indication of changing attitudes may be seen in a speech at the 1915 conference of 
Bell System engineering and manufacturing personnel, where H. F. Albright asked the 
Western Electric and AT&T engineers to reconsider the potential benefits of professional 
activities outside the Bell System.  Individual employees would gain “an enlarged circle 
of acquaintances” and learn about other engineering methods.  The company as a whole 
would benefit, as well:  
through such associations the company obtains recognition for its 
principles and achievements; its worth and position in the community are 
better known; the quality of its scientific work and its efficiency in 
production becomes better known and our customers and friends learn to 
better appreciate our pioneer work in the development of the art of 
telephony.73 
 
AT&T engineers quickly learned that “outside” cooperation had more than a 
social function.  One prominent example of the technical benefits of cooperation may be 
seen in AT&T efforts to address electrical interference generated by the close proximity 
of other networks that utilized electrical current, such as electrical power lines, lighting 
systems, and railroad equipment.  In the nineteenth century, information infrastructures 
                                                
73 H. F. Albright, “The Business Activities and Relations of Members of Engineering and 
Manufacturing Departments Outside the Western Electric Company [page 2],” Manufacturing and 
Engineering Conference (1915). 
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such as the telegraph and railroad networks grew in a largely complementary manner.74  
The electrical infrastructures of the twentieth century, however, created new problems 
that engineers attacked by using both technical and organizational means. 
AT&T engineers had long been familiar with interference, such as “crosstalk” 
(speech from one conversation was audible in another) and “babble” (unintelligible 
background noise), that resulted from placing telephone circuits in close proximity.75  By 
1920, however, AT&T engineers were increasingly concerned with the electrical 
interference generated by the power companies.  Although Gherardi and AT&T Chief 
Counsel N. T. Guernsey believed that AT&T held a strong legal position to avoid 
interference through litigation against the power and light companies, they preferred to 
settle the problems through negotiation among engineers of the respective industries.76 
To accommodate a cooperative settlement to the problems of interfering 
infrastructures, Gherardi participated in the creation of new institutions to host direct 
negotiations with the powerful firms and industry groups in the railroad and electrical 
industries.  Beginning in 1921, Gherardi led the Bell System’s involvement in three 
separate Joint General Committees: one with the Edison Electrical Institute, a second 
with the Association of American Railroads, and a third with the National Electric Light 
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Association.77  These committees eventually formulated standards for safety and the 
shared use of poles, and established the foundations for creating standards for inductive 
coordination—a difficult technical problem that continues to vex telecommunications and 
electrical engineers in the early twenty-first century.78  Because the negotiations between 
the telephone, power, railroad, and light companies had legal as well as technical 
dimensions, it would have been premature to bring such discussions into standard 
committees in groups such as the AIEE or the American Engineering Standards 
Committee.  Instead, the telephone, electrical, and railway engineers first used the ad hoc 
Joint General Committees to establish a shared commitment to solving the problems of 
inductive interference through engineering cooperation instead of litigation.  Once the 
problems were reduced to a set of technical problems that could be solved through 
standardization, the AIEE and American Standards Association provided ideal venues for 
ensuring widespread adoption of standards for inductive coordination.79  
These Joint General Committees, oriented around collaborative research and data-
gathering, left a lasting impression on Gherardi.  Reflecting in 1928 on the Bell System’s 
seven years of collaboration with the National Electric Light Association, Gherardi 
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declared that “we came to the conclusion that 10 per cent of our problem was technical 
and 90 per cent was to bring about between the people on both sides of the question, a 
friendly and cooperative approach.”80 
Such experiences confirmed Gherardi’s belief that cooperative organizations 
could help him solve technical problems.  By the late 1920s, this belief, combined with 
Gherardi’s longstanding interest in technical standardization, led him to get closely 
involved with the activities of the American Engineering Standards Committee (AESC).  
The AESC was formed in 1918 to solve the same types of inter-industry technical 
problems that Gherardi had been investigating through the bilateral and ad hoc Joint 
General Committees.  The AESC, which began as a joint venture between electrical, 
mechanical, civil, mining, and materials testing engineers, had proven to be a productive 
venue for reaching a national consensus among engineers as well as representatives from 
government, academia, the insurance industry, trade associations, and safety groups.  
Three factors drove the rapid growth of the AESC in the early 1920s: the interest of 
engineers in the elite technical societies, increasing participation from trade associations, 
and the support of political leaders such as the highly-regarded mining engineer and 
Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover.81   
                                                
80 Bancroft Gherardi, “Discussion at Pacific Coast Convention,” Transactions of the American 
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At first, AT&T participated in the AESC in a very limited way.  It did not 
contribute to any AESC projects until 1921, when it sent an engineer to only one 
committee—“Symbols for Electrical Equipment of Buildings and Ships.”82  AT&T 
joined the AESC in earnest in 1922, when the Bell Telephone System formed the 
Telephone Group (together with its nominal partner, the United States Independent 
Telephone Association) and became a Member Body of the AESC.83  By the end of 1927, 
Bell System engineers were involved in the work of twenty-one AESC sectional 
committees, such as the National Electrical Safety Code committee as well as committees 
that created standards for manhole frames and covers, tubular steel poles, methods for 
testing wood, direct-current rotating machines, induction motors and machines, and 
drafting room drawings.84  Each of these projects dealt with technologies that lay at the 
boundaries between the telephone business and other industries.  They each were 
important (or in some cases vital) for the operation of the Bell System, but, unlike 
standards for the telephone network and equipment, not subject to AT&T’s monopoly 
control.  As it formed committees, the AESC was very careful not to tread on AT&T’s 
technological turf, and there is no evidence that AT&T submitted any of its internal 
standards for AESC approval.  The full name of an AESC committee responsible for 
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standards for insulated wires and cables illustrates the point clearly: “Wires and Cables, 
Insulated (Other than Telephone and Telegraph).”85 
Gherardi became personally involved in the AESC as the consensus 
standardization movement reached a turning point in 1928.  In response to increasing 
amounts of interest from all aspects of industry—not just engineers—the AESC made 
fundamental changes to its structure and process, and reconstituted itself as the American 
Standards Association (ASA) in July 1928.86  Most of the organization’s reforms were 
aimed at making it more welcoming and efficient for industry representatives of all 
stripes—passing control, as the New York Times noted blandly, from engineers and 
scientists to “the executives of railroad, public utility companies and industrial 
concerns.”87  Engineers and scientists remained in charge of the standards-setting process 
in the ASA Standards Council, while the industry executives formed a Board of Directors 
that assumed responsibility for the ASA’s financial administration.88  Gherardi was a 
member of the Board of Directors from 1929 to 1935, and also played a key role in the 
ASA Underwriters’ Fund, which raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for ASA coffers 
by soliciting direct contributions from industrial firms.89 
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Gherardi’s importance to the ASA—and the ASA’s importance to Gherardi—was 
underscored by his election as ASA President for the years 1931 and 1932.90  Despite the 
potentially crippling effects of economic depression, Gherardi could boast by the end of 
his term in 1932 that the ASA consensus standardization process was alive and robust.  
During 1932, 2,700 individuals from 570 technical, trade, and government bodies were 
involved in ASA projects—more people than ever before.91  In the standards committees 
of the ASA, AT&T found venues to leverage its status and power to extend its technical 
jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of the Bell System.  A close look at AT&T’s extended 
efforts to revise a single, seemingly mundane standard for lock washers illustrates how 
the company’s engineers used the industry standards process to attack critical system 
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3.4.1  Telephone Slugs: a “Petty Racket” 
To understand why AT&T engineers thought the standardization of lock washers 
could help solve a critical system problem, it is necessary to take a slight excursion and 
consider some of the history of coin-operated telephones.  The first coin-operated 
telephone was invented in 1888, but Bell companies did not adopt them immediately on a 
large scale.  When they first appeared, coin-operated telephones were well suited for two 
different purposes:for convenient on-the-go calls in busy public areas, and for residential 
customers or shops—particularly in Chicago—who preferred the option to pay on a per-
call basis instead of a more expensive monthly subscription.92 
For the Bell System, the major disadvantage of these coin-operated telephones 
was that they could be tricked.  Instead of inserting nickels, dimes, or quarters, some 
customers used metal objects—known as slugs—that were a similar size and weight to 
the legal coins.  Slugs posed a costly problem for operating companies.  For example, one 
1927 report suggested that in Detroit alone, over 15,000 slugs were found in coin-
operated phones each month, which translated to $750 in lost revenue.93  
As engineers from Western Electric, AT&T, and the operating companies studied 
the problem, they realized that any exclusively technical solution to the slug problem 
would be costly and excessively difficult to engineer.  One possibility they considered 
was to design coin boxes to use non-circular or octagonal tokens; but this solution would 
have triggered other substantial system problems, such as increased installation and 
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maintenance costs.94  Bell System engineers also considered making changes to the slots 
used to filter and collect nickels, dimes, and quarters, but these channels were already 
built to meet precise tolerances designed to allow legitimate coins to work.  In both 
cases—the introduction of irregular tokens and the redesign of coin channels in existing 
telephones—the costs of fixing the slug problem within a system context were 
prohibitive, and both alternatives were rejected as short-term solutions.95   
Unable to solve the slug problem through an internal technological fix, AT&T 
engineers chose to attack the problem by turning to institutions outside the Bell System.  
Between 1927 and 1938, AT&T cultivated relationships with two communities: private 
firms active in industry standards committees, and government officials who took an 
interest either in the standardization process or in connections between “the slug racket” 
and other forms of organized crime.  In their efforts with both communities, AT&T’s 
strategy was based on a fascinating assumption: it was easier to change the world than it 
was to change a technology embedded deep within the Bell System. 
In 1927, the Superintendent of the Michigan Bell Telephone Company alerted 
AT&T engineers that a significant portion of slugs discovered in coin boxes were in fact 
washers that were manufactured to conform with a particular industry standard.  Many of 
the slugs that turned up in Bell coin boxes were, from a different perspective, simply 
standard iron washers that coincidentally had similar dimensions to nickels, dimes, or 
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quarters.96  Two of the leading engineering societies in the country—the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers and the Society of Automotive Engineers—had 
separately published these washer standards in the early 1920s.  Beginning in 1926, these 
two groups combined efforts under the auspices of the American Standards Association, 
and formed ASA Sectional Committee B27, “Standardization of Plain and Lock 
Washers.”  Since this was a clear opportunity to eliminate the offending sizes of washers 
that were being used as slugs, AT&T sent one of its senior equipment engineers, George 
K. Thompson, to participate on the B27 Committee beginning in late 1927.97 
The pace of work in the ASA Committee was slow—so slow that when 
Thompson retired in 1930, the committee had not even published a draft of the revised 
washer standards.  When he retired, Thompson left the AT&T washer standards 
campaign in the hands of Eliot W. Niles, an engineer in the Department of Development 
and Research.  By early 1931, progress seemed imminent: the B27 committee had 
prepared a tentative standard with revised dimensions for lock washers.  However, in 
June 1931 the ASA Standards Council reviewed the committee’s work and discovered a 
violation of ASA rules that caused further delay.  The problem was that ASA procedural 
rules required sectional committees to have an even representation of producers and 
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consumers—in this case, manufacturers and buyers of washers.  With eighteen committee 
members designated as consumers and only eleven designated as producers, B27’s 
membership failed to meet the ASA’s procedural standard.  It took the committee another 
full year to canvass existing members for manufacturers who might be interested, 
convince six of these manufacturers to join the committee, and obtain Agnew’s approval 
for this change.  After these new members were approved, they needed several additional 
months to review the proposed specifications.98  
As the standards process plodded along, AT&T also utilized a second, more 
aggressive, tactic to recruit allies among other industrial firms.  Thompson and Niles 
were eager to learn of companies that manufactured brass tags, commemorative coins, or 
non-standard washers that could be used as slugs, and AT&T was not shy about 
dispatching company representatives to warn these companies about the damage their 
products were causing.  This approach worked well with small companies, but larger 
manufacturers or Bell System suppliers—such as Bethlehem Steel—were less easily 
persuaded (or intimidated) by letters, calls, or even visits from AT&T representatives.99  
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In 1933, a full six years after AT&T first identified the standard washers that were 
being used as slugs, AT&T officials finally found a strategy that helped them bring the 
work of committee B27 to completion.  Upon discovering that washer dimensions 
specified in an Air Corps Standard contained the same specifications as some of the 
offending slugs, they pressured Harry H. Woodring, the Assistant Secretary of War, to 
support a new standard.  Woodring, spurred to action by letters and meetings with Niles 
and A. E. Van Hagen (an AT&T official based in Washington), persuaded the Army-
Navy Standards Board to back the changes favored by AT&T.  This appeal, directed 
toward a high-ranking military officer, sparked a final surge of support that culminated in 
the publication of the revised washer specification as an ASA-approved “American 
Standard” in 1934.100 
The long-awaited victory was bittersweet.  By itself, the new standard—a 
significant technical, organizational, and political achievement that took seven years—
was not a wholesale solution to the slug problem.  ASA standards were used only on a 
voluntary basis, and the ASA, by design, had no authority to enforce compliance with its 
standards.  Even though AT&T had spent the last seven years building a strong network 
of partners through the standardization process, this alliance could not protect the Bell 
System from those elements of American industrial society who did not want to adhere to 
the consensus industry standard.  The offending standard was eliminated, but the slug 
problem remained. 
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By the mid-1930s, exasperated AT&T executives appealed to regulators and law 
enforcement officials for their help in stopping the fraudulent manufacture and use of 
telephone slugs.  This political strategy began to pay dividends in 1936.  In February of 
that year, the New York District Attorney arrested three men alleged to be responsible for 
manufacturing and selling a majority of slugs used to defraud coin-operated boxes used 
by telephone companies, public utility companies, and restaurants.  As the arrest was 
announced, a representative from New York Telephone took advantage of the publicity to 
disclose the extent of the slug problem: In 1935 alone, New York Telephone recovered 
4,277,256 slugs, which amounted to $344,524 in lost revenue.  This announcement was a 
shrewd public relations move, calculated to build a sense of indignation against the “slug 
racket.”  Twenty more suspects were arrested in an April 1936 sting, and sixteen of them 
(including their “spearhead”) were convicted by the end of June.101  Reflecting on these 
arrests, an outraged editorial in the Washington Post asked the public to rise above this 
“petty racket,” and suggested that a cultural standard could succeed where a technical 
standard did not: 
Petty rackets in which the public at large is able to participate with slight 
danger of detection are not so easy to control. They constantly crop up in 
one form or another. The ultimate hope of exterminating them lies in 
elevating standards of personal conduct through education in the home 
and schools… For immediate relief from mass pilfering a great deal can be 
done by unrelenting pursuit of the individuals who earn a living by 
encouraging such practices.102 
 
 Buoyed by public support for police action against the slug racket, AT&T and the 
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regional Bell Associated Companies pressed state regulators around the country to pass 
laws that made the use of telephone slugs a crime punishable by fine, imprisonment, or 
both.  In December 1937, the Washington Post reported the first arrest under the District 
of Columbia’s new law prohibiting the use of telephone slugs.  The article concluded by 
noting the financial benefits of such laws for the telephone company: “In 38 states where 
similar laws have been enforced, company officials said losses had ‘dropped 
tremendously.’”103  Of all the different tactics used by AT&T men since discovering the 
slug problem in 1927, this lobbying offensive—a political solution to a technical 
problem—yielded the best results by far.104 
This brief history of AT&T’s anti-slug efforts illustrates some of the more general 
features of AT&T’s attitude toward industry standardization.  Beginning in the 1920s, 
AT&T engineers joined dozens of consensus standards committees.  Their experiences in 
these committees were as diverse as the standards they sought to influence.  In many of 
these committees, such as those that set standards for wood poles and acoustic 
terminology, work proceeded in a much more harmonious and less controversial 
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fashion.105  In other cases, such as the battles for control of radio transmission, the 
standards-setting process became a lightning rod for scientific, technical, and political 
controversy.106  Sometimes AT&T participated in more targeted and specific institutions, 
such as the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, Institute of Radio Engineers, 
American Society for Testing Materials, and National Electric Light Association; other 
times it participated in larger and more bureaucratic bodies such as the ASA and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission.107  AT&T’s motivations for joining these 
committees also varied.  In some cases, industry standards helped to improve the 
efficiency of operations in the Bell System.  In other cases, standards work helped AT&T 
engineers to either establish or enhance their personal reputations and professional status.  
In still other cases, AT&T strove to shape the industry consensus around solutions and 
technologies that it favored.   
Amidst this variety, AT&T engineers effectively learned a valuable overarching 
lesson: they could use industry standards committees to solve critical problems with the 
telephone system that AT&T could not solve on its own.  Moreover, standards committee 
provided avenues for AT&T to throw its weight around in American industry, politics, 
and society.  The standardization process could be painfully slow over the short term, but 
AT&T managers realized that, over the long term, they could leverage standards 
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committees to extend their influence over separate, non-telephone lines of business.  At 
the same time, AT&T managers learned that there were limits to the utility of the 
consensus standards process—and also limits to the willingness of antitrust regulators to 
let the telephone monopoly expand its reach. 
 
3.5  Containing System Momentum Through Regulation, 1934-1956 
Despite small problems (such as telephone slugs) and big problems (such as 
prolonged economic depression), by the end of the 1930s the Bell System was in good 
health—“sitting pretty” in the assessment of historian John Brooks.  However, the 
reemergence of anti-monopoly sentiment in the 1930s led government officials to renew 
its efforts to regulate the Bell System.  As part of the Communications Act of 1934, 
Congress gave a new independent regulatory body—the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC)—the authority to regulate the telephone industry.108  The Act 
represented the first in a series of regulatory initiatives, led by the FCC and the 
Department of Justice, that by 1956 had the cumulative effect of restricting the 
manufacturing and operations of the Bell System strictly to common-carrier telephone 
service and military contracting.  These jurisdictional constraints, which AT&T 
executives viewed with satisfaction as a successful defense of their telephone monopoly, 
had the long term effect of containing AT&T’s dominance to the telephone industry—
ultimately leaving the commercial application of electronic technologies to other firms. 
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Soon after its creation, the FCC acted quickly to exercise its statutory authority to 
police the Bell System.  In 1935, the FCC commenced a “Telephone Investigation” that 
culminated in a 661 page Report on the Investigation of the Telephone Industry in 
1939.109  Although the FCC staff believed that a cooperative relationship with AT&T 
would be much more productive (and in the public interest) than an adversarial one, the 
Report was nevertheless highly critical of the Bell System.  An entire chapter of the 
FCC’s Report focused on “engineering and standardization.”  The FCC showed no 
awareness of AT&T’s involvement in industry standards organizations or on the potential 
for AT&T to manipulate these committees.  Instead, the FCC’s focus was exclusively on 
the internal workings of the System. 
The FCC tacitly accepted AT&T’s claims of the enormous savings that had been 
achieved through its standardization work, including $99 million from cable 
development, $50 million from the use of less expensive metals, and $5 million per year 
from improvements in switchboard cords.  The FCC also acknowledged that 
standardization in the monopoly Bell System had generated substantial social benefits, 
such as the development of long-distance capabilities, service to rural areas, and increases 
in service quality through technological advances such as repeaters and telephone 
handsets.  Moreover, the FCC recognized that centralized control and standardization had 
the benefit of providing “flexibility in the interchange of equipment and trained 
personnel” throughout the System, and helped to create a “uniformly high quality of 
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service.”110   
However, in keeping with the critical tone of the Report, the FCC concluded that 
“centralized control over engineering, standardization, and manufacturing” could provide 
opportunities for the suppression of inventions, the failure to take advantages of outside 
improvements, and the sale and installation of outdated or inferior equipment by Western 
Electric to the regional operating companies.  Consequently, the FCC recommended 
continued regulatory scrutiny of AT&T’s standardization activities—especially those that 
required large capital investment.  Given the FCC’s ultimate conclusion in this area (“the 
overall results of standardization by the American Co. are such as to justify a continuance 
of research and standardization”), this call for continued scrutiny sounded more like a 
justification or plea for the FCC’s own existence, rather than any principled 
demonstration that such oversight would produce benefits to telephone subscribers and 
the general public.111   
In any case, over three decades of advertising, public relations, and high-quality 
service had left AT&T with a positive public image that would have rendered ineffective 
any potential regulatory attacks.112  AT&T’s actions in the face of disasters—both natural 
and man-made—further established its reputation as a public servant.  If AT&T’s 
response to a devastating hurricane in 1938 cast it in a heroic role, as John Brooks 
suggested, then its wartime efforts confirmed this heroic status.  The combined service of 
AT&T, Bell Labs, and Western Electric enhanced the American military and civilian 
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communications infrastructure to meet heightened demand during World War II, and also 
contributed to the design and manufacture of decisive technologies such as radar and 
antiaircraft systems.  After the war, officials in the Defense Department depended on Bell 
executives to manage efforts to build nuclear weapons, providing further confirmation 
that the Bell System was a vital asset for national security.113   
Despite these good deeds, anti-monopoly sentiment in the federal government 
was rekindled after World War II.  The mild complaints raised in the 1939 FCC Report 
fed a full-fledged antitrust suit filed in 1949.  In United States v. Western Electric 
Company and American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the government repeated its 
claims that the exclusive ties between AT&T and Western Electric had stifled new 
technologies and generated excessive profits for AT&T.  However, conflicts within the 
federal government—including a difference of opinion between the Departments of 
Defense and Justice as well as within the Justice Department itself—dulled the 
adversarial edge of the antitrust suit.  With the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952, 
the Justice Department adopted a much more tolerant attitude toward big business, and 
Justice officials and AT&T executives pursued an amicable settlement that would keep 
intact the relationship between Western Electric and AT&T.114 
As the government built its case, AT&T executives recognized that they would 
need to make concessions in order to attain their primary objective, which was continued 
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control over the American telephone industry.  In January 1956, the antitrust suit was 
settled by a Consent Decree.  The Consent Decree prevented both AT&T and Western 
Electric from entering markets outside of common carrier telephone service, thus 
restricting the Bell System’s ability to control the interfaces and standards being 
developed in the nascent American electronics industry.  Additionally, by forcing the Bell 
System to license its patents at reasonable rates, the Consent Decree forever ended the 
practice developed by earlier generations of Bell executives—notably Edward Hall and 
Theodore Vail—in which patents and technical standards functioned as strategic tools to 
marginalize competitors.115  
Both parties claimed victory: the Justice Department, because it forced 
concessions from AT&T; and AT&T, because it kept intact the relationship between it 
and Western Electric.116  In their haste to maintain the status quo, AT&T executives 
made the mistake of reaping what they had sown.  Over the short term, AT&T 
maintained control over the telephone industry, but over the long term, technological 
change in American telecommunications markets moved swiftly past anything that 
AT&T could control.  By ceding control over patents and accepting regulation as a 
condition of continued telephone monopoly, AT&T undermined its ability to influence 
standards committees in the same manner it did in the 1920s and 1930s.  Rather than 
looking forward or beyond the Bell System toward new technologies and markets, AT&T 
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executives happily accepted federal regulation to protect what their company had already 
built.117 
 
3.6  Conclusions 
Monopoly, like standardization, was neither natural nor stable.  In the context of 
the growth and development of the Bell System, monopoly and standardization were 
mutually causative and mutually reinforcing: standardization facilitated the drive for 
managerial integration and market superiority, which in turn facilitated further initiatives 
for standardization.  Through this dynamic relationship, the Bell System gained 
momentum and matured as a large technological system—indeed, the largest such system 
in the history of American private enterprise.   
Momentum brought stability to Bell System, but it also was accompanied by 
significant technological and organizational problems.  The Bell System was powerful, 
but not omnipotent.  Two factors—technological change and government regulation—
were the primary challenges for AT&T managers as they struggled to control the 
direction and pace of change within the Bell monopoly between 1913 and 1956.   
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control over interconnection standards for the telephone network, and allowed a flood of 
entrepreneurial competitors to enter markets that were previously dominated by AT&T and 
Western Electric. The next two chapters explore these changes in technology and regulation in 
more depth. 
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By the 1930s, AT&T executives and engineers had learned to use consensus 
standardization to achieve strategic goals, including system-wide problems that it found 
to be impossible to solve through its own isolated effort.  Because consensus standards 
committees were oriented around problems that could be solved through technical 
expertise, these committees were well suited to AT&T’s style of persuasion based on 
extensive research and technical data.  When faced with critical system problems, such as 
inductive interference and illegal telephone slugs, AT&T engineers such as Bancroft 
Gherardi and George K. Thompson looked to standards committees to establish a unified, 
inter-industry front against problems that could not be solved within the boundaries of the 
Bell System.   
Through consensus standards committees, AT&T executives and engineers used 
the power of the Bell System to pursue technological solutions that threatened the 
efficiency of the Bell System.  In addition to these dimensions of power and efficiency, 
AT&T participation in industry standards committees also depended upon cultural 
notions of trust and reputation.  The Western Electric engineer H. F. Albright stated the 
importance of these cultural aspects as early as 1915.  Albright, framing AT&T’s 
participation in industry bodies in civic terms, told his fellow engineers that Bell System 
support for the AIEE “is as much needed and is as much a duty as the support of local 
institutions for good government, the schools, and the churches.”118 
                                                
118 H. F. Albright, “The Business Activities and Relations of Members of Engineering and 
Manufacturing Departments Outside the Western Electric Company [page 2],” Manufacturing and 
Engineering Conference (1915). 
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The career of Bancroft Gherardi provides a good example of the ways that the 
cooperative ideology of standardization shaped technology and strategy in the monopoly 
Bell System.  In addition to his duties as a traffic engineer and eventually Chief Engineer 
of AT&T, Gherardi devoted substantial effort to “industrial legislatures” such as the 
AIEE and American Standards Association.  As AT&T engineers followed Gherardi’s 
lead, they learned that they could mobilize these industry standards committees to help 
solve critical problems within the Bell System.  Ultimately, however, AT&T executives 
needed to take additional steps—appeals to government authorities—to protect and 
preserve their control over telephone networks.  By doing so, these executives voluntarily 
ceded control over new technologies, such as the transistor, that presented opportunities 
for radical innovation in telecommunications services.  
Beginning as early as the 1890s AT&T had sacrificed the pursuit of radical or 
disruptive innovations in order to preserve incremental momentum.  Thanks to the vision 
of the system architects Edward Hall, Theodore Vail, John Carty, and Bancroft Gherardi, 
the Bell System was thoroughly standardized and fully protected from competitive entry 
and regulatory control.  Between the 1880s and the 1950s, standardization provided a 
smooth middle ground between innovation and stability, between the development of 
new technologies or methods and the diffusion of these innovations on a calculated and 
system-wide basis. 
By looking at the creation and growth of the monopoly Bell System from the 
vantage point of standardization, we can see two different roles of standardization—
dynamic and static.  As Louis Galambos argued, many Bell standardization initiatives 
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before 1907 “had an essentially static quality,” and sought to stabilize and harmonize 
technologies and practices across local and regional Bell licensee companies.  With 
monopoly achieved under Vail, Bell engineers shifted focus and emphasized the dynamic 
aspects of standardization.119  At a 1915 conference, Frank Jewett felt the need to instruct 
his fellow engineers on the differences.  Jewett suspected that many of his colleagues 
interpreted the term “standard” to mean something like the standard meter in the 
Archives of Paris that was “fixed as nearly as possible for all time.”  Standards in the Bell 
System, however, were more dynamic.  “What we call a standard of to-day may not be 
the standard of tomorrow,” Jewett explained, “because some condition in that operating 
field or some advance in manufacturing may have made it expedient to change that 
practice or that apparatus.”120  This dynamic conception of standardization was of vital 
importance in the “engineering of the present,” such as the transition from manual to 
machine switching that Gherardi oversaw during the 1920s and 1930s.  In the view of 
Jewett and Gherardi, standardization was an ally of innovation and change.   
However, as the Bell System gained momentum and monopoly status and sought 
to protect that momentum between the 1930s and the 1950s, the tendency toward stasis 
became more pronounced in the Bell approach to standardization.  For example, instead 
of absorbing the staggering costs associated with redesigning coin telephone boxes, 
                                                
119 Galambos also suggests that, prior to 1907, many standardization initiatives “had an 
essentially static quality.” Galambos, “Theodore N. Vail and the Role of Innovation,” 106-107.  
120 Frank Jewett, “Discussion of Mr. McQuarrie’s paper [pages 7-8],” Manufacturing and 
Engineering Conference. Jewett’s recognition of this tension anticipated conceptions from the 1920s, 
articulated by standards advocates such as P. G. Agnew and Albert Whitney, that drew 
philosophical distinctions between the static and dynamic character of standardization. See 
Chapter 3, “From Industry Standards to American Standards, 1910-1930.” 
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AT&T looked to standards committees—and eventually regulators and police—to 
eliminate washers that could be used to manipulate coin-operated telephones.  In another 
example in the 1940s and 1950s, AT&T lawyers successfully convinced the FCC that 
even harmless a device like the “Hush-a-Phone” was illegal because it was a network 
attachment that was not furnished by AT&T.121  In both of these examples, AT&T 
demanded end-to-end control over the telephone network, and struggled mightily to avoid 
changing their entrenched structures of control.  
AT&T got what it wanted from the Consent Decree in 1956: total control over 
telephone technology and administration in exchange for all rights to enter new and 
dynamic markets.  Although Bell Labs produced a steady stream of innovations, AT&T 
executives recognized that their company was not in a position to capitalize on them.  
With AT&T’s power curtailed, a diverse set of institutions—including established firms 
such as IBM, a group of entrepreneurial ventures in California, government agencies such 
as the Department of Defense, and international standards-setting committees such as the 
International Organization for Standardization—would assume leading positions in the 
development of electronic forms of communication.  This constellation of institutions, 
through cooperative and competitive relationships, would create new standards, new 
network architectures, and, ultimately, a new information infrastructure for the Third 
Industrial Revolution.
                                                
121 Vietor, Contrived Competition, 190-191. 
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Chapter 4: “Rough Consensus and Running Code”: The Political Economy of 
Network Architecture, 1956-1992 
 
4.1  Introduction 
In the second half of the twentieth century, fundamental changes in technology—
including digital and microwave transmission techniques, as well as new solid-state 
electronic components—presented opportunities for the creation of new communications 
systems.  Unlike the technological systems of the early twentieth century, these new 
systems were not developed by any single firm.  Instead, the new system architects were 
leaders of consensus standards committees that integrated decentralized advances in 
computer hardware and software.  As systems innovators such as AT&T and IBM were 
hindered by federal regulation and pursued proprietary, “one-size-fits-all” strategies 
during the 1960s and 1970s, entrepreneurs and small firms flourished by building 
products that conformed to consensus standards.  By the 1990s, hundreds of firms around 
the globe competed within a segmented, diffuse, and highly specialized industry 
structure, industry leaders such as AT&T and IBM lost their dominant positions, and 
systems innovation gave way to modular innovation.1  The combined effects of 
technological, economic, and political change led historians to conclude that global 
society was in the midst of a Third Industrial Revolution.2 
                                                
1 Andrew S. Grove, Only the Paranoid Survive: How to Exploit the Crisis Points That Challenge Every 
Company (New York: Currency, 1999), 37-52; and Richard N. Langlois, “Organizing the Electronic 
Century,” Paper for the conference "Has There Been a Third Industrial Revolution in Global 
Business?" November 16-18, 2006, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy. 
2 Thomas McCraw, ed., Creating Modern Capitalism: How Entrepreneurs, Companies, and Countries 
Triumphed in Three Industrial Revolutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Alfred 
D. Chandler, Jr., “The Information Age in Historical Perspective: Introduction,” in Alfred D. 
 
 194 
One of the most striking developments of the Third Industrial Revolution was the 
rise of “open systems” in the computer and electronics industries.  In contrast to the 
proprietary systems developed by IBM and its imitators, open systems consisted of 
components with interfaces that were publicly available.  Open systems appealed to users 
who valued the ability to mix and match components for technologies such as personal 
stereos and minicomputers.  But, perhaps more importantly, they also appealed to 
regulators, engineers, and entrepreneurs who disapproved of IBM’s dominance and 
wished to facilitate greater diversity and competition in markets for electronic 
components.3  
The most significant developments in open systems occurred within computer 
networks designed between the late 1960s and the early 1990s.  During this period, 
computer scientists and engineers in the United States and Europe began to experiment 
with electronic computers and digital transmission as the basis of new packet-switched 
networks.  AT&T executives, hamstrung by the 1956 Consent Decree and fully 
committed to their analog, circuit-switched network, opted not to participate in these 
experiments in computer networking.  In the absence of AT&T’s commanding 
institutional presence, the designers of the new computer networks—supported by the 
                                                                                                                                            
Chandler, Jr. and James W. Cortada, eds., A Nation Transformed By Information: How Information 
Has Shaped the United States from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 3-38. 
3 On open systems, see Richard N. Langlois and Paul L. Robertson, “Networks and Innovation in 
a Modular System: Lessons from the Microcomputer and Stereo Component Industries,” Research 
Policy 21 (1992): 297-311; Carl Cargill, “Evolution and Revolution in Open Systems,” StandardView 
2 (1994): 3-13; Martin Libicki, Information Technology Standards: Quest for the Common Byte (Boston: 
Digital Press, 1995), 75-129; Garth Saloner, “Economic Issues in Computer Interface 
Standardization: the Case of UNIX,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1 (1989): 135-156; 
and Sigram Schindler, “Open Systems, Today and Tomorrow – A Personal Perspective,” 
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United States Department of Defense and national governments in Europe—created new 
standards to fit within their new concepts in network architecture.  
Institutional innovation sustained and guided technological innovation.  As 
researchers sponsored by the Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA)4 created new protocols from scratch, they learned that regular meetings within 
informal settings greatly facilitated their collaborative technical work.  Because their 
network—the Arpanet5—was sponsored by the Defense Department and was not part of 
commercial, for-profit activity, these researchers did not turn to existing committees—
such as the American Standards Association or the Institute for Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers—that were dedicated to industrial standardization.  Instead, they created a 
fluid group of informal institutions, such as the Network Working Group (1969), Internet 
Configuration Control Board (1979), and Internet Engineering Task Force (1986), to 
manage the development of standards for packet-switched networks.  These informal 
institutions consisted of members from a wide range of academic institutions, 
government contractors, and, eventually, private companies.  Participants in these 
institutions established a culture of free-wheeling technical discussions in which they 
would test and compare a number of protocols and specifications before coming to an 
agreement on a single standard.  On January 1, 1983, ARPA forced all the administrators 
                                                
4 ARPA was renamed DARPA (for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) in 1972; then 
ARPA again in 1993, before changing back to DARPA once again in 1996. For consistency, I will 
use “ARPA” throughout this chapter. 
5 The proper rendering of the network’s name is ARPANET. For aesthetic purposes, I use 
“Arpanet” throughout this chapter. 
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of all computers on the Arpanet to convert to a new set of “Internetworking” protocols, 
TCP/IP, thus marking the birth of the Internet. 
Although researchers in Europe also sought to create a new network architecture 
for packet-switched networks during the same time period, their standardization process 
followed a different path.  After an initial phase of cooperation with ARPA researchers, 
in 1977 the leaders of the major European computer firms and telecommunications 
monopolies decided to create their own network architecture within the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO).  ISO was a federation of national standards-
setting organizations that was created in 1947 under the auspices of the United Nations.  
This network architecture, Open Systems Interconnection (OSI), was an attempt to 
establish a framework to accommodate “anticipatory standards,” or standards that had not 
yet been created.  Between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, the OSI seven-layer model 
became enshrined in computer science curricula and was endorsed by governments 
around the world.  Because OSI enjoyed such widespread support, most experts expected 
competing networks—including the TCP/IP Internet—to fade away once protocols 
within the OSI model were standardized and implemented by users and manufacturers.   
As the Internet and OSI were under development, a tense rivalry emerged 
between advocates of the two competing network architectures.  The rivalry—described 
in 1993 by the telecommunications analyst William Drake as “the Internet religious 
war”—highlighted divergent worldviews toward technology, system design, and political 




The debate is not merely about the comparative efficacy of two sets of 
standards, but it is rather between two competing visions of how 
international standardization processes and network development should 
be organized and controlled.6 
 
Where OSI advocates favored an approach that was blessed by negotiations at the 
highest levels of international politics, Internet advocates insisted that their work should 
be immune from such political pressures.  Their style of innovation, therefore, was an 
implicit—and at times explicit—rejection and critique of the existing political economy 
of standardization.  In 1992, the Internet architect David D. Clark articulated the 
conventional wisdom of the Internet community in a memorable phrase that became the 
community’s credo: “We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe in: rough 
consensus and running code.”7 
The Internet religious war was settled by the mid-1990s, as ISO’s bureaucratic 
and politicized standardization process failed to keep up with the Internet’s informal 
approach that was more effective at coordinating diffuse and rapid technological 
innovation.  An examination of the competition between the two network architectures 
reveals the ways that Internet engineers embedded their cultural values into specific 
Internet standards as well as the organizations responsible for creating and maintaining 
these standards.8  As we strive to understand these technological, organizational, and 
                                                
6 William Drake, “The Internet Religious War,” Telecommunications Policy 17 (1993): 643. 
7 David D. Clark, “A Cloudy Crystal Ball: Visions of the Future,” (plenary presentation at 24th 
meeting of the Internet Engineering Task Force, Cambridge, MA, July 13-17, 1992). Available 
from http://ietf20.isoc.org/videos/future_ietf_92.pdf.  
8 According to one history, the Internet’s architectural principles “embody some value judgments 
and reflect the fundamental political and ethical beliefs of the scientists and engineers who 
designed the Internet.” National Research Council, The Internet’s Coming of Age (Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press, 2000), 35. See also Helen Nissenbaum, “How Computer Systems 
Embody Values,” Computer (2001): 118-120. 
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cultural choices, it is helpful to keep in mind the forms of consensus standardization 
pioneered in the early twentieth century (and described in Chapter 2).  Internet 
researchers may not have seen themselves as operators within an “industrial legislature,” 
but much like Paul Gough Agnew in the 1920s, they did view their collaborations as a 
demonstration of the failures of existing power structures.  In both the Second and the 
Third Industrial Revolutions, creating consensus standards was as much an act of 
inclusion as it was an act of exclusion; as much a creation of new institutions as it was a 
critique of existing power structures. 
 
4.2  Computer Systems and Networks, 1956-1969 
IBM dominated the early years of the electronic computer industry.  The demand 
for computers rose dramatically in the late 1940s and early 1950s, as the American 
military searched for the means to process large amounts of data for ballistics firing 
tables, radar systems, and command and control systems.  Based in large part on its 
ability to partner with the military and research projects at MIT, IBM became a world 
leader in computing technology, and leveraged its organizational capabilities to become 
the dominant force in the domestic and international computer industry by the mid-1950s.  
IBM manufactured different electronic computers—six models in total—that could be 
programmed to meet the needs of almost every type of user in scientific, government, 
military, and business settings.9  However, the incompatibilities between IBM’s different 
                                                
9 Kenneth Flamm reported that over half of IBM’s research budget in the 1950s and 1960s came 
from government contracts. Kenneth Flamm, Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and 
High Technology (Washington: The Brookings Institutions, 1988), 94. See also Steven W. Usselman, 
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models created problems that the firm found difficult to manage, such as tensions 
between divisions and excessive diversity in components.  In 1964, IBM executives 
responded to these problems with a strategy that replaced all existing models of IBM 
machines with a series of computers designed around a single system architecture: 
System/360. 
The chief architectural innovation of System/360 was the establishment of 
standard interfaces for different components of the system, including peripherals (such as 
storage devices, printers, and terminals) and software.  By creating standardized 
components that fit within a modular design, IBM ensured that different customers and 
users could customize the system in order to meet their individual needs.  On the supply 
side, IBM achieved new economies of scale and scope in production by reducing variety 
in components, further adding to the company’s bottom line.  The System/360 was a “bet 
the company” strategy that paid spectacular dividends: the company received over one 
thousand orders within a month of the System/360 announcement in April 1964, and 
IBM’s gross income more than doubled between 1965 and 1970.10  Altogether, 
System/360 was a brilliant strategy because it consolidated existing market power into a 
standardized system that was under IBM’s exclusive control. 
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IBM executives, much like their counterparts at AT&T in the early twentieth 
century, used standardization as a strategy and a practice when their company faced 
organizational and technological complexity.  Standards simplified intra-company 
coordination and, when imposed by dominant firms such as AT&T or IBM, created 
higher barriers to entry.  Just as Edward Hall and Theodore Vail devised AT&T’s 
corporate strategy in order to control the terms of telephone interconnection, so too did 
Gene Amdahl and Fred Brooks (two of the lead architects of System/360) design the 
System/360 so that IBM could define and control the standardization of interfaces 
between computer components.  For both firms, complete control over system 
architecture reinforced and extended existing dominance in their respective industries.  
Like AT&T in the era of “Universal Service,” IBM faced a number of smaller 
competitors.  Most of the competitors, including Sperry Rand, National Cash Register, 
Burroughs, Honeywell, RCA, and General Electric responded to the System/360 by 
introducing their own proprietary alternatives, but ultimately failed to take much of 
IBM’s market share.  Two of the notable successes in this era, Control Data Corporation 
and Digital Electronics Corporation (“Digital”), survived by focusing on niche markets.  
Control Data found some success with a strategy that focused on making high-
performance “supercomputers” for scientific uses at the high end of the market.  Digital, 
on the other hand, created a line of “minicomputers” in the early 1960s that appealed to 
users who wanted to modify and experiment with machines for their own specialized 
purposes.  In stark contrast to IBM’s policy of leasing computers to customers, Digital 
sold their computers outright and provided customers with detailed specifications for 
 
 201 
tinkering with the machine.  This strategic decision fed a growing appetite among users—
including communities of “hackers” at MIT—who resented the IBM approach that kept 
its computers out of reach in sealed rooms.11   
The above examples—IBM’s success with the System/360 as well as the niche 
strategies of Control Data and Digital—show how computer manufacturers in the 1960s 
designed system architectures to meet a wide variety of customer needs.  Recent studies 
by James Cortada indicate the breadth and diversity of computer users in almost every 
conceivable industry, including firms in the manufacturing, retail, transportation, 
financial, media, and entertainment sectors.12  However, in one case in the late 1960s, an 
important community of computer users in the United States Defense Department found 
that neither IBM nor its competitors could meet its needs.  This community responded to 
the market’s failure to provide an appropriate commercial solution by building a new 
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4.2.1  JCR Licklider, Interactive Computing, and the Arpanet 
The visionary behind the creation of the Arpanet was a psychologist from MIT, 
J.C.R. Licklider.  Licklider was the leader of a nascent community of computer 
researchers funded by the Department of Defense during the 1960s.  Licklider had a 
longstanding interest with computers that began after his research in psychoacoustics 
convinced him that computers could help humans think and work in more sophisticated 
ways, resulting in a partnership of humans and electronic computers that, by the early 
1960s, he called “interactive computing.”13  Licklider’s vision of interactive computing 
differed from the prevailing notion of computing at IBM, in which users submitted stacks 
of cards to a uniformed operator who was the only person authorized to run programs on 
the computer.  In the vision of interactive computing shared by Licklider and others at 
MIT, the tremendous social potential of computers could be tapped only when individual 
users could interact directly with the machine.14   
Broader developments in national security provided Licklider with a chance to 
pursue his vision on a large scale.15  After the “Sputnik shock” of 1957, President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower created the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) within the U. S. 
Defense Department, with the expectation that it would help the American military keep 
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up with the technological capabilities of the Soviets.  This basic course of action—heavy 
government investment in science and technology, in the hopes that American scientists 
would be able to win another war—was one of the core assumptions of the science policy 
consensus that Americans forged in the early Cold War.16 
In 1961, Defense Department officials Jack Ruina and Eugene Fubini decided to 
centralize the DoD’s research on computing technology into one program, and asked 
Licklider to lead it.17  Licklider, known to Ruina as a “man of some distinction,” had 
previous experience in military science through acoustic research for the Navy during 
World War II and as an advisor to Air Force scientific studies since 1952.18  Licklider 
immediately seized the opportunity to advance what he often referred to as an evangelical 
mission, his “religious conversion to interactive computing.”19  His primary strategy was 
to link his vision of interactive computing to ARPA’s overarching need to find new ways 
to use computers in military communications (known at the time as command and 
control). “Every time I had the chance to talk,” Licklider recalled of his first days at 
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ARPA, “I said that the mission is interactive computing.”  He convinced his colleagues 
that 
the problems of command and control were essentially problems of man 
computer interaction… Fubini essentially agreed 100% with that and so 
did Ruina… Why didn’t we develop an interactive computing?  If the 
Defense Department’s need for that was to provide an underpinning for 
command and control, fine.  But it was probably necessary in intelligence 
and other parts of the military too. So, we essentially found that there was 
a great consonance of interest here, despite the fact that we were using 
different terms we were talking about the same thing.20 
 
Once he convinced his Pentagon bosses of the utility of his work, Licklider 
operated freely under conditions that he referred to as “benign neglect.”  With Ruina and 
Fubini concentrating on the agency’s much larger programs for ballistic missile defense 
and nuclear test detection, Licklider was able to direct the program with a great deal of 
autonomy.  Throughout the mid-1960s, Licklider and his successors at ARPA’s 
Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) funded research projects in pursuit of 
their shared vision of interactive computing, such as time sharing, networking, graphics, 
and artificial intelligence.  These types of projects—especially time-sharing, where 
different users could use a single computer simultaneously—were not priorities in the 
“one-size-fits-all” design of IBM’s System/360.21 
Licklider left IPTO in 1964 and was succeeded at first by Ivan Sutherland (1964-
1966) and then Robert W. Taylor.  In 1966 and 1967, Taylor and his deputy Lawrence 
Roberts initiated a series of conversations among IPTO-supported researchers about the 
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21 Licklider interview, Charles Babbage Institute.  On IPTO, See Arthur L. Norberg and Judy E. 
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possibility of building a network to connect the seventeen ARPA-funded computer 
centers around the country.  Such a network—dubbed the Arpanet—could 
simultaneously address IPTO’s administrative and research goals: IPTO would be able to 
conserve its computing budget by facilitating remote access to expensive computers; 
researchers at different sites could swap data and programs developed remotely and on 
incompatible systems (such as the IBM System/360 and Digital’s PDP-8); and the 
network itself would be an exciting new research focus for the time-sharing community.22  
Since every major computer manufacturer was following a proprietary strategy designed 
to prevent connections between dissimilar systems, the Arpanet represented a 
government-funded project that sought to compensate for this market failure.   
The chief innovation in the Arpanet’s system architecture was its reliance on 
packet-switching.  Packet-switching was developed independently in the mid-1960s by 
two researchers, Paul Baran at RAND in the United States and Donald Davies at the 
National Physical Laboratory in England.  Packet-switching breaks data into discrete 
chunks (or packets) that contain basic information about their places of origin and 
destination.  The packets are then sent throughout nodes in the network and eventually 
arrive at their destination, where they are reassembled into their original form.  Unlike the 
circuit-switched networks used by AT&T, packet-switched networks did not require a 
constant connection.  Instead, a packet-switched network could send individual packets 
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along any number of routes to their final destination—a feature that made packet-
switched networks more robust and, according to Baran, more likely than circuit-
switched networks to survive a catastrophic event.23   
Although AT&T provided the leased-line infrastructure for the Arpanet, AT&T 
played a curious—and ultimately negligible—role in the design of packet-switched 
networks.   When Baran approached AT&T with his ideas in the mid-1960s, AT&T 
executives dismissed the notion that their analog network was inadequate.  Despite some 
support for Baran’s ideas within Bell Labs, Baran and AT&T could not get past what he 
called a “cultural impasse”: AT&T engineers were fully enmeshed in an analog mindset, 
and could not understand how a digital, packet-switched network would be more reliable 
than the Bell System.  AT&T also displayed an arrogance toward Baran’s innovative 
ideas.  Baran recalled in a 1999 interview that an irritated AT&T official told him, “It 
isn’t going to work, and even if it did, damned if we are going to put anybody in 
competition to ourselves.”24  Baran continued,  
I suspect the major reason for the difficulty in accommodating packet 
switching at the digital transmission level was that it would violate a basic 
ground rule of the Bell System—everything added to the telephone system 
had to work with all previous equipment presently installed. Everything 
had to fit into the existing plan.25 
                                                
23 Paul Baran, “On Distributed Communications Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Communications 
12 (March, 1964): 1-9. Baran published more detailed analyses in twelve volumes entitled On 
Distributed Communications, published by RAND Corporation in 1964. For an analysis of packet-
switching in its Cold War context, see Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 7-42. 
24 Paul Baran, Electrical Engineer, an oral history conducted in 1999 by David Hochfelder, IEEE 
History Center, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA.  See also Paul Baran, OH 182. Oral 
history interview by Judy O’Neill, 5 March 1990, Menlo Park, California. Charles Babbage 
Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. 
25 Baran interview, IEEE. 
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AT&T’s greatest technological strength—thorough standardization into a 
permanent, “universal” network architecture—was also a great impediment to new ideas, 
which meant that a digital, packet-switched communications system would require new 
institutions to create and maintain it.  Lawrence Roberts, who replaced Taylor as IPTO 
Director in March 1969, gathered several ARPA researchers into the Network Working 
Group, the first such institutional effort to design a packet-switched network.  At first, the 
Network Working Group was led by Steve Crocker, a graduate student at UCLA, and 
consisted mostly of graduate students at other ARPA-funded sites at UCLA, the 
University of California at Santa Barbara, the University of Utah, and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.  The group also included representatives from ARPA contractors 
such as Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Rand, and the Stanford Research Institute.   
The main technical objective of the Network Working Group was to create 
technical specifications to connect ARPA mainframes—known as “host” computers—to 
the network.  Each mainframe would be connected to a small computer, designed by 
engineers from Bolt, Beranek and Newman, called an IMP (“interface message 
processor”).26  Because IMPs were the common gateways to the Arpanet, their software 
for communicating with hosts—known as the Network Control Protocol (NCP)—would 
be the defining point of interconnection. The most important design principal behind 
NCP was simplicity, which greatly facilitated the implementation of protocols on 
different, incompatible computers at ARPA sites.  By August 1971, the Network 
Working Group had developed and implemented additional network applications on a 
                                                
26 In this era, a “small” computer was about the size of a refrigerator. 
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number of host computers, including the now-familiar programs for remote login (telnet), 
file transfer (ftp), and electronic mail.27   
The social dynamics of the Network Working Group also reinforced the logic of 
simplicity in the Arpanet’s design.  Roberts extended Licklider’s effort to develop a 
social network alongside a computer network, and sought to develop shared goals and 
values through frequent site visits, contractor meetings, and retreats.  However, tensions 
simmered among members of the group, mostly centered around the role of Bolt, 
Beranek and Newman.  The company—the leading contractor for the Arpanet—viewed 
the Arpanet experience as an opportunity to develop a strong position in a growing niche 
of the computer industry, and sought to protect this strategic advantage by taking a 
secretive approach and sometimes resisting the release of the IMPs’ technical details to 
other ARPA researchers.28   
These tensions, though significant, did not derail the group’s promising work.  
They did, however, inform the style of collaboration that took shape within the Network 
Working Group.  In 1969, Crocker initiated a document series—Request for Comments 
(RFCs)—whose name and structure perfectly captured this work style.  In 1987, Crocker 
recalled “Most of us were graduate students… we kept expecting that an official protocol 
design team would announce itself.”  No such team arrived—a fact that Crocker was 
slow to realize.  In the meantime, he was overcome by a  
 
                                                
27 Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 59-69. 
28 Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 69-74. 
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great fear that we would offend whomever the official protocol designers 
were, and I spent a sleepless night composing humble words for our notes. 
The basic ground rules were that anyone could say anything and that 
nothing was official. And to emphasize the point, I labeled the notes 
“Request for Comments.”29 
 
The RFCs soon became the vehicle for the Network Working Group to publish 
consensus statements and technical standards for the Arpanet.30  Over three years of 
planning culminated with the installation of the first node on the Arpanet at UCLA in 
September 1969.  By December, computers at three additional sites were connected via 
IMPs to the Arpanet and, hence, one another.  The Arpanet grew quickly in subsequent 
years: from four hosts at the end of 1969, to 23 hosts in 1971, to almost 50 by the end of 




                                                
29 Stephen D. Crocker, “The Origins of RFCs,” in Joyce Reynolds and Jon Postel, eds. (1987), “The 
Request for Comments Reference Guide,” RFC 1000, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1000.txt. 
30 Steve Crocker, OH 233. Oral history interview by Judy E. O’Neill, 24 October 1991, Glenwood, 
Maryland. Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. See also Reynolds 
















Figure 4.3: Arpanet, September 1973. 
 
As it grew, the Arpanet was an important research project in its own right as well 
as an infrastructure for other ARPA-sponsored projects and experiments in computer 
networking.  The network continued to grow as more and more users wrote, tested, and 
implemented protocols.  In sum, the standards-setting process in the early Arpanet was 
both a forum for debate as well as a means for arriving at a consensus and moving the 
community forward together.  This tension between competition and cooperation in the 







4.3  Internetworking in the United States and Europe 
After their initial networking experiments with the Arpanet, ARPA researchers, 
led by Robert Kahn and Vint Cerf, continued to explore networking concepts for satellite 
and radio technologies.  The problem of network interconnection—how to enable 
communication between technically disparate computer networks—was a challenging 
research problem, one with significant implications for mobile military communications.  
In the early 1970s, ARPA developed a packet radio network (known as PRnet) based on 
the same packet-switching technology being tested in the Arpanet.  The PRnet project 
was led by Kahn, an engineer at Bolt, Beranek and Newman who moved to ARPA in 
1972 and became head of the Arpanet program from 1973-1976.  Kahn hoped to connect 
packet radio networks to large computers in the continental U. S. via the Arpanet (PRnet 
was developed in Hawaii), but faced a problem of trying to connect what he later called 
“two radically different networks” with different network capacities, protocols, and 
routing systems.31  ARPA’s concurrent development of satellite packet switching in 
SATnet further compounded this problem, leading Kahn to conclude that network 
interconnection could not be achieved on an ad hoc, network-to-network level.  
To overcome this problem, in 1973 Kahn rekindled an effective partnership with 
Cerf that began when the two worked together on the first node of the Arpanet at UCLA 
(where Cerf was a graduate student) in 1969.  Cerf graduated in 1972, and joined the 
                                                
31 Robert Kahn, OH 192. Oral history interview by Judy E. O’Neill, 24 April 1990, Reston, 
Virginia. Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. Kahn continued, “… 
all the details were different.  I don’t mean conceptually they were different.  They were sort of 
the same genre.  Just like, say, Chinese and Americans are of the same genre except one speaks 




faculty of computer science at Stanford the same year.  To overcome the problem of 
network interconnection, Kahn and Cerf created a new mechanism to transport data 
packets.  This mechanism was a simple technical protocol (transmission control protocol, 
or TCP) and system of gateways (now known as routers) between networks.32  Their 
underlying goal was to make the network invisible to users, including their military 
patrons, who would be more interested in accessing information over the network instead 
of the operation of the network itself.   
In July 1977, they ran a successful demonstration of a network that consisted of 
the three networks, SATnet, PRnet, and Arpanet.  This was the first public demonstration 
of internetworking, and the ARPA networks would soon be known as one entity—the 
Internet.  In 1978, Cerf and two other ARPA-funded researchers, Danny Cohen and Jon 
Postel, split the functions of TCP into two protocols, TCP and the Internet Protocol (IP), 
that worked together and became known as TCP/IP.33  
Three basic design principles lay behind the Internet’s architecture as it emerged 
in the late 1970s.  The first—interconnection via common protocols—was a principle that 
had been explicitly recognized since the earliest days of the Arpanet.  The second 
principle became known as the “end-to-end” principle.  End-to-end design only required 
the network to send packets back and forth, and left the complex tasks of decoding and 
                                                
32 Vinton G. Cerf and Robert E. Kahn, “A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication,” 
IEEE Transactions on Communications Com-22 (1974): 637-648.  
33 Cerf, Cohen, and Postel split the protocol into TCP and IP in order to reduce the requirements 
on network gateways and leave complex tasks such as tracking reliable packet delivery to the 
computers at the ends of the network. See Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 129-30; Vinton G. Cerf, 
“Protocols for Interconnected Packet Networks,” Computer Communication Review 18 (October, 
1980): 10-11; and Jon Postel, ed. (1980), “DOD Standard Internet Protocol,” RFC 760, 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc760.txt. For records of discussions leading up to the TCP/IP split, 
see the series of “Internet Engineering Notes” at ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org-1/ien-index.html. 
 
 214 
processing packets to host computers at the edges of the network.  This design stood in 
stark contrast to the circuit-switched telephone network, in which AT&T designed a 
stunning amount of intelligence (including human operators) in the middle of the 
network.34  The Arpanet’s designers recognized the importance of the third principle—
layering—as early as 1967.35  A layered network separates various network functions 
from one another, so that a change at one layer of the network does not necessitate 
changes at another.  Layered design thus created both a technical and a social division of 
labor: by relying on a system architecture consisting of common interfaces, researchers 
could focus their efforts narrowly on innovations that fit within one particular layer and 
not concern themselves with how their new application or protocol would interact with 
other innovations.36   
These three basic principles—standard protocols, end-to-end design, and 
layering—became centrally important as the Internet protocols attracted the attention of a 
researchers in England, France, and other countries who were experimenting with packet-
switched networks.  International collaboration was an important feature of the growth of 
computer networks in the mid-1970s.  The opening act of this collaboration was the First 
International Conference of Computer Communications held in Washington, DC in 
October 1972.  After months of preparations orchestrated by Kahn, the Arpanet went on 
                                                
34 Jerome H. Saltzer, David P. Reed, and David D. Clark, “End-To-End Arguments in System 
Design,” ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, Vol. 2, No. 4 (November, 1984), 277-288; and 
David D. Clark, “The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols,” Proc. SIGCOMM ’88, 
Computer Communication Review 18 (1988), 106-114. 
35 M. A. Padlipsky, The Elements of Networking Style, And Other Animadversions on the Art of 
Intercomputer Networking (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2000, first edition Prentice-Hall, 1985), 89-115. 
36 Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 50-53.   
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public display, stunning the audience with demonstrations of applications such as 
interactive graphics, methods of reading Associated Press reports over the network, and 
several chess programs.  It was a resounding success—even if utterly baffling to the ten 
AT&T executives who attended, and declined ARPA’s offer to operate the Arpanet or 
even purchase it outright.37   
The 1972 meeting was a morale boost for the Arpanet community as well as an 
opportunity to formalize international cooperation.  At the Washington meeting, Vint 
Cerf from UCLA chaired the first meeting of the International Network Working Group 
(INWG), created to bring Arpanet researchers in closer contact with their European 
counterparts.  Cerf chaired the group until 1976.  It was a formative experience for Cerf, 
both in a technical sense and in a political sense.  Technically speaking, Cerf’s own ideas 
about networking—which would eventually be incorporated in the design of TCP/IP—
were influenced strongly by his interactions with French researchers in the INWG, 
especially Louis Pouzin and Gerald Lelann.  Pouzin was the head of the Cyclades packet-
switched network in France that was built in 1972 and supported by government funds.  
Lelann, in addition to his active participation in Cyclades and in INWG meetings, also 
spent a year in Cerf’s lab at Stanford, and was active in the discussions leading up to the 
specification of TCP.38   
                                                
37 Robert Kahn (1972), “Demonstration at International Computer Communications Conference,” 
RFC 371, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc371.txt; Hafner and Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late, 176-
186; Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 123-127. 
38 Vinton Cerf, OH 191. Oral history interview by Judy E. O’Neill, 24 April 1990, Reston, Virginia. 
Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. See also Abbate, Inventing the 
Internet, 123-133; and Louis Pouzin, The Cyclades Computer Network: Towards Layered Network 
Architectures (New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1982). 
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Apart from these important technical collaborations, Cerf also obtained a first-
hand look at the politics of European standards-setting—a vast and complex subject 
which has been explored in a number of books and articles.39  Beginning in 1974-5, the 
European telephone monopolies recognized the potential value of packet-switched 
networks and commenced their own standards effort (called X.25) through the 
International Telecommunications Union, which consisted of representatives from 
national governments around the world.  Representatives from Japan and Canada soon 
joined the group.  Where AT&T had been barred from computer markets by the 1956 
Consent Decree and subsequent rulings from the Federal Communications Commission, 
no such regulations prevented the European telephone monopolies from attempting to 
bring computer communications under their own jurisdiction.  Because the X.25 
committee was dominated by the telephone monopolies, European computer firms—as 
well as IBM, which introduced its own proprietary networking system in 1974—looked 
for other venues to create their own standards.40   
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As this controversy was brewing, Cerf and the INWG were trying to establish a 
consensus around their own standards for packet-switched networks.41  Cerf attempted to 
convince the group to adopt TCP as the consensus transport protocol; but, in January 
1978, the group instead chose a protocol developed within the Cyclades network.  This 
was a turning point in a previously collaborative effort.  Members of the INWG 
immediately moved their work to a more established standards body, the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), which would be in a better position to advance 
their interests and resist the competing initiative led by the telephone monopolies.  Cerf, 
who became the director of the Internet program at ARPA in 1976, became frustrated 
with the politics of the European situation, rededicated his efforts to the TCP/IP Internet 
and, according to one participant, subsequently denied funding for ARPA contractors to 
participate in ISO meetings.42  By the late 1970s, then, three competing communities of 
researchers—ARPA contractors, telecommunications professionals in the ITU, and 
European computer professionals—were seeking to establish their own design as the 
definitive architecture for packet-switched networks. 
 
 
4.3.1  The Political Economy of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
                                                
41 In 1972, the group had become affiliated with the International Federation for Information 
Processing (IFIP), a non-governmental organization of computer professionals that was 
established under the auspices of UNESCO in 1960. See Alex Curran and Vinton Cerf, “The Work 
of IFIP Group 6.1,” ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 6 (April, 1975): 18-27. 
42 John Day, conversation with author, November 8, 2006. Day worked on the Arpanet and 
Internet protocols, first at Bolt, Beranek and Newman, and later in several other small 
networking companies. An extensive set of materials related to the INWG are available from the 
Charles Babbage Institute. See Alex McKenzie Collection of Computer Networking Development 
Records (CBI 123), Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. 
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The late 1970s was a dynamic and uncertain period for international computer 
networking.  In addition to the three efforts described above, both IBM and Digital 
introduced their own proprietary networking products: IBM’s System Network 
Architecture (1974) and the Digital Network Architecture (1975).  For many customers, 
these proprietary solutions were adequate; but for users who were technically advanced—
and for regulators and competing firms who did not want to see one or two firms 
dominate the industry—proprietary networks threatened their own visions of the future.43   
During the same period, a movement for “open systems” emerged as a technical, 
economic, and political response to the proprietary network architectures.  An open 
system consisted of interfaces that were non-proprietary and available to any interested 
firm (instead of controlled by a single firm or group of firms).  The emergence of many 
types of open systems in the 1970s and 1980s (such as for microcomputers and personal 
stereos) helped smaller producers and consumers who did not want to be locked in to 
proprietary products from a single manufacturer.44 
The political economy of the European computer industry made open systems an 
especially attractive option for computer networking in the late 1970s.  First, although 
individual European nations pursued industrial policies that favored “national champion” 
firms, this approach flew in the face of the movement to unify European markets.  
                                                
43 Paul E. Green, Jr., ed., Network Interconnection and Protocol Conversion (New York: IEEE Press, 
1988); R.J. Cypser, Communicating for Cooperating Systems: OSI, SNA, and TCP/IP (Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1991); and Timothy F. Bresnahan and Shane Greenstein, “Technological 
Competition and the Structure of the Computer Industry,” The Journal of Industrial Economics 47 
(1999): 30. 
44 Langlois and Robertson, “Networks and Innovation in a Modular System: Lessons from the 
Microcomputer and Stereo Component Industries,” 297-313.  
 
 219 
Second, the limited size of each national market prevented the national champions from 
generating the economies of scale and scope necessary to compete with IBM.45  Finally, 
standardization efforts among European telecommunications and computing 
professionals in the ITU, INWG, and the European Computing Machinery Association 
were working at cross-purposes, without sufficient levels of cooperation.  As a result, 
when the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) created a subcommittee in 
1977 to create a new network architecture, Open Systems Interconnection (OSI), each of 
the various constituencies (along with representatives from national standards bodies in 
the United States, Japan, and Canada) joined in the effort to create an international 
consensus network architecture. 
OSI defined a seven-layer Reference Model in which standards could fit and work 
together.  This Reference Model did not specify individual standards—those could be 
proposed and negotiated by constituent groups.  In other words, OSI set the ground rules 
for network interconnection, and left the specific terms of interconnection to standards 
that fit within the overarching Reference Model.46  OSI, then, was a departure from the 
standards typically sanctioned by ISO: in most cases, ISO standardized existing 
technologies and designs; but OSI was a rare case of “anticipatory standardization,” 
where ISO moved ahead of the existing state of technology and sought to shape future 
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developments.47  Like the Internet, OSI emphasized principles of layering and 
modularity; however, unlike the Internet, OSI sought to impose the network architecture 
in a top-down manner, rather than developing protocols in an organic and—to an 
outsider—almost haphazard way.  OSI was designed by professionals, who saw the 
Internet as an experimental work in progress and a playground for graduate students and 
the American military.48 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the OSI effort within ISO enjoyed widespread 
support from national governments, particularly in Western Europe, North America, and 
the Far East.49  ISO was an “industrial legislature” on an international scale—a direct 
descendent of the efforts of Paul Gough Agnew and Charles Le Maistre, two pioneers of 
consensus standardization in the early twentieth century.50  Indeed, the organization that 
Agnew had championed for so long—the American Standards Association—sent 
                                                
47 In their ongoing work on the history of ISO, JoAnne Yates and Craig Murphy emphasize that 
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representatives to participate on OSI committees.51  ISO’s organizational culture—
concerned with defining and controlling the future of information and telecommunication 
services on behalf of its representatives from national governments—resembled 
democratic legislative bodies that utilized voting and partisan compromises. 
Unfortunately, the ISO process was also a focal point for the ongoing conflict 
between representatives from the computer and telecommunications industry, and its 
bureaucratic safeguards often introduced substantial delays into an already complicated 
technological project.  IBM, in the midst of an effort to embrace the turn toward 
interoperable open systems while maintaining its own powerful position, was one of the 
chief culprits that introduced delay and confusion within the development of OSI.52  In 
the early 1980s, IBM saw the biggest payoffs from its strategy of creating an “open 
architecture” for a new, smaller and more affordable line of computers known as personal 
computers.53  However, IBM reverted to its customary proprietary strategy in markets for 
local area networking (LAN) technology during the same period.  As a consortium of 
firms led by Digital, Intel, and Xerox mobilized to support the Ethernet standard in the 
early 1980s, IBM chose to pursue its Token Ring technology in the hopes that it could 
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deliver a technologically superior product and defeat Ethernet—a strategy that would 
ultimately fail.54 
Within the system of ISO subcommittees, IBM exploited opportunities to use the 
committee to advance its own strategic goals.  One tactic used by IBM was to alter its 
System Network Architecture in 1982 to be compatible with OSI.  According to John 
Day, an American who participated in the Internet standards process as well as many OSI 
meetings, IBM representatives also manipulated the egos of representatives from various 
constituencies who were “fighting over who would get a piece of the pie.”  Day 
continued, “IBM played them like a violin.  It was truly magical to watch.”  The 
experience led Day to conclude, “I think I could write a ‘Discourses on Livy’ for 
standards committees.”55  Although IBM’s Machiavellian behavior inspired admiration 
from some (and fury from others), it ultimately detracted from ISO’s effort to establish a 
universal network architecture for packet-switched computer networks.  A different 
approach—one that occurred within the informal and relatively insulated environment of 
Internet researchers—provided more usable results. 
 
4.4  Internet Protocols and Institutional Evolution, 1979-1992 
After his education in the realpolitik of European standards-setting, Vint Cerf 
must have been relieved to concentrate on the development of Internet standards within 
the small community of like-minded ARPA contractors and researchers.  Cerf became the 
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director of ARPA’s Internet program from 1976 to 1982, and along with Kahn and MIT 
computer scientist David Clark, created a new set of institutions to coordinate the Internet 
community and standards-setting process.  As these institutions grew and changed 
between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, Cerf, Kahn, Clark, and their colleagues 
struggled to find a balance between maintaining a fluid and informal environment while 
at the same time ensuring that the Internet standards-setting process could stay open to 
new participants and new ideas.  By the early 1990s, this informal process emerged as 
one of the keys to the Internet’s growth on a global scale. 
When he began at ARPA in 1976, Cerf worked informally with a small group of 
researchers to test and refine the Internet protocols.  By 1979, Kahn and Cerf agreed that 
more regular meetings of researchers in the community would be desirable.  Kahn 
recalled, 
when we started the Internet program in the mid 1970s, originally it was 
just me in the office running the program.  And after Vint was hired, then 
it was just Vint running the program with me to kibitz.  And he was so 
good at what he did that he basically had everything in his head.  What I 
worried about was what would happen if he got hit by a truck?  Number 
two, what would happen if he would ever have to leave?  And number 
three, how was anybody else in the community ever going to be part of the 
thinking process.  So he set up, after some discussions, a kind of kitchen 
cabinet, if you will, of knowledgeable people that he would convene 
periodically.  These were mostly the workers in the field, the key people 
who were implementing protocols… When he left, that group stayed 
intact.56    
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Cerf’s “kitchen cabinet” was the Internet Configuration Control Board (ICCB),  
created in 1979 and chaired by David Clark, a computer scientist at MIT.  The ICCB 
expanded control over Internet development by bringing more of the users of the 
network—technical experts distributed in universities, firms, and government agencies—
into Cerf’s inner circle in a more structured way.  For Kahn, the ICCB was an important 
innovation because it “brought a wider segment of the research community more directly 
into the decision-making aspects of the Internet project which, until then, had been 
almost solely undertaken by ARPA.”57  Yet, despite this gradual diffusion of control, the 
ICCB was still immune from the commercial pressures and political rivalries that riddled 
standards development within ISO.   
The members of the Internet community enjoyed their work, were energized by it, 
and took a great deal of pride in it.  In a 2004 interview, David Mills, who participated in 
the group as an employee of two ARPA contractors—COMSAT (1977-1982) and 
Linkabit (1982-1986)—as well as a professor at the University of Delaware (1986-
present), reflected on the informality and energy of the ICCB meetings that Clark 
chaired.  
Dave [Clark] is a technical guy. His style at meetings, the meetings kind 
of crackled, because new ideas would fly back and forth, and frequently a 
bunch of us wanted to talk at the same time. He’d go like this [points and 
stares]. And he’d say, “there’s this issue,” and you’d raise your hand. And 
he’d go, “you, go.” I called it eyeball meetings. Floor control by eyeball.58 
 
                                                
57 Robert E. Kahn, “The Role of the Government in the Evolution of the Internet,” Communications 
of the ACM 37 (August, 1994): 16.  
58 David A. Mills interview, February 26, 2004, in Newark, DE, conducted by Andrew L. Russell. 
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As Cerf and Kahn were developing new versions of the Internet Protocol and 
Transmission Control Protocol, they would frequently convene the community to test 
different implementations of the protocols and compare which versions worked the best.  
Jon Postel, a computer scientist at the University of Southern California, often hosted 
these tests, which were commonly referred to as “Bake Offs.”59  Postel, who died in 
1998, was a fair-minded and technically gifted individual, known for his long hair, grey 
beard, and sandals.  He was the longtime editor of the Request for Comments series, and 
was in charge of a number of administrative functions for the Arpaent and Internet.  Mills 
recalled him as “the Internet glue”; Cerf, who memorialized Postel in RFC 2468, referred 
to him as  
our resident hippie-patriarch at UCLA. He was a private person but fully 
capable of engaging photon torpedoes and going to battle stations in a 
good engineering argument. And he could be stubborn beyond all 
expectation. He could have outwaited the Sphinx in a staring contest, I 
think.60 
 
Postel’s Bake Offs were technically rigorous and enjoyable at the same time.  
Postel developed a scoring metric for successful implementations of TCP and IP that he 
divided into three divisions—featherweight, middleweight, and heavyweight.  
Implementations would have to navigate difficult network conditions, including 
“flakeways,” which Postel defined as “a purposely flakey gateway.”61  On the basis of the 
                                                
59 Postel reflected on the legacy of the bakeoffs in an RFC published in 1987. See Jon Postel (1987), 
“TCP and IP Bake Off,” RFC 1025, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1025.txt. A different document 
series, the “Internet Engineering Notes,” contain reports on bakeoffs as they occurred in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. See ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/ien.  
60 Mills interview, February 26, 2004; Vint Cerf (1998), “I Remember IANA,” RFC 2468, 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2468.txt. 
61 Postel, RFC 1025. He also awarded bonus points for “the best excuse” and “the fewest excuses.” 
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data accumulated through the Bake Offs, Postel articulated a “Robustness Principle” that 
he wrote in to the standard definitions of TCP and IP: “be conservative in what you do, 
be liberal in what you accept from others.”62  Although the Robustness Principle was 
written to aid in the implementation of TCP and IP in diverse computing environments, 
one cannot help but conclude that this principle was also a product of the tolerant cultural 
milieu in which Postel, as a hippie in Southern California, spent his life. 
David Mills was one of the members of the Internet community who participated 
in Postel’s Bake Offs as well as demonstrations of packet-switched networks that he 
referred to as “packet poppers.”   
One of my favorite packet poppers was some admiral at sea, in Monterrey 
Bay, wanted to talk to his counterpart at Eastcom in Stuttgart, Germany. 
And this involved a satellite hop, involved a packet radio hop, it traversed 
several networks—and he wanted to do it in real time. Just actually being 
able to do that was a good demonstration for the military. Another was 
packet radio. To get the whole idea of packet radio. And one packet 
popper to do that involved me sitting in the back of a Land Rover 
bouncing around the hills of mountain England, reading my [electronic] 
mail in the U. S.  And dodging sheep on the back roads. That was fun.63 
 
Mills’ recollections demonstrate the longevity of the vision first articulated by 
Licklider in the early 1960s—that interesting research problems for computer scientists 
could also be valuable for military command and control.  One of the benefits of ARPA’s 
sponsorship was that, when necessary, it could force Arpanet users to act in specific 
ways, even when it was against the wishes of individual researchers.  The most 
significant example of ARPA-mandated action occurred on January 1, 1983, when Kahn, 
                                                
62 Jon Postel, ed. (1981), “Transmission Control Protocol: DARPA Internet Program Protocol 
Specification,” RFC 793, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc793.txt. 
63 Mills interview, February 26, 2004. 
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as Director of IPTO (Cerf had left in 1982 to pursue opportunities in the private sector), 
forced all sites on the Arpanet to stop using NCP as their primary means of connecting to 
the network.  In place of NCP, all sites transitioned to TCP/IP—a transition that was 
traumatic for some users, who created buttons that bragged “I survived the TCP 
transition.”64  With the universal adoption of TCP/IP, Internet sites could more easily be 
connected to local area networks, and the Internet’s growth intensified.  In light of this 
growth, Kahn realized that he needed to reconsider “the process that ARPA was using to 
manage the evolution of the network.”65   
Barry Leiner—who replaced Vint Cerf as head of the ARPA Internet program in 
1983—assisted Kahn in this “rethinking” of the Internet’s management.  In September 
1984, Leiner disbanded the ICCB and, in its place, created the Internet Advisory Board 
(IAB).66  Clark continued his close involvement as the first Chair of the IAB—a position 
that conferred the title of “Internet Architect.”67  Within the IAB, Leiner created a 
number of small groups (called Task Forces) focused on various aspects of Internet 
                                                
64 Amy Slaton and Janet Abbate, “The Hidden Lives of Standards: Technical Prescriptions an the 
Transformation of Work in America,” in Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht, eds., 
Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), 95-144. For a discussion of the strategy behind this transition, 
see Jon Postel (1981), “NCP/TCP Transition Plan,” RFC 801, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc801.txt. 
The “trauma of the birth of the Internet proper on January 1, 1983” is captured in the “TCP/IP 
Digests,” an electronic mailing list that Arpanet engineers used to trade stories and advice. See 
ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/museum/tcp-ip-digest/. 
65 Kahn, “Role of Government,” 16. 
66 The acronym “IAB” remained consistent since 1984, but the “A”—and the meanings behind 
it—have changed. From 1984 to 1986 the IAB was the Internet Advisory Board; in 1986 its name 
changed to the Internet Activities Board; in 1992 it changed once again, this time to the Internet 
Architecture Board. See “A Brief History of the Internet Advisory / Activities / Architecture 
Board,” http://www.iab.org/about/history.html. 
67 Clark was Internet Architect from 1983 to 1989; Cerf served from 1989 to 1991, and was 
followed by Lyman Chapin (through March 1993).  
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technologies, such as gateway algorithms, end-to-end protocols, privacy, and security.68  
Clark, as Chair of the IAB, selected the chairs of each Task Force, and, in consultation 
with the Internet community, decided whether new members should be invited.  
Consequently, the IAB had a much narrower constituency than the ISO committees and 
was thus less susceptible to strategic behavior, power politics, and other delays that were 
characteristic of more mature and formal standards-setting organizations.69  Given this 
description, it is not difficult to see why author and computer scientist Ed Krol described 
the IAB as a “council of elders.”70  Although there were tensions within the community, 
there was also a strong esprit de corps and a shared recognition that the community’s 
research efforts were dedicated toward the continued growth of the Internet, and not 
toward the financial ambitions of any particular individual.   
This esprit de corps—and the non-commercial orientation of Internet engineers—
became strained as the Internet grew and more and more people sought to have a voice in 
the Internet’s design and standardization process.  A major source of new interest came 
from researchers who had been working on the NSFNET, a packet-switched network 
created in 1984 by the National Science Foundation and open to university researchers.  
By 1986, the convergence of the Arpanet and NSFNET meant that the number of 
networks connected via the Internet grew dramatically, with several thousand hosts 
                                                
68 http://www.iab.org/about/history.html. 
69 See Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, 
Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry Roberts, and Stephen Wolff, “A Brief History of the Internet,” 
last revised December 10, 2003, http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml.  See also 
Kahn interview, Charles Babbage Institute; and Vinton Cerf (1990), “The Internet Activities 
Board,” RFC 1160, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1160.txt. 
70 Ed Krol (1993), “FYI on ‘What is the Internet?’” RFC 1462, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1462.txt. 
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connected to over 400 networks via 120 gateways located within the network.  Because 
of the importance of these gateways for ensuring that new networks could connect, the 
Gateway Algorithms and Data Structures Task Force experienced tremendous growth, 
and split into two groups: the Internet Architecture Task Force (INARC) and the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF).  INARC became a focus for forward-looking research 
problems; the IETF became the place to hammer out the messy details of day-to-day 
implementation, and to formulate technical standards that would facilitate the growth of 
the Internet.71 
Because of its broad mandate and importance for the engineering of the present, 
the IETF became the main focus of attention for newcomers. After its first meeting in 
January 1986, the IETF met four times in 1986 and 1987, and three times annually in 
every subsequent year.  Twenty-one people attended the January 1986 meeting, and 35 
attended the October 1986 meeting.  The number of attendees increased dramatically in 
1987, from 35 at the February meeting to 101 at the July meeting.  At first, only invited 
participants could attend the IETF meetings; by the end of 1987, anyone interested in the 
Internet—including representatives from commercial firms not under government 
contracts—were welcomed at the meetings.72   
A “Brief History of the Internet” co-authored by a number of Internet pioneers 
(including Cerf, Clark, Kahn, and Leiner) describes this formation of community 
governance as a “steady evolution of organizational structures designed to support and 
                                                
71 Mills interview, February 26, 2004. 
72 IETF Proceedings are available from http://ietf.org/meetings/past.meetings.html. 
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facilitate an ever-increasing community working collaboratively on Internet issues.”73  
These structures combined two models of governance.  The first model, the structure led 
by Cerf that coordinated the development of the Internet at ARPA, was a self-selected, 
experienced group—a “council of elders.”  Historians of the Internet unequivocally praise 
this group as a source of its astounding growth.  Frequently described as a meritocracy, 
this close-knit network of people worked together since the early Arpanet days (many as 
graduate students at MIT or UCLA or as engineers at Bolt, Beranek and Newman, the 
consulting firm that had designed aspects of the Arpanet) and provided the bulk of the 
technical and bureaucratic leadership necessary to keep the Internet up and running.74  
“Relatively few, competent, highly motivated people were involved,” recalled Larry 
Press, “and they had considerable autonomy.”75 
Kahn’s observation about the ICCB’s role as a sort of kitchen cabinet provides an 
insight into the second model of governance, which has received less attention from 
historians: the function of the ICCB, IAB, and IETF as mechanisms for engaging and 
directing the efforts of a distributed group of Internet researchers.  The Internet user 
community was small enough in 1979 that the ICCB functioned simultaneously as both 
                                                
73 Leiner, et al., “Brief History.” In a 1993 article, Dave Crocker concurred: “In general, the IETF is 
applying its own technical design philosophy to its own operation.” Dave Crocker, “Making 
Standards the IETF Way,” StandardView 1 (1993): 54. The 1968 musings of Melvin Conway are 
also strikingly relevant: “there is a very close relationship between the structure of a system and 
the structure of the organization which designed it.” See Melvin E. Conway, “How Do 
Committees Invent?” Datamation Vol. 14, No. 4, April 1968, 30; and “Conway’s Law,” at 
http://www.catb.org/~esr/jargon/html/C/Conways-Law.html. 
74 See for example Norberg and O’Neill, Transforming Computer Technology; and Hughes, Rescuing 
Prometheus.  
75 Larry Press, “Seeding Networks: the Federal Role,” Communications of the ACM 39 (1996): 11-18.  
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“council of elders” and a “grass-roots mechanism” for Internet standards.76  By the early 
1990s, the IAB maintained the character of the “council of elders,” responsible for 
architectural and bureaucratic oversight.  The IETF, as a task force for “Internet 
engineering,” assumed responsibility for the distributed, hands-on tasks involved in the 
engineering and implementation of protocols and provided a forum for interested 
newcomers.  The transfer of responsibility for technical standards from the ICCB to the 
IAB and then the IETF demonstrated a strong desire on the part of the “council of elders” 
to engage and empower the broader community that wanted to contribute to the further 
development of the Internet.  Under this system, the architectural oversight of the Internet 
remained with the reconstituted IAB, while the efforts of participants in the IETF were 
channeled toward the technical aspects of protocol development and implementation.         
The Internet community established several foundational standards for Internet 
applications during the ongoing institutional evolution in the 1980s.  For example, in 
August 1982, Dave Crocker, a computer scientist at the University of Delaware, 
published an RFC that specified addressing conventions for electronic mail that are still 
in use today.  In April 1984, Charles Hornig of the Symbolics Cambridge Research 
Center published an RFC that provided a way to sent Internet packets over Ethernet local 
area networks.  In October 1984, Joyce Reynolds, a computer scientist at the University 
of Southern California’s Information Sciences Institute, published an RFC that provided a 
simple method for remote clients to retrieve electronic mail from dedicated mailbox 
                                                




servers.  And in September 1985, David Mills proposed a precise method for 
synchronizing time across the Internet in RFC 958, “Network Time Protocol.”77  
Each of these four examples illustrate the Internet community’s decentralized and 
iterative style of developing standards.  After discussing their protocols within the 
community, the authors published stable drafts as RFCs.  In subsequent months and 
years, these authors (as well as others who were interested in those specific functions and 
protocols) published RFCs that revised the initial protocol based on changing conditions 
outside the Internet community as well as their own trial-and-error experiments.  For 
example, the standardization of Ethernet technologies within the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) prompted a group of Internet engineers, led by Joyce 
Reynolds and Jon Postel, to publish in 1988 a new standard for transmitting Internet 
packets over Ethernet networks.  The subsequent popularity of Ethernet (including the 
development of wireless Ethernet, known as IEEE 802.11 or “Wi-Fi”) led to the creation 
of new standards as well as formal liaisons between the IETF and the IEEE so that the 
two groups could further coordinate their standardization initiatives for wireless Internet 
applications.78 
Another example—the Network Time Protocol—demonstrates the increasingly 
international orientation of Internet research and standards.  In 1988, David Mills 
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published a more extensive and sophisticated version of the “architectures, algorithms 
and protocols” used in the Network Time Protocol “which have evolved over several 
years of implementation and refinement,” including two years of operation in the 
Internet.79  Two years later, two British academic computer scientists published an RFC 
that specified a version of the Network Time Protocol for use in OSI networks.  In 1992, 
Mills published a third revision of the Network Time Protocol, and also published the 
“Simple Network Time Protocol” that could “be used when the ultimate performance of 
the full NTP implementation described in RFC-1305 is not needed or justified.”80  Mills 
again revised the Network Time Protocol in 1996 and 2006, and continues to run 
experiments to further refine and improve it.81  In the meantime, several other 
researchers—including a computer scientist working for Cisco Systems’ office in 
Bangalore, India—continued to publish extensions and adaptations of the Network Time 
Protocol.82 
Despite the increasing sophistication of Internet technologies during the late 
1980s and early 1990s (as well as the institutions that coordinated technological 
development), officials in the ITU, ANSI, and the U. S. Department of Defense did not 
think of the Internet as a serious competitor to OSI.   Mills recalled that the very names of 
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80 David L. Mils (1992), “Network Time Protocol (Version 3): Specification, Implementation and 
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the bodies to coordinate Internet standards—the “Internet Configuration Control Board” 
and the “Internet Activities Board”—were intentionally crafted as bland and non-
threatening names, much like the Request for Comments series.83  Although the ITU and 
ANSI did not see the Internet as a significant long-term competitor to OSI, the Defense 
Department—having spent millions of dollars developing the Arpanet and Internet—
looked more closely at the relative merits of the two network architectures.  In 1983, the 
Defense Department asked the National Research Council to compare the transport 
protocols of both network architectures and advise the Defense Department officials in 
charge of procurement.  The National Research Council’s final report in 1985 compared 
TCP and its functional counterpart in OSI, a protocol called TP-4.  The report presented 
three options: keep the two as co-standards; adopt TP-4 as soon as it was shown to be 
ready for military networks; or keep TCP and defer indefinitely a decision on TP-4. 84  
The Defense Department supported Option 2 and planned to “move ultimately toward 
exclusive use of TP-4.”85   
The National Bureau of Standards also supported OSI protocols, first through a 
series of workshops cosponsored by the IEEE, and eventually by creating a version of 
OSI, known as Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile (GOSIP), for use in 
the American federal government.  By August 1990, federal agencies were required to 
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procure GOSIP-compliant products.86  Through this procurement requirement, the 
government intended to stimulate the market for OSI products and fall in line with the 
global consensus growing around OSI.  However, since products designed around 
TCP/IP were more familiar and readily available—and OSI products were not—this 
requirement did not achieve the intended result.87  
  
4.4.1  “OSI Bigots” and “IP Bigots”: The Culture of Standards Wars 
Tensions between researchers in the OSI and Internet communities became 
apparent in the early 1980s.  For example, in their 1983 paper describing the similarities 
between the ARPA and ISO protocol architectures, Danny Cohen and Jon Postel painted 
the ISO model as an abstraction, far too rigid in its reliance on seven interrelated layers, 
and inappropriate to be used “as a model for all seasons.”88  In this unusually colorful 
paper, Cohen and Postel—both of whom were instrumental in the early history of 
TCP/IP—mockingly speculated that “mystical” traditions such as Early Zoroastrianism, 
New Testament celestial beings, and the Christian seven deadly sins might have “shaped 
the choice of Seven.”89  Another Internet advocate, in his 1991 “technical travelogue” of 
networking in 21 countries across the world, suggested that trying to implement OSI over 
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Standards Publication 146, Version 1, August 1988, cited in Vinton Cerf and Kevin Mills (1990), 
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slow, low-quality lines was “akin to looking for a hippopotamus capable of doing the 
limbo.”90 
The resentment of Cohen, Postel, and their Internet colleagues stemmed from 
their frustration with the technical aspects of OSI as well as with the organizational 
culture of ISO.  Where TCP/IP was developed through continual experimentation in a 
fluid organizational setting, Internet engineers viewed OSI committees as overly 
bureaucratic and out of touch with existing networks and computers.  OSI’s political and 
formal process did not endear the TCP/IP Internet community—who were accustomed to 
a decentralized division of labor throughout the standards process—to the ISO Reference 
Model.  In a scathing 1985 critique of OSI and its advocates, one veteran of the Arpanet 
and Internet community, Mike Padlipsky, characterized the ARPA Internet Reference 
Model as “Descriptive” and ISO Reference Model as “Prescriptive.”  “Another way of 
putting it,” Padlipsky wrote, “is that whereas the Descriptive approach is suitable for 
technology, the Prescriptive approach is suitable for theology.”91 David Mills, who was 
also active in ARPA’s networking experiments during this time, agreed: “Internet 
standards tended to be those written for implementers.  International standards were 
written as documents to be obeyed.”92   
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A spirited rivalry between respective advocates of OSI and TCP/IP networks 
emerged as they fought for jurisdiction over standards for computer internetworks.  
Richard des Jardins—an early contributor to the ISO Reference Model and President of 
the GOSIP Institute—captured the intensity this rivalry when, in a 1992 article, he 
compared the “OSI Bigots” and the “IP Bigots” to people who objected to “the 
convergence of cultures and races in the world at large.”93  Despite their heated rhetoric, 
many researchers were active in finding ways to make the Internet and OSI work 
together.  The first such proposal appeared in an RFC published in April 1986 that 
described (in self-consciously defensive language) a method to implement some features 
of OSI over TCP.94  Beginning in 1987, the IETF established several Working Groups to 
integrate Internet and OSI technologies for electronic mail, directory services, and 
fundamental network protocols.  However, this work was far from universally admired 
among IETF participants, especially those who had become frustrated with the ISO 
process, OSI technologies, or personal relationships with OSI proponents.95 
 
4.4.2  “We reject: kings, presidents and voting” 
Apart from the external OSI threat, the Internet community faced a succession of 
internal problems throughout the Internet’s rapid growth during the 1980s and early 
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1990s.  As Internet advocates battled against OSI, they also continued to struggle with the 
organizational problems of their own standardization process.  Some critics felt that the 
IAB “failed at times to provide a solid agenda and timetables of engineering problems” 
for the IETF to address.96  The informal character of the IAB’s oversight of the IETF also 
created problems, and there were occasions when IETF engineers perceived that IAB 
decisions favored the commercial interests of vendors over the technical consensus of the 
Internet community.97   
The tensions between the IAB and IETF came to a head in 1992, when the IAB 
considered incorporating one of the OSI protocols into the Internet architecture. The IAB 
took this step in order to avoid a major technical obstacle to Internet growth.  The 
problem stemmed from the amount of network addresses that could be handled by the 
Internet Protocol (IP version 4, or IPv4).98  IPv4, designed in the late 1970s, did not take 
into account the explosion of computers and networks that would join the Internet.  By 
the early 1990s, it appeared that the address space in IPv4 would soon be exhausted—an 
event that would prevent new machines from joining the network, thus throttling the 
Internet.99  To avoid this problem, the IAB considered adopting the ConnectionLess 
Network Protocol (CLNP), which was the OSI functional counterpart to IPv4.100 
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Although they were aware of strong opposition to OSI within the Internet 
community, the members of the IAB felt that CLNP could help the Internet overcome the 
address space problem.  From this perspective, the technical rationale for incorporating 
CLNP into the architecture of the Internet supported the broader interests of the 
community and the mandate of the IAB—keeping the network open for anyone who 
wanted to connect.101  As a result, at its June 1992 meeting in Kobe, Japan, the IAB 
developed a draft proposal—a starting point for discussion within the Internet 
community—to use CLNP as the basis for a larger address space.  To the IAB, this 
seemed a responsible path to take, given the limits of the IPv4 address space and the 
widespread desire for the Internet to accommodate as many users as possible.  As IAB 
member Christian Huitema later recalled:  
 
 
The IAB discussed [the draft proposal to incorporate CLNP] extensively. 
In less than two weeks, it went through eight successive revisions. We 
thought that our wording was very careful, and we were prepared to 
discuss it and try to convince the Internet community. Then, everything 
accelerated. Some journalists got the news, an announcement was hastily 
written, and many members of the community felt betrayed. They 
perceived that we were selling the Internet to the ISO and that 
                                                                                                                                            
Vinton Cerf, Robert Braden, and Russ Hobby (1991), “Towards the Future Internet Architecture,” 
RFC 1287, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1287.txt. Lyman Chapin, IAB Chairman in 1992, said in 
May 1992 that the shortage of Internet addresses was “definitely the most significant engineering 
problem on the Internet now.” Ellen Messmer, “Internet Architect Gives Long-Term View,” 
Network World 9 (May 18, 1992), 37. 
100 For one proposal to incorporate CLNP, see Ross Callon (1992), “TCP and UDP with Bigger 
Addresses (TUBA), A Simple Proposal for Internet Addressing and Routing,” RFC 1347, 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1347.txt.  
101 In addition to this technical rationale, Clark suggested that ISO and the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) were pressuring the IAB to implement CLNP as the Internet host 
protocol. David D. Clark, personal communication, October 27, 2001. 
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headquarters was simply giving the field to an enemy that they had fought 
for many years and eventually vanquished. The IAB had no right to make 
such a decision alone.102 
 
The fact that this proposal provoked such outrage from hundreds of engineers and 
computer scientists reflects the passion and commitment of engineers in the pitched battle 
of a standards war. The Internet engineer Carl Cargill preferred a religious metaphor to 
Huitema’s military metaphor: “For the general membership of the IETF,” he commented, 
“this was rank heresy.”103  Both metaphors were apt: where Huitema’s military metaphor 
captured the strategic and organizational tensions between the competing standards 
bodies, Cargill’s religious metaphor captured the emotional commitment that Internet 
engineers had invested in their underdog network architecture. 
Many IETF participants, while aware of the limitations of IPv4, assumed that the 
Internet and OSI would coexist for the foreseeable future.  Because they were convinced 
of the superiority of the Internet, they certainly would not allow an outside body—even 
the “council of elders” in the IAB—to make such dramatic and offensive changes to the 
Internet architecture with the presumption that the IETF would go along.104  Lyman 
Chapin, who served as the IAB Chair from July 1991 to March 1993, was fully aware of 
the IETF’s leading role in the Internet standards process: indeed, in March 1992 he 
published RFC 1310, “The Internet Standards Process,” in which he stated that the IETF 
                                                
102 Christian Huitema, IPv6: The New Internet Protocol (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall PTR, 
1998), 2.  Minutes of the IAB discussion are available from 
http://www.iab.org/documents/iabmins/IABmins.1992-06-18.html.  
103 Cargill, Open Systems Standardization, 257; Scott Bradner, “The Internet Engineering Task 
Force,” OnTheInternet, 7 (2001): 24; Cerf, “IETF and ISOC.” 
104 These two objections—technical and procedural—were the primary topics of discussion on the 
two mailing lists—the IETF discussion list and the “big-internet” list—dedicated to these issues. 




had “primary responsibility for the development and review of potential Internet 
standards from all sources.” However, Chapin was also a firm believer in “an Internet 
that supports multiple protocol suites,” and supported efforts to utilize OSI standards 
within the Internet architecture.105  Chapin assumed that the entire Internet community 
shared his support of OSI.  In a May 1992 interview, he remarked that “The most 
comprehensive solution [to the shortage of Internet addresses] is to replace the Internet 
Protocol in the Internet with the Open Systems Interconnection Connectionless Network 
Protocol. That idea is already almost universally accepted.”106  Subsequent events would 
show that he badly misjudged the mood of the Internet engineering community. 
At the July 1992 IETF meeting in Cambridge, Massachusetts, irate IETF 
participants—over 700 people attended the meeting—protested about what they 
perceived as a unilateral decision by the IAB.  Although many IETF participants had 
technical reservations about CLNP, their resistance was also motivated by the fear that 
the IAB was violating established procedures and turning the Internet into the thing they 
most despised.  Faced with such resistance, the IAB backed down from its CLNP 
proposal.  Vint Cerf, a member of the IAB (and formerly IAB Chair from July 1989 to 
July 1991), used the occasion of his plenary address to try to win back the support of the 
IETF.  As he addressed the IETF, he slowly removed the layers of his signature three-
piece suit, performing a striptease that revealed a t-shirt: “IP on Everything.”  The t-shirt, 
                                                
105 Internet Activities Board, Lyman Chapin, Chair (1992), “The Internet Standards Process,” RFC 
1310, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1310.txt. 
106 Chapin remarked in May 1992, Clearly Chapin was mistaken in his assessment of community 
support for CLNP. Messmer, “Internet Architect,” 46. 
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according to Cerf, was to reiterate a goal of the IAB: to run IP on every underlying 
transmission medium.107 
 
Figure 4.4: Vint Cerf posing in his “IP on Everything” t-shirt, circa 1996.  
Source: http://ietf20.isoc.org/videos/ip_on_everything.jpg. 
 
Another emeritus Internet Architect and founding father, David Clark, viewed his 
plenary presentation as an opportunity to “rally the troops” and reaffirm the shared values 
of the Internet community.108  Clark framed his talk, titled “A Cloudy Crystal Ball: 
Visions of the Future (Alternate Title: Apocalypse Now),” in terms of architectural 
choices in front of the IETF.  After spending several minutes urging the audience to focus 
                                                
107 Vinton G. Cerf, personal communication, January 27, 2002.  
108 Bradner, “The Internet Engineering Task Force,” OnTheInternet, 24. 
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on how network security challenged the basic assumptions of the protocol architecture, 
Clark considered how the IETF should “manage the process of change and growth.”  He 
amused the audience by taking a shot at ISO, calling it the “standards elephant of 
yesterday.”  But he also warned the audience that the IETF would itself become a 
standards elephant if it failed to strike a balance between an open and closed process, 
between a fast and slow process, and if it ignored the signals coming from the market.109  
Near the end of his talk, Clark summarized his view of the IETF approach: “We reject: 
kings, presidents and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code.”110 
 
Figure 4.5: Slide from David D. Clark, “A Cloudy Crystal Ball,” 1992. 
Source: David D. Clark. 
                                                
109 David D. Clark, “A Cloudy Crystal Ball: Visions of the Future (Alternate Title: Apocalypse 
Now),” presentation at the July 1992 meeting of the Internet Engineering Task Force. Available 
from http://ietf20.isoc.org/videos/future_ietf_92.pdf. On the occasion  of the IETF’s twentieth 
anniversary in 2006, Clark delivered an encore of this presentation. The video of his talk is 
available from http://ietf20.isoc.org/videos. 




The IETF community responded with overwhelming approval.  “Rough 
consensus and running code” was so popular that one IETF participant created the 
ultimate form of computer geek approval: T-shirts with the phrase emblazoned across the 
front.  “Rough consensus and running code” generated and sustained this level of 
enthusiasm because of the way it framed the successful aspects of the IETF process as a 
critique of the ISO process.  The rough consensus component of this motto referred to the 
decision-making process within IETF working groups.  Since its inception, the IETF did 
not have a formal voting structure.  In the tradition of Cerf’s “kitchen cabinet” meetings 
in the late 1970s, IETF leaders encouraged newcomers to contribute their expertise, and 
approved proposals that enjoyed broad support within the group.  IETF veterans placed 
an acceptable level of agreement at around 80 to 90%: a level high enough to 
demonstrate strong support, but flexible enough to work in the absence of unanimity.  In 
short, rough consensus was an apt description of an informal process where a proposal 
must answer to criticisms, but need not be held up if supported by a vast majority of the 
group.111  To IETF participants, this process was vastly superior to the bureaucratic and 
political approach of ISO.  
As a complement to rough consensus, running code meant “multiple actual and 
interoperable implementations of a proposed standard must exist and be demonstrated 
                                                
111 Scott Bradner, “The Internet Engineering Task Force,” in Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman, and 
Mark Stone, eds., Open Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolution (Cambridge, MA: O’Reilly, 
1999), 47-53. See also Dave Crocker, “Making Standards the IETF Way,” 48-54. 
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before the proposal can be advanced along the standards track.”112  Since most standards 
began with a proposal from an individual or small group—and not from the IAB or IETF 
leadership—the party behind the proposal needed to provide multiple working versions 
of the proposal.  This burden of proof upon the proposed standard facilitated the adoption 
of new standards across the diverse computing platforms on the Internet.  Running code 
also evoked a major difference between the IETF and ISO approaches: where the IETF 
protocols represented “the result of intense implementation discussion and testing,” ISO 
committees developed a theoretical model that was difficult to alter or implement fully.113  
Lyman Chapin, who participated in both OSI and Internet standards committees before 
becoming IAB Chair in 1991, summarized the difference between the two approaches in 
1990: “it didn’t take long to recognize the basic irony of OSI standards development: 
there we were, solemnly anointing international standards for networking, and every time 
we needed to send electronic mail or exchange files, we were using the TCP/IP-based 
Internet!”114  Or, as Internet pioneer Einar Stefferud was fond of saying, “OSI is a 
beautiful dream, and TCP/IP is living it.”115 
Beyond serving as a concise description of the IETF’s organizational and 
technical approach, “rough consensus and running code” also served as a means of self-
identification and a positive summary of the IETF’s model for standards development.  
                                                
112 Bradner, “The Internet Engineering Task Force,” OnTheInternet, 26. Bradner’s summary is 
telling: “In brief, the IETF operates in a bottom-up task creation mode and believes in ‘fly before 
you buy.’” Bradner, “The Internet Engineering Task Force,” Open Sources, 51.  
113 Padlipsky, Elements of Networking Style, 104. 
114 Lyman Chapin, quoted in Gary Malkin (1990), “Who’s Who in the Internet: Biographies of 
IAB, IESG, and IRSG Members,” RFC 1336, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1336.txt.  
115 Einar Stefferud, quoted in Marshall T. Rose, “Comments on ‘Opinion: OSI Is (Still) a Good 
Idea,’” ConneXions 6, No. 8 (1992): 20-21. 
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The internal divisions exacerbated by the controversy over CLNP prompted a good deal 
of reflection among those who were committed to defending the traditions of the IETF.  
While most of his presentation was devoted to the pressing technical and organizational 
problems within the Internet standards community, Clark’s memorable phrase was an 
attempt to unite the fractured community by pointing out the shortcomings of ISO, while 
simultaneously challenging the IETF to maintain its unique identity.  Given the dramatic 
events they had just witnessed, one can imagine IETF engineers leaving the July 1992 
meeting with a certain sense of optimism about the future of the Internet.  
Although the IAB had abandoned its CLNP proposal by the end of the July 1992 
meeting, the underlying technical problems remained.  Over the next two years, the IAB 
(which was renamed the Internet Architecture Board in 1992) and the IETF debated 
various proposed designs for the next generation of the Internet Protocol.116  By January 
1995, the community arrived at a consensus over the broad outlines of the new protocol, 
known as Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), that would be developed within the IETF 
over the next several years.117  In the meantime, another protocol developed within the 
IETF, the Dynamic Host Control Protocol, helped to ensure that the Internet did not run 
out of address space.  The technical crisis was averted; but the procedural drama of the 
1992 meetings precipitated what Scott Bradner, a longtime IETF participant, later 
                                                
116 Tim Dixon (1993), “Comparison of Proposals for Next Version of IP,” RFC 1454, 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1454.txt; Scott Bradner and Allison Mankin (1993), IP: Next 
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referred to as a “constitutional crisis.”118  For engineers in the IETF, the Kobe proposal 
called the IAB’s legitimacy and authority into question.  Consequently, the Internet 
community began an effort to better define the informal process that had served the 
Internet so well for so long.   
Between 1992 and 1996, members of the Internet community revised and clarified 
the Internet standards process so that future constitutional crises would be avoided.  
These reforms also sought to strengthen and maintain the integrity of the Internet 
standards process in the face of increasing commercial interest.119  In 1993, the IETF 
published an RFC titled “The Tao of the IETF” that introduced newcomers to the 
customs and norms of the IETF.  Such changes also were motivated by the need to make 
the Internet standards process more international and legitimate in the eyes of non-
American engineers and government officials who were looking to the Internet as an 
element of their strategies to build national information infrastructures.  The days of 
informal discussions among bearded and sandaled graduate students were in the past; 
instead, a greater proportion of IETF attendees in the late 1990s worked for private 
companies and wore suits and ties—a vivid reminder that the world of Internet standards 
had changed.120 
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Even as the Internet community struggled to accommodate rapid 
commercialization, Internet standards continued to be adopted widely.  In 1991, the 
National Science Foundation, which had operated the backbone of the Internet since 
1986, lifted its restriction on commercial activity over the Internet—thus paving the way 
for the Internet to serve as a new commercial infrastructure.121  Another turning point for 
the popularity of the Internet also occurred in 1991 when Tim Berners-Lee released the 
World Wide Web, an application that used the Internet to create links between hypertext 
documents.  In 1994, the National Bureau of Standards (renamed National Institute of 
Standards and Technology in 1988) abandoned its GOSIP program in favor of the 
TCP/IP Internet.  The market for network protocols had tipped in favor of TCP/IP, the 
Internet-OSI religious war was over, and grand future planned for OSI had vanished.  The 
Internet had emerged as the victor.122   
 
4.5  Conclusions 
The computer network architectures developed between the 1960s and the 1990s 
were not simply technological innovations.  They were also organizational and political 
critiques, embodiments of specific beliefs about who should control the processes of 
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innovation and standardization.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Arpanet was 
created as a response to the market’s failure to provide networking solutions that 
permitted connections between proprietary mainframes.  Between the late 1970s and the 
early 1990s, Open Systems Interconnection was ISO’s response to the fractured political 
economy of European telecommunications and computing.  At the same time, the Internet 
Engineering Task Force proudly defined its informal, technically-oriented work style in 
opposition to ISO and the “official” standards bodies—“We reject: kings, presidents and 
voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code.”  
By the mid-1990s, the success of the Internet represented a fundamental shift in 
the political economy of communications networks.  No longer were executives in 
monopoly telephone companies in charge of providing voice communications; by the end 
of the twentieth century, thousands upon thousands of consumers subscribed to digital 
phone service—known as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)—that had no use 
whatsoever for the legacy analog and circuit-switched telephone network.  Many VoIP 
products, offered by startup companies such as Vonage and Skype as well as cable 
television providers such as Time Warner and Comcast, utilized standards developed 
within the IETF in the late 1990s.123  The new network architects were no longer AT&T 
executives who were pursuing complete control over a proprietary network.  Instead, they 
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were leaders of the IAB and IETF, struggling mightily to provide coherence and direction 
within the modular industry structure of the Third Industrial Revolution.  
The failure of OSI stemmed from its inability to overcome the political and 
strategic differences among its diverse and powerful constituencies.  Perhaps, over time, 
OSI would have become the comprehensive network architecture envisioned by its 
leaders.  In the meantime, users found that they could buy and customize products 
designed to work around TCP/IP standards—thus feeding a boom in the global computer 
networking industries.124  The key to the Internet’s success was its dynamic and fluid 
institutional foundation and work culture.  By circumventing the industrial legislatures 
responsible for the “official” standards process, and by developing their network 
architecture in a homogenous environment insulated from commercial and political 
pressures, Internet engineers were able to develop a network that “only just works.”125  
To sustain their technological innovations, the Internet community developed a structure 
and process that generated sufficient levels of consensus and legitimacy to continue their 
experiments in internetworking.  While it is now common to see participants in the 
Internet standards community refer to the “rough consensus and running code” ideal for 
their technical work, Clark’s rejection of alternative forms of decision-making—kings, 
presidents and voting—reminds us of the close links between network standards, 
international politics, and visions of a new future free from hierarchical control.126  As 
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Lawrence Lessig summarized in his influential 1999 book Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace, “rough consensus and running code” was “a manifesto that will define our 
generation.”127  
However, the Internet’s informal process led many observers—especially those 
outside the United States—to be suspicious of the Internet standards process.  Before the 
late 1980s, this process did not allow all interested participants to have a voice in the 
process and fell well short of the procedural safeguards, treasured by groups such as 
ANSI and ISO, that ensured an open and fair standardization process.  With the advent of 
commercial interest in the Internet in the 1990s—and given the continued ambitions of 
commercial firms to disrupt the end-to-end architecture of the Internet for their 
proprietary gain—the Internet community has only been partially successful in assuring 
outsiders that its processes are fair and robust.128   
In the meantime, engineers and regulators in the American and European 
telecommunications industries experimented with different approaches to building 
networks for digital cellular telephony.  As the next chapter describes, even though these 
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experiments occurred during a similar time period as the development of the Internet and 
OSI (between the 1970s and the early 1990s), historical constraints and political events 
shaped the cellular industry in different ways—and generated different results.  
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Chapter 5: The Cellular Telephone as Political Instrument: Standardization in the 
United States and Europe, 1982-20001 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Cellular telephone networks provide another example of a central argument of 
this dissertation: new communication networks embodied technological and ideological 
critiques of existing networks.  American firms—led by AT&T and Motorola—
dominated the first generation of cellular networks.  The cellular concept was first 
defined in 1947 by the Bell Labs engineer Douglas H. Ring, but commercial service only 
began in 1980, when AT&T and Motorola ran successful tests of the first commercial 
systems.  In 1982, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) bowed to intense 
pressure from the nascent American cellular industry and adopted the standard developed 
by AT&T and Motorola as the single American standard for analog cellular networks.  
Buoyed by the stability that this regulatory decision created, American firms stepped up 
their production of analog cellular equipment, and found ready customers in the United 
States and in more than 100 nations around the world.  The booming market for 
American analog cellular equipment provided a vivid demonstration of the “bandwagon 
effects” and economies of scale that can follow from government-mandated standards.2 
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In Europe, the development of analog cellular networks during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s reflected the prevailing European approach in which national governments 
protected their domestic telecommunications firms by developing analog systems through 
their own state sponsored monopolies.3  With the exception of some important 
collaborations between several Nordic countries, many of the largest European nations 
including France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy applied a defensive mindset to the 
development of analog mobile technology.  While these “national champion” strategies 
protected domestic industries from foreign competition, they also had the unintended 
consequence of creating a patchwork of incompatible systems across Europe.4  As a 
result, customers who “roamed” from one country to another could not use their phones.  
Additionally, the limited size of equipment markets made it difficult for manufacturers to 
generate economies of scale in production of network equipment and handsets, which 
kept prices high and sales low.5  
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As engineers developed the second generation of cellular networks during the 
mid-1980s and 1990s, this basic state of affairs—a unified American approach and a 
fragmented European approach—was turned upside down.  The second generation of 
networks were built around digital transmission technologies instead of analog, and hence 
required new transmission standards.  In both the United States and Europe, prevailing 
ideological currents pushed the respective cellular industries in opposite directions.  
Throughout the 1980s, regulators in the FCC rejected both government control and 
monopoly control of the American telecommunications industry.6  Instead, they decided 
in 1988 that their social, economic, and political goals could best be met by allowing 
firms in the cellular industry to set standards through market mechanisms, without 
government mandates.  This decision split the American industry between two competing 
standards specified within industry standards committees, and left room for alternative 
standards to emerge in market niches.7 
By the time the FCC arrived at its decision, telecommunications regulators in 
Europe had backed away from their defensive strategies and linked the creation of the 
second (digital) generation of cellular networks with a broader social and economic 
vision of a unified Europe.  In 1982, the Europeans decided to create a single pan-
European standard.  The technological features of the standard—known as the Global 
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System for Mobile Communication, or GSM—were in place by the end of 1987, and 
every European nation committed to create commercial digital cellular networks by 1991.   
In Europe, decisive political action generated tremendous first mover advantages 
for the companies—mostly but not exclusively European—that participated in the GSM 
process.  The European standard soon became the dominant global standard, and the 
European success in system-building generated immediate benefits for European 
businesses and consumers: European firms such as Nokia and Ericsson became global 
leaders, and European consumers enjoyed the liberating effects of the new technology 
that were unavailable to Americans.8 
Date GSM (Europe) CDMA (US)  TDMA (US) GSM/CDMA 
ratio 
12/1995 13,034,000 9,000 2,055,000 1448:1 
12/1996 32,878,500 987,000 2,700,000 33:1 
12/1997 71,359,000 5,980,000 6,900,000 11:1 
12/1998 138,107,240 22,771,750 17,729,410 6:1 
11/1999 200,000,000 45,000,000 n/a 4.4:1 
6/2000 331,500,000 67,000,000 n/a 5:1 
12/2000 455,100,000 82,200,000 65,200,000 5.5:1 
12/2001 627,700,000 113,000,000 93,300,000 5.5:1 
12/2002 787,500,000 143,000,000 109,200,000 5.5:1 
Table 5.1: Worldwide digital cellular subscribers by standard, 1995-2002. 
Third-generation standards are not considered. GSM is the European 
standard; CDMA and TDMA are the two leading American standards. 
Sources: Cellular Online; GSM Association; CDMA Development Group.9 
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“Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in Western Europe,” World 
Politics 45 (1993): 242; and Jacques Pelkmans, “The GSM Standard: Explaining a Success Story,” 
Journal of European Public Policy 8 (2001): 432-453. The term “bureaucratic miracle” comes from Jon 





As the European cellular industry boomed in the 1990s, many analysts celebrated 
the “bureaucratic miracle” that created the foundations for market success and for 
Europe’s emerging “mobile society.”10  A 2003 article in Telecommunications Policy 
summarized the conventional wisdom: “Many have argued that the EC adoption of a 
uniform 2G/GSM standard is one of the great successes of European telecommunications 
policy, and the North American regulators’ decision to let the market determine standards 
is a great failure.”11  Some analysts, however, departed from this conventional wisdom 
and praised the American decision to resist mandates and allow firms to experiment with 
new technologies.  The emergence of CDMA, a standard that provided a more efficient 
means to use the scarce amounts of spectrum available for cellular networks, provided 
compelling evidence for this dissenting view.  For the firms that designed their equipment 
around CDMA technologies, smoother transition paths to subsequent generations of 
broadband cellular networks (third generation, or 3G)—all of which are based on 
versions of CDMA technologies—provided further evidence of the merits of the 
American laissez-faire approach.12  In sum, mandated de jure standards gave European 
firms strong first-mover advantages, but de facto and consensus standardization in the 
                                                
10 For an entrée to the literature on the social implications of cellular telephony, see Manuel 
Castells, Mireia Fernandez-Ardevol, Jack LinchuanQiu, and Araba Sey, Mobile Communication and 
Society: A Global Perspective (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006); and Richard Ling, The Mobile 
Connection: The Cell Phone’s Impact on Society (San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, 2004). 
11 Neil Gandal, David Salant, and Leonard Waverman, “Standards in Wireless Telephone 
Networks,” Telecommunications Policy 27 (2003): 325-332. See also John Leslie King and Joel West, 
“Ma Bell’s Orphan: US Cellular Telephony, 1947-1996,” Telecommunications Policy 26 (2002): 189-
203 (“The question is not whether [American firms] missed the boat, but rather how they missed it 
given their advantage at the time”). 
12 See for example Philip J. Weiser, “Which Broadband Nation?,” Foreign Affairs (Sept/Oct 2005); 
and Johannes M. Bauer, Yu-Chieh Lin, Carleen F. Maitland, and Ankur Tarnacha, “Transition 
Paths to Next-Generation Wireless Services,” TPRC 2004, the 32nd Research Conference on 
Communication, Information, and Internet Policy, Alexandria, VA (October, 2004). 
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United States created greater incentives for innovation and allowed American firms to 
catch up with and surpass European technology—even though the European standard 
retained its dominant share of global markets.  
Given the unfolding state of digital cellular markets, it is impossible to determine 
how this standards war will play out over the long term.  Where most analysts contrast 
the relative technological and ideological merits of the American and European styles of 
system-building, this chapter situates these systems within a broader and longer historical 
context.  When we look at the decisions and tradeoffs that regulators and engineers made, 
we can see how these divergent paths of innovation embodied critiques of the existing 
order, drawn from the lessons these professionals had learned from previous generations 
of communication networks, and applied as they hoped to lead the way toward a more 
prosperous future.  Moreover, by stepping outside of a strictly comparative framework 
and adopting a longer and broader historical view, we can see how both the European and 
American decisions indicate that the institutional basis of standardization in the 
telecommunications industry had abandoned its roots in national monopolies, and turned 
to consensus committees to set new standards, define new network architectures, and 
coordinate the constituent components.  In short, the history of digital cellular in the 
United States and Europe illustrates two different strategies for managing the transition to 
the modular technologies and industry structures of the Third Industrial Revolution.  The 
differences between these two strategies lie in different styles of reaching and 
implementing “consensus” standards—one enforced by government, one subject to 
market forces.  
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5.2  European Integration: Ideology, Politics, and Technology 
 As European regulators contemplated a new generation of digital cellular 
networks in the early 1980s, they reflected on the drawbacks of the existing patchwork of 
incompatible analog cellular networks across Europe.  First, the incompatible networks 
added friction to the political and economic integration of Europe, a movement that had 
been gaining momentum under the Commission of European Communities and Council 
of Ministers.  Second, the “lack of spontaneous cooperation” between firms in the 
European telecom industry seemed certain to spell doom in competitive global markets 
against the industrial giants of America and Japan.  The Commission declared that a 
“more systematic, more effective approach” would be necessary to spark the European 
industry.13  European telecommunications professionals confronted these challenges at 
two interrelated levels: within the political bureaucracy of the Commission of European 
Communities and within the technological bureaucracy of standard-setting committees. 
The modern basis of European integration began after World War II, when 
several European leaders committed to a course of political and economic cooperation 
that they hoped would prevent the recurrence of the bloody wars that had scarred Europe 
for centuries.14  In 1967, a European Merger Treaty created three bodies to work in 
tandem: a Commission of European Communities (“Commission”), Council of Ministers 
                                                
13 Commission of the European Communities, Telecommunications (Communication from the 
Commission to the Council), COM (83) 329 final (Brussels: CEC, 9 June 1983), 1-2, 5, 7. 
14 Six European countries (Belgium, Italy, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West 
Germany) took formal steps toward this integration by establishing three groups—the European 
Coal and Steel Community (1951), the European Atomic Energy Community, and European 
Economic Community (both formed by the 1957 Treaties of Rome). 
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(“Council”) and European Parliament.15  The Commission struggled to establish 
consensus over European tariffs and industrial policy during a “decade of stagnation” 
between 1973 and 1983, but by the early 1980s they began a new round of initiatives to 
establish a single European market.16   
One such initiative was in the area of mobile telecommunications, which the 
Commission saw as an important sector for growth both as infrastructure for other 
European industries and as a significant market in itself—“no less essential than coal and 
steel were at the beginning of the fifties,” according to one document.17  Engineers from 
Commission member states coordinated the technical development of the new cellular 
network in a strikingly productive series of negotiations that occurred between 1984 and 
1987.18  The landmark publication of this era of technical diplomacy was the 
Commission’s June 1987 Green Paper entitled “Towards a Dynamic European 
                                                
15 In general, the Commission was responsible for proposing and implementing legislation and 
policies; the Council was the highest decision-making body, whose decisions were binding for 
member nations. For a seminal analysis of the political economy of European integration, see 
Charles S. Maier, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic 
Policy after World War II,” in Charles S. Maier, ed., The Cold War in Europe (New York: Markus 
Wiener Publishing, Inc., 1991), 169-201.  
16 See Keith Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe:  The Informal Politics of European Union 1973-1995 
(London: Fontana Press, 1995), 73-155; and Egan, Constructing a European Market, 61-81. 
17 Commission of the European Communities, Telecommunications (Communication from the 
Commission to the Council), COM (83) 329 final (Brussels: CEC, 9 June 1983), 10. See also 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council on 
Telecommunications – Lines of Action, COM (83) 573 (Brussels: CEC, 1983), 6-7. 
18 See for example Council of Ministers, Council Recommendation of 12 November 1984 concerning the 
implementation of harmonization in the field of telecommunications, 84/549/EEC (Brussels: EEC, 12 
November 1984). See also Council of Ministers, Council Directive of 24 July 1986 on the initial stage 
of the mutual recognition of type approval for telecommunications terminal equipment, 86/361/EEC 
(Brussels: EEC, 24 July 1986); and Council of Ministers, Council Decision of 22 December 1986 on 
standardization in the field of information technology and telecommunications, 87/95/EEC (Brussels: 
EEC, 22 December 1986). 
 
 261 
Community.”19  The Green Paper reinforced the importance of telecommunications as the 
“‘nervous system’ of modern society,” and highlighted the consensus conclusion that 
traditional forms of organization that enforced “national frontiers” would prevent new 
technologies from reaching their full potential.20  Although some areas of disagreement 
persisted, the specific provisions for the creation of a pan-European digital mobile 
network—including the need for “a substantial re-inforcement of resources applied to 
standardisation”—enjoyed broad support. 21 
This emerging political and technological consensus required new institutions to 
create technical standards that would be acceptable to all parties.  Between 1980 and 
1982, the Conference of European Posts and Telecommunications Administrations 
(CEPT), a powerful group of national regulators from 26 European countries, conducted 
a thorough analysis of the European cellular industry.  In their December 1982 report, 
they declared that a band of spectrum between 862 and 960 MHz would be set aside for a 
pan-European mobile system, and created a committee of technical experts called the 
Groupe Spéciale Mobile, or GSM, to plan and design of the new system.22  Much like the 
negotiated and iterative process that the Commission had followed at the diplomatic 
level, the engineer-statesmen of the GSM met regularly between 1982 and 1989.  These 
                                                
19 Commission of the European Communities, Towards a dynamic European economy: Green Paper on 
the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment, COM (87) 290 
(Brussels: CEC, 30 June 1987). 
20 CEC, Green Paper, 1. 
21 Commission of the European Communities, Towards a competitive community-wide 
telecommunications market in 1992: Implementing the Green Paper on the development of the common 
market for telecommunications services and equipment, COM (88) 48 final (Brussels: CEC, 9 February 
1988).  
22 See Garrard, Cellular Communications, 63; and “GSM Plenary Report,” GSM Temporary 
Document 32-83, (P-83-032), December 1982.  
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technical negotiations, chaired skillfully by the Swedish telecommunications engineer 
Thomas Haug, operated according to similar procedural values that sought to establish a 
widely shared consensus through focused and diplomatic discussion.  Haug recalled that 
the consensus process “may not be the speediest way to reach a decision, but on the other 
hand, a consensus makes it almost certain that everyone is going to stick to the 
decision.”23  
One benefit of Haug’s leadership was that he was an experienced leader in 
situations that called for international negotiations.  The major source of his experience 
was a series of collaborations between Nordic countries in the 1970s and early 1980s to 
create a single Nordic analog system (known as NMT).24  This Nordic system was born 
out of a 1969 Swedish proposal to collaborate with Denmark, Finland, and Norway to 
create a mobile telecommunications network.25  The Nordic system emerged as a potent 
competitor to American analog systems, and the commercial success of the Nordic 
system demonstrated the economic and technical viability of an international alliance of 
telecommunications firms and regulators.26  
                                                
23 Haug recalled that the consensus process “may not be the speediest way to reach a decision, 
but on the other hand, a consensus makes it almost certain that everyone is going to stick to the 
decision.” Thomas Haug, “The GSM Standardisation Work 1982-1987,” in Friedhelm Hillebrand, 
ed., GSM and UMTS: The Creation of Global Mobile Communication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
2002), 16. 
24 Thomas Haug, “A Commentary on Standardization Practices: Lessons from the NMT and GSM 
Mobile Phone Standards Histories,” Telecommunications Policy 26 (2002): 104. See also Ari T. 
Manninen, “Elaboration of NMT and GSM Standards: From Idea to Market” (Ph.D. Diss., 
University of Jyväskylä, 2002).  
25 See Haug, “A Commentary on Standardization,” 101-107; and Janne Lehenkari and Reijo 
Miettinent, “Standardisation in the Construction of a Large Technological System—the Case of 
the Nordic Mobile Telephone System,” Telecommunications Policy 26 (2002): 109-127. 
26 Funk, Global Competition Between and Within Standards, 53-56.  
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In early 1982, the Nordic alliance expanded to include the Netherlands.  Together, 
they proposed to create a common European standard that would suit the political goals 
of European integration.27  Soon thereafter, a separate and competing European alliance 
emerged with France and Germany at its core.  This Franco-German alliance was itself a 
remarkable departure from the bitter technological disputes between the two nations in 
the post-war era, most visible in a series of disputes during the 1960s over the 
standardization of color television.  Between 1983 and 1985, the French and German 
ministries cooperated to create an interim analog system as well as a joint research and 
development program for digital cellular technologies.28  The Franco-German alliance 
expanded to include Italy in 1985 and British network operators in 1986.  As with the 
Nordic collaborations, the Franco-German cooperative relationship was an experiment to 
build an international standards alliance in order to benefit their respective national 
manufacturers.29 
                                                
27 The Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden submitted joint statements to CEPT 
asserting that concerted action for 900 MHz band was needed before each country developed its 
own system. See “GSM Study Plan,” GSM Temporary Document 2/82 (P-82-002), June 1982; and 
“Public Mobile Communications Systems in the 900 MHz band,” GSM Temporary Document 
4/82 (P-82-004), June 1982. See also Thomas Haug, “The Market Fragmentation in Europe and 
CEPT Initiatives in 1982,” in Hillebrand, ed., GSM and UMTS, 12-14.  
28 See Philippe Dupuis, “The Franco-German, tripartite and quadripartite co-operation from 1984 
to 1987,” in Hillebrand, ed., GSM and UMTS, 26-29. Dupuis served as assistant for mobile 
communications to the French Director General of Telecommunications from 1981 to 1988, and 
was deeply involved in French participation in GSM activities. See also Rhonda Crane, The 
Politics of International Standards: France and the Color TV War (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing 
Corporation, 1979). 
29 Europeans alliances to support this “national champion” strategy existed in a number of high-
tech industries, including computers and airplanes. See David C. Mowery and Richard R. Nelson, 




Beginning in 1986, the engineers in the GSM committee evaluated eight 
competing proposals to determine a single European standard for digital cellular 
networks.  The GSM committee sought to base its decision on the technical performance 
of the competing networks.  To generate data for comparison, engineers in the GSM 
committee undertook a series of field tests in 1986 and 1987—somewhat reminiscent of 
Jon Postel’s “bake-offs” (discussed in the previous chapter) in the early 1980s to 
determine the best implementations of Internet protocols.30 
Leading up to a tense meeting in Madeira, Portugal in February 1987, the eight 
proposals had been narrowed down to two: one developed by Franco-German alliance, 
and the other created by the Nordic alliance. At the Madeira meeting, the Nordic proposal 
gained the support of all of the fifteen GSM representatives except two, the French and 
the German.  The French and German opposition was not technical; instead, it stemmed 
from political pressure from their respective national governments, who had subsidized 
their joint proposal and, for economic and cultural reasons, strongly preferred to see a 
standard developed by their own engineers adopted as the European standard.  However, 
the French and German representatives in GSM eventually convinced their domestic 
leaders that the Nordic system would be economically and technically superior.   
Outflanked by the Nordic alliance and unwilling to endure further delays to fight 
what appeared to be a hopeless battle, the telecommunication ministers in the French and 
German governments dropped their objections in May 1987 and supported the Nordic 
                                                
30 Dupuis, “Franco-German cooperation,” in Hillebrand, ed., GSM and UMTS, 23-36. 
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proposal.31  Ericsson, a prominent firm in the Nordic alliance, sweetened the deal for 
France and Germany by cooperating with Alcatel and Siemens, two of the champion 
firms of the latter two countries.32  Shortly thereafter, the consensus negotiated in the 
GSM committee received a political blessing from the European Council, which required 
that member states to defer to the GSM committee for “planning all system aspects of a 
second-generation cellular mobile radio infrastructure.”33  In other words, the technical 
consensus forged within the GSM committee was backed by the legal authority of the 
European Council, thus elevating their consensus standard to de jure status. 
Two subsequent institutional innovations paved the way for the GSM standard to 
move quickly to market.  First, representatives from 14 national telecom monopolies and 
private network operators from 13 European countries signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding in September 1987 that committed the signatories to work toward the 
commercial introduction of GSM networks by July 1, 1991.34  The Memorandum of 
                                                
31 See “Declaration of the ministers on the introduction of a pan European public digital cellular 
radiocommunication service,” GSM Temporary Document 68/87 (P-87-068), 19 May 1987. For a 
glimpse into the politics involved, see Haug, “The GSM Standardisation Work,” in Hillebrand, 
ed., GSM and UMTS, 21-22; Dupuis, “Franco-German cooperation,” in Hillebrand, ed., GSM and 
UMTS, 31-35.  
32 Rudi Bekkers and Isabelle Liotard, “European Standards for Mobile Communications: The 
Tense Relationship between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights,” European Intellectual 
Property Review 3 (1999): 110-126. 
33 Council of Ministers, Council Directive of 25 June 1987 on the frequency bands to be reserved for the 
coordinated introduction of public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications in the 
Community, 87/372/EEC; Council of Ministers, Council Recommendation of 25 June 1987 on the 
coordinated introduction of public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications in the 
Community, 87/371/EEC. 
34 GSM, “Memorandum of Understanding on the implementation of a pan European 900 MHz 
digital cellular mobile telecommunications service by 1991,” 7 September 1987. In his comments 
on the importance of British initiation of the MoU, Stephen Temple (a GSM participant from the 
UK) suggested that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s policy of promoting competition in 
telecommunication injected “into the European strategic thinking in standards making a strong 
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Understanding was significant because it ensured market acceptance and thus reduced the 
risks of investments in research, development, and manufacturing.  If the Green Paper 
confirmed the political viability of a pan-European digital mobile network, the 
Memorandum of Understanding confirmed the commercial viability of the system to be 
created by the GSM committee.  
The second institutional innovation brought private manufacturers and network 
operators into the standardization process.  In 1989, the standards development work of 
the GSM committee moved to the newly created European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI).35  At the same time, the GSM standard itself was renamed 
Global System for Mobile Communication, and retained the “GSM” acronym.  The main 
difference between ETSI and the pre-existing international telecommunications standards 
bodies was that ETSI’s rules allowed participation from private firms.  By taking this 
step, European regulators acknowledged that the ancien regime where national 
monopolies dominated telecommunications had passed: in the new order, private firms—
even non-European firms with significant operations in Europe—had equal standing in 
the standardization process.  The private firms responded eagerly to this new opportunity 
                                                                                                                                            
dose of market realism.” Stephen Temple, “The GSM Memorandum of Understanding – the 
Engine that Pushed GSM to the Market,” in Hillebrand, ed., GSM and UMTS, 37-40. 
35 Created in March 1988 to coordinate European telecom standards in an era of deregulation, 
ETSI was a child of multilateral jurisdictional conflicts between the Community (which was 
pushing for liberalization of equipment markets), CEPT (which was interested in maintaining 
national sovereignty), and CEN and CENELEC (the electronics industry and standards bodies 
who felt telecommunications standards were on their turf). Stanley M. Besen, “The European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute: A Preliminary Analysis,” Telecommunications Policy 14 
(1990): 521-530. See also Egan, Constructing a European Market, 146-151. 
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to shape standards, and membership in ETSI grew rapidly, with over 135 members by 
1990.36  
Once the European nations reached a political consensus and established new 
institutions to create the needed standards for the new digital network, one of the most 
important issues within the standards committee was how they would treat patented 
technologies.  Which patented technologies were essential for the GSM standard?  On 
what terms would these patents be licensed?  The two questions were linked.  As the 
committee developed the technical specifications, they discovered conflicting norms 
between many of the European firms and one American firm in particular, Motorola.  
Motorola, which was able to participate within the European process because of its 
manufacturing facilities in Europe, embodied a more aggressive, brute force style of 
patent negotiation that was customary among American firms in the computing and 
electronics industries.  European firms such as Philips, Ericsson, Nokia, Alcatel, and 
Siemens favored more modest terms in which patents would be licensed on either 
“reasonable and non-discriminatory” terms or at no cost (otherwise known as “royalty-
free” terms).  These leading companies eventually resolved the conflict through an 
exchange of patent licenses.  The resulting cross-licensing regime meant that the firms 
with the strongest patent portfolios (Motorola, Nokia, Ericsson, Siemens, and Alcatel) 
were best positioned to manufacture equipment for GSM networks at the lowest cost—an 
                                                
36 For a nuanced analysis of this shift away from the “ancien regime,” see William J. Drake, “The 
Transformation of International Telecommunications Standardization: European and Global 
Dimensions,” in Charles Steinfield, Johannes M. Bauer and Laurence Caby, eds., 
Telecommunications in Transition: Policies, Services, and Technologies in the European Community 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 71-96. 
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advantage that translated into market success for these firms.  The “passive behavior” of 
Philips, as well as Japanese companies such as NEC and Mitsubishi—which declined to 
participate in cross-licensing agreements—meant that they were initially frozen out of 
manufacturing for GSM handsets and equipment.37 
 Taken together, this series of institutional innovations—the multilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding that committed signatories to developing GSM 
networks, and the development of patent exchanges among private firms within the GSM 
committee—provided the technological and commercial foundations for market adoption 
of GSM standards.  The resulting rapid adoption of GSM networks within European and 
global markets indicates that the European professionals successfully managed the 
transfer of power from the old order of national monopolies to the new order where 
power resided with private firms and international organizations.  At both the political 
and technical levels, European telecommunications professionals engaged in a power-
laden diplomatic process, infused with complicated technical issues, in which their home 
nations ceded power and authority to international organizations in order to reap the 
benefits of cooperation.  The benefits were substantial: by the early 1990s the leading 
European firms were growing far more quickly than their American and Japanese rivals.  
GSM grew from 250,000 users in 1992 to over 450 million users in 2000 – almost 70% 
of all digital mobile customers worldwide.  By the turn of the twenty-first century, GSM 
                                                
37 Bekkers and Liotard, “European Standards for Mobile Communications: The Tense 
Relationship between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights,” 110-126; and Rudi Bekkers, 
Bart Verspagen, and Jan Smits, “Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization: the Case of 
GSM,” Telecommunications Policy 26 (2002): 171-188. 
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networks were present in 147 countries on all continents.38  When viewed in light of 
earlier failures of European high-tech initiatives, such as the failure of the OSI computer 
network architecture, the success of GSM was indeed a “bureaucratic miracle”—a 
technological manifestation of the new ideology of European cooperation. 
 
5.3  American Deregulation: Spectrum Scarcity and Mandated Competition 
In the European setting, ideology pulled together the most important institutions 
in the telecommunications industry; in the United States, ideology pulled these 
institutions apart.  Digital cellular technologies came of age at the same moment when 
American regulators finally decided to dismantle the Bell System and began experiments 
to, somewhat paradoxically, mandate more competition in the telecommunications 
industry—“contrived competition” in the assessment of historian Richard Vietor.39  The 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency that directed these experiments, 
has been the subject of criticism that included allegations of incompetence and utter 
subservience to the lobbyists of the industries under their jurisdiction.  However, a more 
sympathetic look at the FCC provides a picture of civil servants under siege, whose 
embrace of market-oriented reforms was as much a product of the intrinsic logic of these 
reforms as it was an attempt to save their own necks. 
Throughout its history, the central function of the FCC was to manage a scarce 
resource: the radio spectrum.  All of the complex technical and bureaucratic issues that 
                                                
38 Friedhelm Hillebrand, “GSM’s Achievements,” in Hillebrand, ed., GSM and UMTS, 1-10.  
39 Richard H. K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
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permeate the history of the FCC stem from the simple fact that the radio spectrum could 
not accommodate all of the signals that people want to transmit over it.40  The FCC 
managed this scarcity through a complex licensing scheme: it allocated specific portions 
of the spectrum for specific uses, and then assigned licenses for private parties to use the 
spectrum.41  For example, the FCC assigned licenses to television broadcasters to use the 
spectrum in the 512-608 MHz band only for broadcast television.  They were not allowed 
to use that spectrum for other uses, such as mobile telephony, radio broadcasts, or 
satellite transmission.  
During the twentieth century, the FCC utilized two strategies to alleviate the 
technical and political problems associated with the allocation of spectrum.  One strategy 
was to re-allocate or re-assign spectrum for new or different uses based upon technical 
proposals from private firms.  Although these comparative hearings—commonly known 
as “beauty contests”—were ostensibly based on technical criteria, in practice they 
subjected the FCC to tremendous amounts of pressure from private firms, lobbyists, and 
elected officials (often acting on behalf of private interests).  The process of setting 
standards clearly illustrates these problems.  One familiar example is the FCC’s decision 
to set color TV standards in 1950 that benefited CBS, only to reverse that decision and 
                                                
40 On the early history of the FCC and the “scarcity” rationale for its existence, see Robert W. 
McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, & Democracy: The Battle for the Control of U. S. 
Broadcasting, 1928-1935 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
41 For a recent overview of the complexities of spectrum management, see Government 
Accountability Office, “Telecommunications: Preliminary Information on the Federal 
Communications Commission's Spectrum Allocation and Assignment Process,” GAO-06-212R, 
November 10, 2005. 
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mandate a different standard—to the memorable delight of RCA President David 
Sarnoff—in 1953.42 
Given the difficult bureaucratic problems associated with the FCC’s tight control 
over spectrum allocations and uses, one can understand the enthusiasm for a second 
strategy to alleviate spectrum scarcity: technological solutions that used spectrum more 
efficiently.  This quest for a technological fix has been one of the consistent themes in the 
history of the FCC, and has always been a prominent concern in the FCC’s regulation of 
land mobile communication.  The FCC frequently turned to competition to create 
incentives for developing more spectrum-efficient technologies.  In 1949, the FCC 
established two separate sets of land mobile frequencies in every geographical region, 
one for firms with existing wireline operations (such as AT&T) and one for a group of 
hundreds of smaller firms classified as Radio Common Carriers.  As the mobile industry 
grew over the next thirty years, its representatives tried to persuade the FCC to re-allocate 
UHF spectrum from television broadcasters.  Time and again, the broadcasters resisted 
such incursions, leaving the FCC with the unenviable task of mediating the demands of 
both industries.43   
The cellular concept was a central breakthrough in this quest for spectrum-
efficient technologies.  As opposed to the traditional “one-to-many” style of radio 
communication where signals were broadcast over tens or hundreds of miles, the cellular 
                                                
42 Hugh R. Slotten, Radio and Television Regulation: Broadcast Technology in the United States, 1920-
1960 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 189-231. 
43 This complex story is told by Dale N. Hatfield, “FCC Regulation of Land Mobile Radio—A 
Case History,” in Leonard Lewin, ed., Telecommunications: An Interdisciplinary Text (Dedham, MA: 
Artech House, 1984), 105-132. 
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concept called for a system of towers arranged in a cell-like grid that would transmit 
signals for only a few miles.  This lily pad network architecture, in which radio signals 
persisted only over small distances, provided a more efficient way to use the scarce 
amounts of available radio spectrum by allowing the same frequencies to be reused many 
times in a given geographic area.44 
Technical complexity and regulatory hurdles delayed the testing of a cellular 
system until 1962, when Richard Frenkiel and Joel Engel (also in Bell Labs) presided 
over a team of almost 200 engineers who put the cellular concept into practice.  Because 
Western Electric was barred from entering markets for mobile equipment by the 1956 
antitrust decree, Motorola—a company that had established itself as a leader in mobile 
equipment since before World War II—quickly emerged as the premier American 
manufacturer.  The industry seemed poised to grow quickly, but continued political 
squabbles delayed the further development of cellular networks until the late 1960s.45  It 
took until 1980 for AT&T and Motorola to conduct the first successful tests of cellular 
systems.  These tests generated tremendous demand for mobile service, which in turn 
overwhelmed the both the capabilities of cellular systems and the capacity of the 
available spectrum.  In 1982, the FCC bowed to pressure from Motorola and AT&T to 
endorse the analog standard jointly developed by the two companies as the single 
                                                
44 This description is necessarily brief and simplified. Young, “Advanced Mobile Phone Service: 
Introduction, Background, and Objectives,” 1-14. 
45 The main political problem was that the slice of spectrum most desired by AT&T and Motorola 
was allocated to UHF television, and the powerful broadcasting industry managed to delay any 
attempts to convince the FCC to change that status quo. Hatfield, “FCC Regulations of Land 
Mobile Radio,” 112-130.  
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American standard.  This mandate, however, was only a temporary fix, and did nothing to 
alleviate the underlying problem of spectrum scarcity.46 
 
5.3.1  Ideology and FCC Domain Contraction  
As the FCC struggled to guide the technological development of the cellular 
industry, broader changes in the realm of political economy led the FCC to reconsider its 
policy of mandating standards for wireless services.  In 1984, a landmark antitrust 
settlement split up the Bell System and completed the process of shattering the structure 
of the American telecommunications industry.  The FCC became the chief regulatory 
authority for the new industry structure that took the place of the Bell System, one that 
sought to replace a single bureaucracy with a competitive marketplace.  This introduction 
of regulated competition in American telecommunications illustrated broader ideological 
shifts in American regulation that had begun in the late 1970s.  As a reaction to rising 
inflation, stagnant productivity, and pressure from global competition, regulatory 
reformers altered the structure of a number of major industries, including airlines, 
banking, and natural gas.  This deregulatory turn embodied a rising distrust of 
government and an emerging bipartisan conviction that the regulatory system was 
interfering with, instead of aiding, innovation and consumer welfare.47  
                                                
46 Louis Galambos and Eric John Abrahamson, Anytime, Anywhere: Entrepreneurship and the 
Creation of a Wireless World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 32; see also Garrard, 
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Broadcasting Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1986), 125-129. 
47 In Richard Vietor’s summary, “new technology in the hands of aggressive entrepreneurs forced 
changes” in the regulatory system that had protected AT&T from competitive entry in services 
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Under the leadership of Charles Ferris (appointed by President Carter in 1977) 
and Mark Fowler (appointed by President Reagan in 1981), the FCC embraced 
marketplace solutions to regulatory problems.48  One example of the FCC’s new 
approach was evident in proceedings between 1980 and 1982 in which the FCC weighed 
competing standards for AM stereo.  After years of technical evaluations and industry 
lobbying, in 1980 the FCC chose a system by Magnavox over four alternatives as the AM 
stereo standard.  Predictably, the sponsors of the losing systems objected strenuously, 
thus legally obligating the FCC to reconsider its choice.  On the basis of its extensive 
technical tests and data analysis between September 1980 and March 1982, the FCC staff 
declared that it could not identify any clearly superior technical system.49  Industry 
responses to the FCC’s call for comments were split between those who urged the FCC to 
let standardization occur through a commercial adoption and those who argued that the 
FCC could promote market stability and growth by mandating a single standard.  
According to political scientist Sanford Berg, this ideological split also existed within 
branches of the Reagan administration, with the FCC’s Office of Plans and Policy in 
favor of the marketplace approach, and the White House Office of Science and 
Technology in favor of mandatory standards.  Faced with the prospect of further appeals 
                                                                                                                                            
and equipment. Vietor, Contrived Competition, 19. In contrast, Peter Temin argued that ideological 
changes were more decisive than changes in technology. Temin, Fall of the Bell System, 7-9, 336-
348.  
48 See Mark S. Fowler and Daniel L. Brenner, “A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast 
Regulation,” Texas Law Review 60 (1982): 207-256. 
49 Several commentators argue that the FCC’s reduction of technical and engineering staff during 
this period—whether caused by a budget crunch or because of an ideological preference for 
economists—may have influenced the FCC’s ability to make technical judgments. See e.g. 
Christopher H. Sterling, “The FCC and Changing Technological Standards,” Journal of 
Communication 32 (1982): 140. 
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and reported legal threats from losing competitors, the FCC declined to mandate a 
standard, defending a market-oriented approach as more likely to facilitate subsequent 
innovation and prevent monopoly control of the industry.  According to Christopher 
Sterling, who worked at the FCC at the time, this decision represented “a benchmark in 
the Commission’s approach to regulation of changing technology.”50    
This market-oriented logic was evident in other FCC proceedings, most notably in 
the FCC Computer Inquiries that structured markets for telecommunications equipment 
and articulated the FCC policy of resisting regulation of rapidly growing markets for 
computer networking (so-called “advanced services”)—a decision that contributed to the 
stunning growth of the Internet.51 
As it evaluated its role in the regulation of communication standards across a 
number of technologies, the FCC faced a consistent set of difficult problems, including 
rapid technological change, intense lobbying from self-interested private groups, and an 
ideological climate that increasingly favored leaving industrial coordination and 
development to private firms.  This combination of practical strains and shifting political 
winds suggests that Chairmen Ferris and Fowler’s embrace of market-oriented reform 
                                                
50 Sanford V. Berg, “Public Policy and Corporate Strategies in the AM Stereo Market,” in H. 
Landis Gabel, ed., Product Standardization and Competitive Strategy (New York: North-Holland, 
1987), 155; and Sterling, “FCC and Changing Standards,” 137. See also Besen and Johnson, 
Compatibility Standards, 38-50. In 1990, two commentators concluded that the experiment had 
failed to generate the desired results, and that “the adoption and diffusion of AM stereo has been 
retarded by the FCC’s decision in 1982 to not establish a technical standard.” Bruce C. 
Klopfenstein and David Sedman, “Technical Standards and the Marketplace: The Case of AM 
Stereo,” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 34 (Spring 1990): 188. 
51 See Robert Cannon, “The Legacy of the Federal Communication Commission’s Computer 
Inquiries,” Federal Communications Law Journal 55 (2003): 167-206; and Jason Oxman, “The FCC 
and the Unregulation of the Internet,” (Federal Communications Commission Office of Plans and 
Policy, Working Paper No. 31, 1999) (arguing that the FCC’s regulatory forbearance was a major 
contributing factor in the development of the Internet). 
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was an attempt to remove some of the pressure on the FCC by limiting the agency’s 
authority through deregulation.52  The FCC came under siege from a variety of 
constituencies in the early 1980s, including the broadcasting industry, the cable television 
industry, competing factions within the telephone industry, Congress, the federal courts, 
the Presidency, and public interest groups.  As Florence Heffron noted, the “FCC’s 
deregulation efforts provide an excellent example of the general circumstances under 
which voluntary deregulation and reduction of power emerge as a rational organizational 
strategy for survival in a hostile environment.”53  It was in this dynamic institutional 
environment—the experimental stages of regulated competition—that American 
telecommunications professionals pounced on opportunities to make “money from thin 
air” in the rapidly growing cellular industry.  At the time, however, it was unclear how 
well this swarm of new entrants would do in place of the old, stable, cozy relationships 
between AT&T, Motorola, and the FCC. 
In late 1983, the Bell System was on the verge of divestiture and many Americans 
were concerned that their world-class telecommunications system would fall into a state 
of disrepair.  As the FCC contemplated how to ensure the technical coordination of the 
national network, it decided to turn to a new industry group called the Exchange Carriers 
Standards Association (ECSA).  The ECSA’s legitimacy was in part a function of its size: 
firms in the ECSA served 95% of American customers.  In response to an FCC 
                                                
52 Florence Heffron, “The Federal Communications Commission and Broadcast Deregulation,” in 
John J. Havick, ed., Communications Policy and the Political Process (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1983), 61-67; Gail Crotts Arnall and Lawrence M. Mead, “The FCC as an Institution,” in 
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proceeding on standards in the post-monopoly world, the ECSA volunteered to sponsor a 
committee that would follow the guidelines of the American National Standards Institute 
that sought to ensure openness, due process, and balance of interests.  With the approval 
of the FCC and the industry, the ECSA created committee T1 in February 1984.  The new 
T1 committee was able to fill the coordinating role previously assumed by the Bell 
System, and thus provided a template for future standardization policy decisions.54 
 
5.3.2  The FCC and the Creation of Cellular Competition  
The FCC’s determination to create competition in hundreds of local markets 
throughout the United States led to a slow and inefficient license assignment process, one 
that did not begin until 1982 and dragged on until 1989.55  The causes of this delay 
stemmed from the inability of FCC staff to create a process for assigning spectrum that 
was both fair and efficient.  At first, the FCC invited technical proposals (the traditional 
“beauty contest” approach), but applicants overwhelmed the FCC by adding charts, maps, 
and market forecasts—in short, anything and everything they thought would help them 
win.56  Unable to review the proposals—let alone judge their technical merits—the FCC 
                                                
54 Ian M. Lifchus, “Standards Committee T1—Telecommunications,” IEEE Communications 
Magazine 23 (1985): 34-37; and Arthur K. Reilly, “Defining the U.S. Telecommunications Network 
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55 See James B. Murray, Jr., Wireless Nation: The Frenzied Launch of the Cellular Revolution in America 
(Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2002); and O. Casey Corr, Like Money from Thin Air: The 
Story of Craig McCaw, the Visionary who Invented the Cell Phone Industry, and His Next Billion-Dollar 
Idea (New York: Crown Business, 2000).   
56 Much of this application fodder seems to have been pure speculation. As one participant in the 
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everything—and frequently guessing very badly.” Murray, Wireless Nation, 46; and Galambos 
and Abrahamson, Anytime, Anywhere, 164. 
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abandoned the beauty contests in favor of a system of lotteries on April 11, 1984.  Once 
again, spectrum speculators found ways to “game” the lotteries and further frustrate 
efforts to conduct a fair and efficient assignment process.  These various gaming 
tactics—including some that were legally and ethically dubious—detracted from the 
serious, capital-intensive work required to build cellular systems.  Some went so far as to 
create “application mills” that reduced applications for wireless spectrum to little more 
than binder-sized lottery tickets.57   
Consequently, many winners of the spectrum lotteries were interested only in 
reselling spectrum, and completely uninterested and incapable of building cellular 
systems that could compete—as the FCC intended—against the cellular subsidiaries of 
the Baby Bells.  A wave of consolidation ensued over the next few years as entrepreneurs 
such as Craig McCaw bought up licenses in a freewheeling market.58  Because the 
cellular market became a laboratory for mandating competition in the immediate 
aftermath of AT&T’s divestiture, the American process of spectrum assignments was far 
less efficient than the European strategy of international harmonization.  This difference 
accounts more than any other factor for the lag in the development of the American 
cellular industry.  
Given this state of affairs—the fragmented state of the cellular industry and the 
scarce amount of spectrum allocated for cellular service—the American digital cellular 
                                                
57 Murray, Wireless Nation, 127-161. 
58 On the enigmatic McCaw’s leading role, see Corr, Money From Thin Air. Murray provides an 
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industry was in desperate need of clear rules to stabilize commercial development.  The 
FCC, which had thus far hesitated to provide guidance or leadership, finally initiated 
proceedings in October 1987 to create new rules and clarify the existing rules that 
governed the cellular industry.  The main thrust of the FCC’s proposal was to move away 
from specific rules mandating what spectrum licensees could or could not do with their 
spectrum.  In this form, “deregulation” would, in the view of the Commissioners, 
“promote the public interest by encouraging the development of more spectrum-efficient 
cellular technologies and by permitting more efficient and intensive use of the 
frequencies that have been allocated for cellular service.”59  Cellular operators could 
achieve this goal by experimenting with “alternative technologies” to the previously 
mandated analog standards.  The FCC found additional justification for its proposal from 
what it referred to as “very positive” recent experiences with market-oriented rule 
changes.  Further, given the dynamic state of cellular technologies, the FCC deemed 
intervention in cellular standards to be “premature,” and instead suggested that market 
competition would be the best way to achieve its primary goal: the development of new 
technologies that would use the existing spectrum more efficiently.60  
                                                
59 Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Gen. Docket 87-390, 2 FCC Rcd 6244 (1987), 1 [hereinafter Notice 
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Most responses to the FCC’s proposal supported the greater technical flexibility 
for wireless firms.61  One of the central issues that emerged from these comments was 
controversy over familiar questions: should the FCC leave firms in the cellular industry 
to choose their own network standards and technologies?  Or should it extend its earlier 
practice of mandating cellular standards?   
In their comments to the FCC, AT&T’s lawyers made a particularly strong case 
for market standards: the choice of technology should be left to the service provider. 
Other major network operators, including McCaw, Ameritech, and SBC supported 
AT&T on this point.62  The main concern expressed in these comments was that 
immediate market opportunities would be delayed if service providers had to wait until 
either the FCC or an industry body created standards.  Mandated standards—either from 
the FCC or from an industry committee—would invite further delay, and could also, in 
AT&T’s view, “deter innovation and stifle competition.”63  AT&T preferred an 
alternative: service providers could use whatever technologies they desired, the FCC 
would refrain from mandates, and when the standards committee completed its work, 
network operators and equipment manufacturers could take those standards into account.  
Implicit—yet unstated—in AT&T’s comments was the recognition that their preferred 
                                                
61 The exception to this support came from firms in the paging industry, which pleaded en masse 
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“market-oriented” approach would give large and well-financed companies (such as 
AT&T) the opportunity to buy up additional spectrum and consolidate their position in 
the industry.  Of course, they could also participate actively within the industry 
committees that would eventually generate a voluntary consensus standard.   
Several firms, including General Electric, Bell Atlantic, PacTel Cellular, and 
Ericsson, submitted comments that took the opposite perspective and urged the FCC to 
mandate a cellular standard.  Of these comments, Ericsson’s were the most compelling.  
By this point in 1988, Ericsson’s engineers had participated in the development of 
equipment for several different cellular standards.  In their comments to the FCC, 
Ericsson’s lawyers pointed out that its “breadth of experience”—including the successful 
Nordic analog system and the ongoing GSM digital system—made it “uniquely 
qualified” to comment on the present proceeding.64  The high costs of incompatible 
standards, Ericsson’s lawyers argued, would harm the infant industry by limiting roaming 
capabilities and requiring higher expenditures for research and development.  Only 
uniform standards would ensure compatibility and therefore stimulate the earliest 
possible development of the American digital cellular industry.  Such development, from 
Ericsson’s point of view, could not emerge solely from the “operation of the 
marketplace.”  Ultimately, Ericsson recommended that the industry develop its own 
standards through existing technical bodies, and that the FCC codify those standards into 
de jure standards.  To achieve this goal, Ericsson encouraged the FCC to take part as an 
                                                
64 These standards included the Nordic analog standard (NMT), the American analog standard 
(AMPS), the British analog standard (TACS), and GSM. “Comments of Ericsson North America 
Inc.,” Gen. Docket 87-390 (January 15, 1988), 2-3. 
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“active participant” in “the context of a standards setting organization which includes 
cellular service providers, the various equipment manufacturers, and relevant trade 
groups.”65 
Despite the split in the industry between companies that opposed mandated 
standards and those that supported mandates, firms on both sides of the divide agreed on 
that two industry groups should play key roles in the development of industry standards.  
The first group was the Electronic Industries Association (EIA), a technical body that the 
American National Standards Institute recognized as an accredited standards-setting 
body.66  Through its Cellular and Common Radio section, EIA oversaw the specification 
of the analog cellular standard that the FCC had adopted as a de jure standard in 1982.  In 
early 1988, the EIA created a new subcommittee to work on a new digital cellular 
standard.  By virtue of the broad participation of cellular operators and manufacturers, the 
EIA argued that its committees were “in an excellent position to yield the optimal 
technical solution” and thus “contribute substantially” to the FCC’s political and 
technological objectives.67    
The second industry group, the Cellular Telecommunications Industry 
Association (CTIA), was a trade association and an industry advocate for policy, 
economic, legal, and technical issues that faced the cellular industry.  Its membership 
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 283 
included approximately 90 percent of all American cellular network operators (49 firms) 
as well as many other manufacturing and support firms in the industry.68  As a 
complement to the technical role of the standards-setting committees in the EIA, the 
CTIA was created in 1984 as a forum for the fragmented industry to coordinate and 
promote their products.  In its comments to the FCC, the CTIA endorsed the 
standardization work of the EIA committee, and announced its own committee to 
continue to evaluate new cellular technologies.  The combined message from the EIA and 
CTIA was clear: the industry had its own mechanisms and incentives to accommodate 
future change on a coordinated, industry-wide basis, and there was no need for the FCC 
to intervene.69  In the realm of standards, industry “self-governance” had worked well in 
the past; there was no reason for the FCC to intrude into this domain. 
The FCC, having found sufficient support for its preferred course of action, ruled 
in December 1988 to permit “greater freedom” to cellular carriers.  It explicitly refused to 
set mandates or to intervene in the standards process, based on the belief that “industry is 
in a far better position to evaluate the technical advantages and disadvantages of the 
various cellular technologies and develop approaches to compatibility.”  Further, the 
FCC’s ruling promised that it planned “to monitor the progress of the industry 
Committee.”70  Significantly, it also flatly denied a request to open a new proceeding on 
digital standards, leaving little doubt that the future of the American digital cellular 
industry was in the hands of the industry itself. 
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By the time the FCC issued its ruling in December 1988, the industry was off to a 
running start: members of the cellular industry association had been debating the 
technological and strategic merits of various digital cellular technologies since January.  
In the meantime, the EIA had passed all of its existing telecommunications projects to a 
new group called Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA).71  The TIA, like the 
EIA before it, was an accredited standards development organization, which meant that it 
adhered to the basic tenets of the consensus process—even representation of producers 
and consumers, due process, rights of appeal, and open membership—that had first been 
articulated in Paul Gough Agnew’s era in the 1920s.  Beginning in January 1989, the TIA 
began work on the technical specifications of the technology chosen by the CTIA, and 
published a first draft of the resulting standard by mid-1990.72  Cellular networks based 
on the new standard, which was commonly known as Time Division Multiple Access (or 
TDMA), were in operation by 1992, only one year after the first GSM networks were 
established in Europe.73   
Even though the American standard arrived only a year later than the European 
standard, the immediate market success of the respective standards had already been 
determined by the cooperation (in Europe) and confusion (in the United States) that had 
taken place over the preceding ten years.  The regulatory certainty and widespread a 
priori commitments to building systems based on the European GSM standard translated 
                                                
71 The Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) was formed after a merger of United 
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into an overwhelming share of the global market.  At the end of 1995, over 13 million 
people worldwide subscribed to GSM networks, where just over 2 million subscribed to 
TDMA networks.  This trend of GSM dominance would continue as millions of 
consumers moved from their analog service to digital service, and millions—and 
eventually billions—more became new subscribers.  
 
5.3.3  The Wisdom of Restraint and the Emergence of CDMA  
As it considered its role in the creation of digital cellular networks, regulators at 
the FCC were not particularly concerned with the type of diplomatic questions that 
motivated the GSM process in Europe.  Nor did they pay much attention to the position 
of American firms in the global market for cellular standards.  Instead, they were 
preoccupied with the question that had vexed the agency throughout its entire history: 
how to make more efficient use of scarce spectrum?   
One solution arrived more quickly than most observers anticipated.  In 1989, a 
San Diego start-up firm, Qualcomm, began to promote a new cellular transmission 
technology, Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), to the cellular industry.  CDMA 
was based on spread-spectrum technology that, like so many other American innovations 
after World War II, had its origins in military research and was developed during the 
Cold War by defense contractors.  Some of these contractors created Qualcomm in 1985, 
hired a team of physicists and engineers who were veterans of the Cold War military-
industrial-academic complex, and developed commercial applications of spread-spectrum 
technology.  By gathering a team that had decades of experience with mobile 
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communications systems, most notably for the military and the trucking industry, 
Qualcomm instantly possessed substantial organizational and technological capabilities in 
research and development, as well as an impressive portfolio of patents for spread-
spectrum technologies.  It was, in short, ideally positioned to play a major role in the 
cellular industry.74  
In 1989 and 1990, the cellular industry was in the final stages of specifying a 
consensus standard that was designed around TDMA technology.  Undeterred, 
Qualcomm executives began a campaign to gather allies in the cellular industry and 
convince the industry standards bodies to develop a second standard based on CDMA.  
On paper, CDMA’s advantages were overwhelming: for manufacturers and network 
operators, it promised at least ten times greater capacity than current analog networks, 
with better security and fewer required towers.  For consumers, CDMA networks offered 
better voice quality, cleaner connections, and longer lives for handset batteries.75 
Technical merit, by itself, is rarely sufficient to drive the adoption of a new, 
disruptive technology.  In practice, Qualcomm succeeded with CDMA through a 
sustained marketing campaign to promote CDMA’s technical features and to build 
alliances with network operators and equipment manufacturers.  Qualcomm founder and 
chief executive Irwin Jacobs publicized CDMA at industry conferences and described its 
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features in a journal article in 1990.76  Technical demonstrations backed up the hype: a 
CDMA trial in San Diego in late 1989 and another in Manhattan in February 1990 
generated substantial financial commitments from leading cellular firms (including 
AT&T, NYNEX Mobile, Ameritech Mobile Communications, Motorola, and PacTel 
Cellular) to support the creation of commercial CDMA systems within two years.77  In 
June 1992, the CTIA agreed to standardize Qualcomm’s technology; by 1994, this work 
was complete and the United States had two industry consensus cellular standards.78 
The chaotic condition of the American cellular industry in the late 1980s soon 
gave way to consolidation and rapid growth.  By the late 1990s, the American market had 
grown substantially—from 7.5 domestic subscribers in December 1991 to over 100 
million by July, 2000.79  CDMA growth was modest in the United States, but extensive in 
Asian countries such as South Korea and China that had not committed to using the 
European GSM standard.  South Korea was a particularly interesting case of the global 
dimensions of this standards war: in July 1993, the Korean government adopted CDMA 
as a national standard, and Korean firms such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai became the 
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first CDMA licensees, which gave them a head start in handset manufacturing.80  It may 
still be too soon to assess the long-term consequences of the American “marketplace” 
approach, but the strong medium-term performance of Qualcomm indicates that the FCC 
was right to anticipate plenty of room in domestic and global markets for more than one 
cellular network standard.81   
The rapid expansion of the global cellular market, driven by sinking costs of 
cellular telephones and service as well as insatiable consumer demand, meant that the 
global market for cellular standards did not “tip” toward any one standard.  Further, 
international adoption of the more efficient CDMA technology indicated that American 
firms possessed the capabilities to catch up with the European first-mover advantage, 
particularly as global cellular networks began to migrate to a third generation of digital 
broadband networks—a process that is still unfolding.  The fact that all third-generation 
cellular standards, even in Europe, are based on CDMA technology indicates that the 
fundamental American tradeoff, one that sacrificed short-term stability for long-term 
innovation, successfully sowed the seeds for the widespread deployment of more efficient 
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Date GSM (Europe) CDMA (US)  TDMA (US) GSM/CDMA 
ratio 
12/1995 13,034,000 9,000 2,055,000 1448:1 
12/1996 32,878,500 987,000 2,700,000 33:1 
12/1997 71,359,000 5,980,000 6,900,000 11:1 
12/1998 138,107,240 22,771,750 17,729,410 6:1 
11/1999 200,000,000 45,000,000 n/a 4.4:1 
6/2000 331,500,000 67,000,000 n/a 5:1 
12/2000 455,100,000 82,200,000 65,200,000 5.5:1 
12/2001 627,700,000 113,000,000 93,300,000 5.5:1 
12/2002 787,500,000 143,000,000 109,200,000 5.5:1 
Table 5.2: Worldwide digital cellular subscribers by standard, 1995-2002. 
Third-generation standards are not considered. GSM is the European 
standard; CDMA and TDMA are the two leading American standards. 
Sources: Cellular Online; GSM Association; CDMA Development Group.83 
 
The global competition between GSM, CDMA, and other standards—as well as 
the competition between firms who seek to earn royalties by embedding their patented 
technology within standards—has also created a new generation of legal problems.  
Examples of these new problems may be found in the recent escalation of litigation over 
aspects of the GSM and CDMA standards between several industry leaders, including 
Nokia and Qualcomm.  Qualcomm’s aggressive tactics within standards committees have 
invited allegations of criminally anticompetitive behavior.84  These lawsuits underline the 
strategic and legal importance of patents in the standard-setting process—a topic I 
explore in depth in the next chapter.  The lawsuits also illustrate the continued 
importance of regulation in an era of “deregulation”: even if regulators do not directly 
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mandate standards or control the standards process, other branches of government are 
required to respond to private disputes over patents, contracts, and allegations of 
anticompetitive behavior. 
 
5.4  Conclusions 
The history of digital cellular standards in Europe and the United States shows 
how different ideological and political convictions shaped the same basic technology in 
different ways, and ultimately led to the creation of three different standards.  There can 
be no dispute that the GSM process was a major bureaucratic, technological, and 
economic triumph for Europe.  The overarching ideological motivation behind GSM was 
European integration; this ideology, translated into concrete political and economic goals, 
called for a single pan-European standard that could generate economies of scale for 
manufacturers and roaming capabilities for consumers.  European telecommunications 
professionals did not want to repeat past mistakes.  An active and decisive government 
role in this centrally planned standards process not only created first mover advantages 
for European firms (such as Nokia and Ericsson) competing in global equipment markets; 
it also provided a symbol for the economic strength of the new, unified Europe.85 
                                                
85 GSM is probably the most successful instance of a recent trend in which European 
policymakers fostered inter-firm alliances to coordinate economic and technological aspects of 
European integration. For broader discussions, see Giovanni Dosi and Luigi Marengo, “The co-
evolution of technological knowledge and corporate organizations”; Patrick Llerena and Mireille 
Matt, “Inter-organizational collaboration: the theories and their policy implications”; and Antoine 
Bureth, Sandrine Wolff, and Antonello Zanfei, “Cooperative learning and the evolution of inter-
firm agreements in the European electronics industry,” all in Alfonso Gambardella and Franco 
Malerba, eds., The Organization of Economic Innovation in Europe (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
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 Different ideological convictions drove the American approach to digital cellular 
standards.  American regulators sought to create a new, competitive industry structure to 
replace institutional forms of coordination from the past—including monopoly control 
and government control—that had fallen out of favor.  The FCC translated these 
ideological convictions into political goals that could be achieved in the technical realm 
of spectrum policy, where regulators aimed to promote experiments with new 
technologies that could utilize scarce spectrum in a more efficient manner.  Ideology and 
politics meant that American firms fell far behind their European counterparts in global 
markets for cellular standards, but the FCC’s laissez faire regime soon generated the very 
sort of technology they had envisioned, an indication of the continued vitality of 
American technological capabilities in an era of global competition. 
Scholars who analyzed the European approach to GSM misunderstood the 
ideological, political, and technological nuances of the American cellular industry.  As 
they celebrated the GSM “success story,” they dismissed the American cellular industry 
as “non-cooperative” or as lacking in the necessary institutions to guide the standards-
setting process.86  Their error was to base their judgment of the American policy on the 
unique ideological and political conditions that prevailed in Europe, and to assume that 
                                                
86 Gandal, Salant, and Waverman, “Standards in Wireless Telephone Networks.”; Pelkmans, “The 
GSM Success Story,” 447-449. King and West—perhaps because their article omitted any 
discussion of the FCC, the EIA/TIA, or the CTIA—concluded that the United States lacked 
“sufficient agency power at the institutional level to channel the disparate interests of a pluralistic 
group of self-interested competitors.” John Leslie King and Joel West, “Ma Bell’s Orphan: US 
Cellular Telephony, 1947-1996,” Telecommunications Policy 26 (2002): 200. 
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governance can only occur through the exercise of government authority.87  In other 
words, the “great failure” assessment was fundamentally ahistorical insofar as it failed to 
consider the constraints and choices of American regulators and industry professionals in 
their own unique context.  When we situate the American decision within its proper 
historical context, and take the standardization process itself as the vantage point from 
which to view this history, we might reasonably conclude that the FCC’s choice to allow 
the industry committees to set standards was, in fact, a wise—albeit initially costly—
decision.    
Despite the ideological and political differences in the standardization process that 
unfolded in Europe and the United States—and the technical differences in the standards 
they created—there were two striking similarities in the standard-setting institutions they 
depended upon.  First, the order that had prevailed for most of the twentieth century, 
where national monopolies determined standards, no longer held.  The tasks of defining 
new network architectures and new standards fell to committees of technical experts who 
reached decisions by consensus.  Of course, powerful actors emerged within these 
committees, and consensus decisions were implemented and enforced in different ways in 
Europe and the United States.  Moreover, the structure and constituency of specific 
committees changed in response to changing regulatory and technological conditions.  
For these committees to be successful—which they ultimately were, each according to 
their own objectives—they needed to remain flexible and adaptable to these changing 
conditions.  
                                                
87 Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe, “Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or 
Primacy of Power?”, World Politics 56 (2003): 1-42. 
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Second, the standards committees in Europe and the United States succeeded 
because the major firms in the global industry participated in the standardization process.  
Their participation included the contribution of technological innovations—often covered 
by patents and facilitated by cross-licensing agreements—as well as a priori 
commitments to implement the standards produced by the committees.  Regulators 
played an indirect yet vital role in this process by endorsing the participation (and in the 
United States, leadership) of private firms, and by defining clearer rules under which 
standards committees could lawfully operate.88  They did so with an awareness, more 
acute in Europe than in the United States, that the standardization process had significant 
implications for their respective positions in a competitive global industry. 
These two trends in the standardization process—the move from national 
monopolies to flexible consensus committees, and the participation of leading firms from 
a variety of nations—illustrate the new order that sustained the development of networks 
in the Third Industrial Revolution.  The cellular industry’s dependence on voluntary 
consensus standards is one example of a new liberalized and pluralistic regime that 
scholars have observed in standardization for electronics, telecommunications, and 
information technology.89  In addition to the institutions mentioned above, the other 
major players in standardization for these technologies—including the Institute of 
                                                
88 D. Linda Garcia, Bethany L. Leickly, and Scott Willey, “Public and Private Interests in 
Standards Setting: Conflict or Convergence,” in Sherrie Bolin, ed., The Standards Edge: Future 
Generation (Ann Arbor: Sheridan Books, 2005), 117-139; and Roger B. Marks and Robert E. 
Hebner, “Government/Industry Interactions in the Global Standards System,” in Sherrie Bolin, 
ed., The Standards Edge: Dynamic Tension (Ann Arbor: Sheridan Books, 2004), 103-114. 
89 Drake, “The Transformation of International Telecommunications Standardization”; and Paul 
A. David and Mark Shurmer, “Formal Standards-Setting for Global Telecommunications and 
Information Services,” Telecommunications Policy 20 (1996): 789-815. 
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Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the Internet Engineering Task Force, and a variety 
of industry consortia such as the World Wide Web Consortium—also relied upon 
consensus-based procedures that differ little from the procedures developed in the 
American Engineering Standards Committee during the 1920s.90   
As the new order in international telecommunications standardization emerged in 
the 1980s, no single firm possessed the technical or organizational capabilities to create 
an entire cellular system from the ground up.  Instead, firms managed this complexity 
through “pure-play” strategies that focused on narrow market segments, such as 
manufacturing microchips, handsets, or network equipment, or operating cellular 
systems.91  Each of these components worked within the larger system by conforming to 
predetermined interface standards, such as GSM or CDMA.  In the absence of monopoly 
control, the institutional grounding for this style of “alliance capitalism” occured in 
standards setting committees—a clear demonstration of a new era of modularity in the 
technological and organizational structures of the global telecommunications industry.92 
Standards committees, in turn, struggled to assume the coordinating role that had 
once been the domain of national monopolies.  The overarching trend of institutional 
experimentation to coordinate modular technologies and organizations intensified during 
                                                
90 Charles Vincent and L. Jean Camp, “Looking to the Internet for Models of Governance,” Ethics 
and Information Technology 6 (2004): 161-173. 
91 Galambos, “Recasting the Organizational Synthesis,” 14-19; and Galambos and Abrahamson, 
Anytime, Anywhere, 251-261. 
92 Two seminal analyses of these types of modular industry structures are Richard N. Langlois, 
“Modularity in Technology and Organization,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 49 
(2002): 19-37; and Stefano Brusoni and Andrea Prencipe, “Unpacking the Black Box of 
Modularity: Technologies, Products and Organizations,” Industrial and Corporate Change 10 (2001): 
179-205. The term “alliance capitalism” comes from Galambos and Abrahamson, who called the 
wireless industry a “key example of the new era of alliance capitalism.” Galambos and 
Abrahamson, Anytime, Anywhere, 255. 
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subsequent efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s to create standards for third-generation 
cellular networks, or “mobile broadband” networks that represented the convergence of 
the Internet and the telephone.  The creation of standards for third-generation networks 
proceeded in new, tightly focused forums—none of them supported by government 
mandates—including the World Wide Web Consortium, the Open Mobile Alliance, the 
Open Mobile Terminal Platform, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (a GSM 
offspring), and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2 (a CDMA offspring).  Each of 
these committees continued to experiment with different features of the consensus 
process, including the scope of participation, the tension between moving quickly (on the 
one hand) and obtaining a widespread consensus (on the other), and terms under which 
key patents could be licensed.  As they defined and honed their institutional structures 
and procedures, they also competed against one another to exercise jurisdiction over the 
next generation of standards.  The next chapter examines one of these bodies—the World 
Wide Web Consortium—and the tradeoffs that its designers made as they sought to 




Chapter 6: Democracy, Legitimacy, and Patents: Setting Standards for the World 
Wide Web, 1990-2003 
 
6.1  Introduction 
You’re about to throw away the geek community’s respect for the W3C.  
And we’re the people who write software…  Don't do this.  It's suicidally 
stupid.  We will bypass you.  We will surpass you.  Will [sic] will make 
fun of you.  And eventually, we will completely ignore you. 
 
- Rob Landley1 
The World Wide Web, like the Internet and cellular telephones, was one of the 
seminal network innovations that sustained the Third Industrial Revolution.  The 
development of Web standards illustrates a broader phenomenon that occurred during the 
1990s in which a new organizational form, industry consortia, emerged as a common site 
of consensus standardization.  The history of Web standards and standard-setting 
institutions sheds light on the promise and perils inherent in this new organizational form. 
Tim Berners-Lee wrote the first Web browser and server software in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  Throughout the 1990s, he took repeated steps to ensure that the 
underlying code remained freely available to anyone and not subject to proprietary claims 
or licensing restrictions.  This strategy made Berners-Lee a champion to open source 
programmers, a group of individuals who believed that software code is knowledge that 
should be shared freely and publicly.  It was also the strategy that made the Web an 
exciting new tool for social and commercial applications, and a symbol of a new era of 
global communication. 
                                                




In the autumn of 2001, however, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)—the 
standards-setting organization created by Berners-Lee to preserve the openness and 
universality of the Web—nearly turned its back on this open and free character of Web 
standards.  A proposal for a new patent policy, first released on August 16, recommended 
that the W3C incorporate royalty-generating patents into Web standards.  Chaos ensued.  
The W3C was besieged by thousands of angry protests, almost universally in support of 
open source software and against patents in W3C standards.  Faced with the potentially 
fatal consequences of an open source mutiny, the W3C made changes in its procedure 
that took dissenting views into account.  Based in large part on this procedural change, 
the W3C quickly reversed course and, in May 2003, formally adopted a royalty-free 
patent policy. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine this flashpoint, and to situate it within a 
longer and broader historical context.  Over the past ten to twenty years, a growing 
number of economists, lawyers, and management scholars have generated a large body of 
quantitative, legal, and prescriptive analyses of patents in the standardization process.2  
However, amidst these efforts to isolate the precise economic and strategic effects of 
patent licensing and disclosure, this literature risks losing sight of how patents and patent 
policies are linked to fundamental questions of power in a technological society.  The 
                                                
2 Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner, and Jean Tirole, “The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An 
Empirical Analysis,” CEPR Discussion Papers 6141 (February, 2007); Mark A. Lemley, 
“Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,” California Law Review 90 
(2002): 1889-1980; Timothy S. Simcoe, “Open Standards and Intellectual Property Rights,” in 
Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke, and Joel West, eds., Open Innovation: Researching a New 
Paradigm (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), and Andrew S. Updegrove, “The Essential 




epigraph, a quote from open source programmer Rob Landley, captures the horrified and 
defiant reaction that the W3C’s proposal elicited from the open source community.  Such 
visceral and emotional reactions are familiar components of the consensus-building 
process, but they are often forgotten or written out of the story when told from an 
economic or technical point of view.   
The W3C’s patent policy is particularly compelling because it revealed a clash of 
values that defined the terms on which standards could be created and implemented.  On 
one side were programmers and engineers who believed that the values of open source 
should be the bedrock of the W3C.  On the other side were representatives of 
corporations that paid $50,000 every year to participate in the W3C, and believed that the 
patent system rightly rewarded inventors for their investments in research and 
development.  The W3C, as it stood at the intersection of these two opposing worldviews, 
needed to resolve this fundamental conflict in order to maintain its standing as a 
legitimate forum for creating standards for the Web.   
The W3C’s problems, in this light, were not exclusively technical, economic, or 
legal, but also political.  How could the W3C convince its constituents that it was a 
legitimate forum for creating the rules—the technical standards—to which they should 
adhere?  This question can shed light on a broader problem that Sheila Jasanoff 
identified, namely, “the possibility of democratic rule in societies where technically 
trained elites perform so much of the everyday work of governance.”3   
                                                
3 Sheila Jasanoff, “Technology as a Site and Object of Politics,” in Robert E. Goodin and Charles 
Tilly, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 745-763. 
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Technically trained elites work within private and public institutions that seek to 
establish the legitimacy of their decisions.  The process by which an institution gains 
legitimacy in scientific and technical settings can be complex, even within the context of 
representative governing bodies whose rules are backed by the force of law.4  However, 
the voluntary character of Web and Internet standards create an additional dimension of 
complexity.  By definition, voluntary consensus standards bodies lack any inherent 
authority to enforce the use of their standards.  Instead, authority is conferred through 
legitimacy, which arises through a social process constructed over time, in the face of 
competing jurisdictional efforts.5   
This social construction of authority and legitimacy has two interrelated 
dimensions, one cultural, one economic.  Due to his position as the Web’s inventor and 
champion, Berners-Lee’s status was what one observer in 1998 called “a moral authority 
that is the closest thing the Internet has to law.”6  When he created the W3C in 1994, 
Berners-Lee consciously began a social experiment, one that would attempt to 
institutionalize his moral authority and place the founding values of the Web in the care 
of the broader community of Web developers.  During the patent policy dispute in 2001, 
the charged rhetoric of the open source community suggested that this social experiment 
                                                
4 See for example Sheila Jasanoff, “Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA,” 
Osiris 7, 2nd Series (1992): 194-217; and Jody Freeman and Laura I. Langbein, “Regulatory 
Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit,” NYU Environmental Law Journal 9 (2000): 60-138. 
5 See for example Raymund Werle and Eric J. Iversen, “Promoting Legitimacy in Technical 
Standardization,” Science, Technology & Innovation Studies 2 (2006): 19-39; A. Michael Froomkin, 
“Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace,” Harvard Law Review 116 
(2003): 751-873; and Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
6 Simson L. Garfinkel, “The Web’s Unelected Government,” Technology Review 101 
(November/December, 1998), 42.  
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was placing the open and free Web—as well as the legitimacy of the W3C—in great 
peril.   
Landley’s threat to “bypass, surpass, and ignore” the W3C reminds us of the 
economic issues that co-exist with the cultural.  The ultimate success or failure of a 
voluntary consensus standard is determined by market demand and acceptance.  Within 
this market for standards, open source advocates—and, indeed, any participant in the 
process—can choose from three options: loyalty, voice, or exit.7  Viewed from this 
perspective, the W3C’s patent policy marked a strategic turning point where the group 
could either maintain or squander its leading position in the market for Web standards.   
When faced with an open source revolt over its proposed policy to incorporate 
patents into its standards, the W3C demonstrated its legitimacy by reforming and 
democratizing its rule making process, which in turn confirmed its authority to set 
standards for the free and open Web.  For scholars and practitioners alike, this episode is 
significant because it advanced a sharp critique of closed and proprietary standards, and 
demonstrated the practical and ideological merits of open standards and an open process.  
As such, it reinforces a major theme developed in this dissertation—that standardization 





                                                
7 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
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6.2  The Political Economy of Consortia 
Beginning in 1980, American firms in a variety of high-technology industries 
began to participate in research consortia.  Research consortia, blessed by the financial 
and legal support of the federal government, existed to distribute the costs of research and 
development in order to create technological and economic advantages as they competed 
in global markets against Japanese and European firms.  One of the most prominent of 
these consortia was SEMATECH, a federally-funded effort created in 1987 to catch up 
with Japanese dominance in global markets for semiconductor memory chips.  As it 
developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, SEMATECH took on functions that had 
traditionally been filled by trade associations, including the distribution of information 
and “best practices,” the establishment of technical standards, and the coordination of 
basic and applied research and development.8 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, competing firms in the telecommunications 
and information technology industries also began to form consortia to coordinate their 
products and accelerate market development.  Unlike SEMATECH, many of these 
consortia focused exclusively on the establishment of technical standards and marketing 
strategies for technologies such as the UNIX operating system and automated teller 
machines in the banking industry, and did not attempt to dictate the research and 
                                                
8 Congress of the United States, The Benefits and Risks of Federal Funding for Sematech (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1997); Peter Grindley, David C. Mowery, and Brian Silverman, 
“SEMATECH and Collaborative Research: Lessons in the Design of High-Technology Consortia,” 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 13 (1994): 723-758. 
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development agendas of their member firms.9  Another difference between these 
consortia and SEMATECH was the absence of direct financial support from the federal 
government.  Instead, federal support for information technology consortia occurred 
through indirect policy measures, such as the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 
and the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, that sanctioned 
cooperative standard-setting so long as participants did not fix prices or engage in other 
illegal forms of collusive behavior.10  
During the 1980s and 1990s, firms in the information technology industry 
responded to this favorable regulatory climate by creating and joining hundreds of 
consortia.11  These consortia were both critiques of and complements to existing 
standard-setting organizations, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), that followed extensive 
rules to ensure that all interested parties could have a voice in the standardization process.  
The new consortia adopted many features of the consensus process utilized within ANSI 
and ISO, such as a reliance on negotiations within a subcommittee structure.  However, 
the consortia rejected the rules—first developed in Paul Gough Agnew’s era in the 1920s, 
                                                
9 Steven C. Salop, “Deregulating Self-Regulated ATM Networks,” Economics of Innovation and New 
Technology 1 (1988): 85-96; Garth Saloner, “The Economics of Computer Interface Standardization: 
the Case of UNIX,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1 (1989): 135-156. 
10 Michelle K. Lee and Mavis K. Lee, “High Technology Consortia: A Panacea for America’s 
Competitiveness Problems?” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 6 (1992): 335-372; Andrew 
Updegrove, “A Work in Progress: Government Support for Standard Setting in the United States, 
1980-2004,” Consortium Standards Bulletin 4 (2005). 
11 Some examples include the X/Open Consortium (created in 1984) to set standards for the Unix 
operating system; CableLabs (created in 1988); the Video Electronic Standards Association 
(created in 1989); and the Asynchronous Transfer Mode Forum (created in 1991). For hundreds of 
additional examples, see Andrew Updegrove, “The Consortiuminfo.org Standard Setting 
Organization and Standards List,” http://www.consortiuminfo.org/links/.  
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and existing in a modern form in ANSI and ISO—that required an equal balance of 
consumers and producers within each committee.  Instead of emphasizing inclusiveness 
and fairness in a strictly technical process, consortia were more attentive to speed and 
marketing considerations.  In most cases, consortia did not override or compete with 
consensus standards, but instead focused on narrow market niches and built upon existing 
standards.12   
One example of this process was visible in the creation of wireless Internet 
standards.  In 1990, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) created a 
committee to develop standards for wireless Ethernet local area networks.  The 
committee completed the first of these standards—known as IEEE 802.11—in 1997.  In 
1999, several firms that had contributed to the development of the 802.11 standards 
created the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance.  This consortium, which eventually 
grew to include hundreds of firms, devised a set of tests to verify that vendor products 
conformed to the standard, and created a logo and trademark—“Wi-Fi”—that could be 
used by products that complied with the tests.  Wi-Fi soon became wildly successful, 
available in coffee shops, restaurants, and airports, as well as a standard feature in 
desktop and laptop computers and home routers.  In sum, Wi-Fi was a textbook example 
                                                
12 Richard Hawkins, “The Rise of Consortia in the Information and Communication Technology 
Industries: Emerging Implications for Policy,” Telecommunications Policy 23 (1999): 159-173; 
Martin Weiss and Carl F. Cargill, “Consortia in the Standards Development Process,” Journal of 
the American Society for Information Science 43 (1992): 559-565; and Carl F. Cargill, “Consortia 
Standards: Towards a Re-Definition of a Voluntary Consensus Standards Organization,” 
Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards, Committee on Science, United States 
House of Representatives, June 28, 2001.  
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of a successful marketing strategy built around a consensus standard and advanced 
through the promotional efforts of an industry consortium. 
However, significant practical problems emerged as consortia proliferated and 
became a common feature of the information technology industries in the 1990s.  First, 
firms had to devote significant resources to consortia membership and participation.  
Membership fees ranged anywhere from $5,000 to $60,000, and travel, research, and 
legal costs presented an additional expense.  Since large firms such as Sun, Microsoft, 
and IBM participated in several consortia, the overall expense for a single firm could 
quickly reach several millions of dollars—figures that standards engineers struggled to 
justify to executives who wondered how the investment would pay off.  Second, because 
of the ad hoc process in which consortia were created, there existed tremendous potential 
for consortia to work at cross-purposes, or even produce conflicting or competing 
specifications.  This created a situation reminiscent of the uncoordinated development of 
standards for screw threads in the early 1900s (discussed in Chapter Two), where no 
central body coordinated several overlapping committee initiatives.   
A third problem with consortia was that their ad hoc and uncoordinated character 
spawned rules and policies that varied widely from one consortium to another.  Some 
consortia adopted strict policies governing the use of intellectual property and patents 
within their committees; others failed to define clear rules.  This variety forced engineers 
to consult intellectual property lawyers to clarify their contribution to standards 
projects—thus adding further costs to the process.  Finally, because consortia standards 
did not (by design) adhere to the procedures that ANSI established for balance, openness, 
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and due process, many observers were skeptical of consortia standards, and viewed them 
simply as attempts by large firms to control the market that were unaccountable to 
regulators or to the general public.  In some cases, this perceived illegitimacy was not a 
problem if consortia standards could take the market by brute force.  In other cases—
particularly in the realm of government procurement—consortia standards did not 
conform with the government definition of a “standard,” and hence could not be eligible 
to be included in lucrative government procurement contracts.13 
In sum, although consortia presented a quicker alternative than existing 
institutions for firms that wanted to create standards, they also had the potential to 
introduce a new set of legal and practical problems into the standardization process.  The 
creation of standards for the World Wide Web illustrates the various advantages and 
drawbacks of consortia standards in a specific historical setting. 
 
6.3  The World Wide Web Consortium 
Berners-Lee invented the Web when he worked as a software engineer at CERN, 
a European physics research laboratory located in Geneva.  Berners-Lee, having observed 
how scientists communicated and shared ideas in a non-hierarchical, networked fashion, 
decided that CERN needed a system for cataloging information that could mimic these 
physical interactions.  He first developed a proposal for a hypertext-based system that he 
called the WorldWideWeb in 1989, and by the end of 1990 he had set up the first Web 
                                                
13 Hawkins, “The Rise of Consortia”; Cargill, “Consortia Standards.” Federal rules that govern 
the inclusion of standards in federal procurement practices are defined in “Federal Participation 
in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment 
Activities,” Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119, Revised February 10, 1998. 
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server and created a program for browsing and editing hypertext pages.  The technical 
foundations of his Web server and browser software included a language for rendering 
hypertext pages—the HyperText Markup Language, or HTML—and a protocol for 
sending hypertext documents over a network—the HyperText Transfer Protocol, or 
HTTP.14   
The Web’s initial growth was a direct consequence of Berners-Lee’s open source 
strategy, which was guided by a mix of ideological and practical concerns.  Berners-
Lee’s ideal for a collaborative approach to Web development was shaped by his 
background in science (he earned a physics undergraduate degree from Oxford in 1976) 
as well as Richard Stallman’s crusade for free software.  In a note circulated in a CERN 
computing newsletter, Berners-Lee wrote, “A source of much debate over recent years 
has been whether to write software in-house or buy it from commercial suppliers.”  He 
continued, “Now, a third alternative is becoming significant in what some see as a 
revolution in software supply.  Richard Stallman’s almost religious campaign for usable 
free software led to the creation of the Free Software Foundation and GNU General 
Public License.”  In addition to the idealism contained in Stallman’s “third alternative,” 
Berners-Lee was particularly attracted by the scientific and academic characteristics of 
                                                
14 This section draws primarily on three sources: Sources for this section: Tim Berners-Lee, 
Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide Web by its Inventor (San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1999); James Gillies and Robert Cailliau, How the Web Was Born 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Dan Connolly, “A Little History of the World 
Wide Web,” http://www.w3.org/History.html. 
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this approach toward software.  “Just as we publish our physics for free,” he wrote, 
“should we not in certain cases ‘publish’ our software?”15 
The academic ideal for open Web standards also suited a bureaucratic imperative: 
it bypassed the costly and time-consuming licensing process.  Accordingly, Berners-Lee 
posted a description of his browser and server software—as well as a link to their source 
code—on several mailing lists and online discussion groups in August 1991.   
By early 1993, Berners-Lee’s decision to release the browser’s source code and 
ask others to collaborate and experiment with it—to “harness the geeks,” as one account 
put it—had ignited a tremendous amount of interest in the Web.  The number of Web 
servers and browsers grew by leaps and bounds.  Berners-Lee later attributed this 
explosive growth to “a grassroots syndrome….  A very significant factor was that the 
software was all (what we now call) open source.  It spread fast and could be improved 
fast—and it could be installed within government and large industry without having to go 
through a procurement process.”16 
This reference to the “procurement process” again reminds us of the bureaucratic 
choices that shaped the Web’s early development as an open information platform.  In 
addition to the intellectual merits of allowing free access to the Web’s source code, there 
were also significant practical benefits to this approach.  In early 1993, the fate of another 
online information system—the gopher system developed at the University of 
Minnesota—further confirmed Berners-Lee’s skepticism of proprietary strategies for 
                                                
15 Berners-Lee, quoted in Gillies and Cailliau, How the Web Was Born, 209. 
16 Gillies and Cailliau, How the Web Was Born, 215; Berners-Lee, quoted in Paul Festa, “Charting 




developing software.  Gopher enjoyed a growing user base in the early 1990s.  However, 
in February 1993, Minnesota announced a plan to charge users (apart from non-profit and 
academic users) an annual fee to use gopher.  The plan backfired.  According to Berners-
Lee,  
This was an act of treason in the academic community and the Internet 
community. Even if the university never charged anyone a dime, the fact 
that the school had announced it was reserving the right to charge people 
for the use of the gopher protocols meant it had crossed the line. To use 
the technology was too risky. Industry dropped gopher like a hot potato.17 
 
Berners-Lee immediately was pressed by members of the Internet community 
who wondered if CERN would follow in Minnesota’s footsteps and require a license to 
use the Web.  Berners-Lee was convinced that any licensing requirements would 
suffocate the Web—gopher provided the proof—and renewed his effort to have CERN 
place the Web technology in the public domain.  In April 1993, CERN administrators 
agreed to a public domain release that Berners-Lee has frequently celebrated as a key 
moment that ensured the continued growth of the Web.18 
During this same period in the early 1990s, several Web browsers—alterations of 
Berners-Lee’s original design—were under development, including Midas, Erwise, 
Viola, and NCSA Mosaic.  Berners-Lee recognized that, absent some sort of institutional 
effort to coordinate these divergent projects, the Web might balkanize into a variety of 
incompatible standards.  As the Web’s inventor, he was in a unique position to lead such 
an institutional initiative.  However, CERN administrators were clearly not interested in 
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providing the resources to support the growth of the Web.  One traditional option in such 
situations is to create a private company that can internalize transaction costs and provide 
greater managerial coordination.19  Berners-Lee and his collaborator Robert Cailliau 
briefly contemplated this option, but quickly rejected it as too much of a financial risk 
and unlikely to prevent the balkanization of Web protocols.   
Instead, Berners-Lee decided that an alternative institutional form—some sort of 
standardization body—would provide the best means for promoting the universality of 
the Web.  One obvious venue was the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a large 
and respected body that had developed the core Internet protocols.  However, Berners-
Lee was discouraged by his initial efforts (in 1992 and 1993) to set standards through the 
IETF process because it forced him to compromise important aspects of his vision for the 
Web.  Moreover, although he was anxious to move quickly, progress in the IETF was 
slow, due in part to “endless philosophical rat holes down which technical conversations 
would disappear.”20 
In early 1994, a meeting with Michael Dertouzos, the Director of MIT’s 
Laboratory for Computer Science, convinced Berners-Lee that he should start his own 
standards consortium.  Dertouzos based his suggestion on a prior success: he had 
overseen the creation of the X-Consortium to coordinate the development of X-Window 
graphical system that, like the Web, was an academic project that grew and attracted 
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interest from a broad and diverse community.  After meeting with Dertouzos in February 
1994, Berners-Lee agreed to move to MIT to be the Director of the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C).  
For Berners-Lee, the W3C was the best option in his menu of institutional 
choices.  Such a consortium would allow him to focus on the Web’s proliferation from a 
“neutral viewpoint,” as opposed to the competitive life of corporate employment.  It 
would also allow Berners-Lee to keep a close eye on the Web’s development, without 
forcing him to be a centralized point of authority or control.  Instead, he thought that the 
Web should be “out of control,” and thought that the W3C could function as a 
coordination mechanism, a middle ground between unilateral control and extreme 
decentralization.  As he summarized in 1999,  
Starting a consortium, therefore, represented the best way for me to see the 
full span of the Web community as it spread into more and more areas. 
My decision not to turn the Web into my own commercial venture was not 
any great act of altruism or disdain for money, of which I would later be 
accused.21 
 
Indeed, the W3C provided a way for Berners-Lee to leverage his status as the Web’s 
inventor and stay at the heart of the action—hardly an altruistic or selfless gesture. 
Berners-Lee envisioned that the W3C itself would be a type of social experiment.  
Although he preferred to start his own consortium, he borrowed heavily from the IETF’s 
structure and process.  The Internet’s success as an information platform was due to the 
fact that its standards were open and freely available for anyone to implement or 
improve.  In 1992, Dave Clark (another computer scientist at MIT’s LCS), famously 
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summarized the Internet’s philosophy of standardization: “We reject: kings, presidents 
and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code.”  This model of open 
participation, with its rapid and informal specification process, appealed to Berners-Lee.  
He did not, however, share the IETF’s wholesale rejection of “kings”; he simply thought 
that kings should preside over a technological style of parliamentary democracy.  As he 
remarked in 1998, “A lot of people, including me, believe in the ‘no kings’ maxim at 
heart…. The wise king creates a parliament and civil service as soon as he can, and gets 
out of the loop.”22  Finally, Berners-Lee decided that the W3C should mimic the informal 
terminology that the IETF used to refer to its products:   
We wrestled over terms—whether the consortium should actually set a 
“standard” or stop just short of that by issuing a formal 
“recommendation.” We chose the latter to indicate that getting “rough 
consensus and running code”—the Internet maxim for agreeing on a 
workable program and getting it out there to be tried—was the level at 
which we would work.23  
 
Once the W3C was established, the major problems for Berners-Lee’s vision 
came from the explosion of commercial interest in the Web—manifest most visibly in the 
“browser wars” between Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer.  In 1999, 
Dertouzos wrote that Berners-Lee’s “consistent aim was to ensure that the Web would 
move forward, flourish, and remain whole, despite the yanks and pulls of all the 
companies that seemed bent on controlling it.”24  Beyond the browser wars, the most 
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significant threat to the unified development of the Web—patents—emerged in the late 
1990s.  “Software patents are new,” Berners-Lee lamented in 1999.   
The Internet ethos in the seventies and eighties was one of sharing for the 
common good, and it would have been unthinkable for a player to ask for 
fees just for implementing a standard protocol such as HTTP.  Now things 
are changing.25  
 
Berners-Lee understood that open standards fueled the growth of the Web.  He 
saw no reason to alter this founding value of the Web, and warned that he would continue 
to advocate keeping the Web open to the widest possible group of users: “If someone 
tries to monopolize the Web—by, for example, pushing a proprietary variation of 
network protocols—they’re in for a fight.”26 
 
6.4  Patent Policy Working Group: October 1999 – May 2003 
Corporate IT strategists should think very carefully about committing to 
the use of features which will bind them into the control of any one 
company. The web has exploded because it is open. It has developed so 
rapidly because the creative forces of thousands of companies are building 
on the same platform. Binding oneself to one company means one is 
limiting one's future to the innovations that one company can provide. 
 
-Tim Berners-Lee, 199627 
For the first ten years of the Web’s existence, tradition and Berners-Lee’s 
personal feelings had prevented the use of proprietary code in Web standards.  By 1999, 
however, the pressures of the dot-com economy—most visible in the heavily corporate 
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Membership of the W3C as well as patent holders outside the W3C Membership—
challenged this tradition.28   
The first sign of trouble came in August 1997, when Sun Microsystems 
announced that they were awarded a patent that covered methods for making anchors, or 
hyperlinks within an individual webpage.  A similar issue cropped up in February 1999, 
when Microsoft was awarded a patent that could have been applied to cover the W3C’s 
Cascading Style Sheet standard, a method that made it simple for designers to use 
consistent formatting within and across a number of webpages.  In both cases, the W3C 
and the patent holders moved quickly to ensure that the patents could be licensed on 
royalty-free terms. 
However, this ad hoc means of resolving patent issues failed in 1999, when 
another W3C Member, a company called Intermind, claimed that they held a patent over 
methods used in a W3C’s project, the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P).  P3P was 
an attempt to solve a social problem through technological means.  The social problem 
was that different websites had widely divergent policies for the use of personal 
information, such as names, passwords, credit card numbers, and demographic 
information.  By the late 1990s, many websites were beginning to articulate the ways that 
they would use and share personal information, but it was a tremendous inconvenience 
for users who were concerned about the potential misuse of their personal information to 
read and review the privacy policies of each and every website they visited.  P3P 
provided a standard way for users to express their privacy preferences, and could thus 
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partially automate the time-consuming process of evaluating the diverse privacy policies 
on the Web.29 
 The W3C began work on P3P in late 1997, and made substantial progress, 
including a public working draft, by May 1998.  Work on the standard was difficult, both 
from a technical point of view as well as from a social point of view: even if the W3C 
created a privacy standard, there was no guarantee that the standard would be 
implemented in browsers and voluntarily followed by large companies that collected and 
traded personal information.  Nevertheless, work continued through 1998 and 1999, until 
the group hit a potentially deadly hurdle in 1999.   
The problem was a patent: Intermind received a patent on January 19 that covered 
the automated transfer of data between clients and servers—which was arguably what the 
W3C was attempting to develop with P3P.  At first, it was unclear if the patent itself 
overlapped with the privacy standard under development in the W3C.  Moreover, 
Intermind did not provide any public statement of the terms under which it would license 
the use of its patent.  Daniel Weitzner, a W3C staff member in charge of the P3P effort, 
recalled that as work on P3P progressed during 1999, “it became clear that the demand 
that implementers pay royalties was chilling the development of the technical 
specification, and rendering deployment of P3P-compliant technologies unlikely.”30  As 
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Intermind refused to make a public declaration, the W3C commissioned a legal analysis 
to determine whether the P3P standard would in fact infringe on the Intermind patent.  
The legal assessment, completed in October 1999, declared that the P3P did not violate 
the patent.  However, the experience proved to be costly, time-consuming, and 
unnerving, and W3C staff began to explore ways to ensure that patent claims, both from 
W3C Members and from individuals outside the W3C, would not derail and delay future 
standards work.31 
In August 1999, the W3C chartered the Patent Policy Working Group (PPWG) to 
study the role of patents and create a clear policy to govern the use of patents in W3C 
Recommendations.  Berners-Lee chose Daniel Weitzner, the leader of the W3C’s 
Technology and Society Domain, to Chair the PPWG.  Before joining the W3C in 
September, 1998, Weitzner had worked as a policy analyst at the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, and was a co-founder and deputy director of the Center for Democracy and 
Technology, a public interest advocacy group in Washington, DC.  In an interview 
published soon after he joined the W3C, Weitzner noted that the “W3C has done a 
progressively better job of engaging outside constituencies and experts,” but added that 
there was still more work to be done.  At the W3C, he planned to “do everything I 
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possibly can to engage people who are interested in these technology-and-society 
issues.”32 
Although Weitzner had hoped to devote his time to helping the W3C develop 
ways to ensure greater online privacy, the patent claims surrounding the W3C’s P3P 
work meant that the W3C’s patent policy—with its significant implications for 
“technology and society”—became one of his primary tasks.  At first, the W3C appointed 
only six people to the PPWG: Weitzner (the Chair), representatives from W3C Member 
companies Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, Philips, and Apple, and a patent attorney retained 
by the W3C who worked on the P3P patent dispute.  The group took a long time—almost 
two years—before publishing a Working Draft that proposed a new W3C patent policy 
on August 16, 2001.33   
The Working Draft, edited by Weitzner, proposed three specific changes to W3C 
patent policy.  The first change would establish clear ground rules by requiring W3C 
Working Groups to articulate in their charters whether the Recommendation would be 
licensed under reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) or royalty-free (RF) terms.  
The second change sought to flush out existing patents by requiring all W3C Members to 
disclose relevant patent claims within their contributions to the W3C’s work.  The third 
change attempted to guard against patent extortion by requiring all W3C Members to 
commit to RAND licensing terms.  By this point, it was widely recognized that the W3C 
and its Members simply could not afford to leave these issues undefined.  In this sense, 
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any policy would be better than no policy.  However, by endorsing royalty-generating 
patents in W3C Recommendations, the W3C proposed a stunning departure from the 
Web’s tradition and Berners-Lee’s founding ideals.34 
Perhaps in anticipation of the resistance to come, the Working Draft also 
acknowledged that the patent policy was “of significant interest to the community-at-
large,” and thus requested the community to direct their comments to www-patentpolicy-
comment, a public mailing list maintained by the W3C.  In keeping with a recent change 
to the W3C’s procedural rules, the PPWG pledged to compile a list of public comments 
at the end of the Last Call period on September 30, and respond to all substantive 
issues.35   
Despite these careful preparations for public comments, the “public” seemed to 
have been mostly unaware of the issue and the forum until late September.  The list 
archives record only one comment in the two weeks following the August 16 draft.  
However, on September 29 and 30—the final days before the end of the Last Call 
period—747 more comments were submitted.36   
Taken together, the comments outlined a scathing reaction against of the RAND 
policy as well as the process by which the W3C consulted with the broader Web 
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community.  A vast majority of the comments displayed emotions ranging from 
measured displeasure to outright disgust.  Many feared that the W3C was losing touch 
with the open source development community, or, even worse, surrendering its founding 
traditions of free and open code to a future controlled by corporate capital.  Microsoft—a 
company that had allegedly vowed to “embrace, extend, and extinguish” open 
standards—was a chief target of scorn.  Microsoft and IBM employees posted notes to 
www-patentpolicy-comment that supported patents in general and the RAND policy in 
particular, which only added fuel to the fire.37  However, representatives from other W3C 
Member companies, such as Sun Microsystems, came out in support of a royalty-free 
policy.  For these companies, the economic case for a royalty-free policy was more 
convincing than any anti-patent ideology.  Indeed, Sun and other W3C Members held 
extensive patent portfolios; they simply argued that a royalty-free Web would provide a 
platform for better growth and revenue opportunities down the road and at the edges of 
the Web. 
Many comments also projected a bitter defiance toward the W3C.  For example, 
one person declared,   
Basing your standards on patented methods will fragment the web and 
destroy your organization.  If you succeed in forcing such debased 
standards on the web, your corporate masters will no longer need you.  If 
you fail, you will be irrelevant.  Either way W3C loses.38 
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With the seemingly imminent demise of the W3C as the steward of open Web 
standards, several open source programmers welcomed the challenge of creating open 
source alternatives.  The ongoing success of open source projects such as the Apache 
server software and Linux operating system had given the open source community 
confidence in its technical and organizational capabilities.  Apache’s dominant position in 
the market for Web server software—over 60% market share, almost three times more 
than Microsoft’s competing product—further emboldened the community, and provided 
compelling evidence that its radically decentralized and modular style of open source 
development was economically and technologically viable.39 
Other critics, writing to www-patentpolicy-comment and in the trade press, 
charged that the W3C tried to sneak its new patent policy past an unsuspecting public.  
Although the W3C had established a mailing list along with its August 16 announcement, 
none of the leading industry news websites—such as Slashdot, LinuxToday, The 
Register, or CNet—had covered or reacted to the announcement.  The fact that so many 
comments were submitted in the final days of September—within hours of the Last Call 
deadline—added an additional sense of drama, urgency, and even conspiracy to their 
collective alarmist tone.40 
In response to these concerns about the transparency and integrity of the W3C’s 
public outreach, the PPWG extended the comment period through October 11.  In the 
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meantime, Weitzner sounded worried.  In an interview published on October 2, he echoed 
a concern that was prominent in the comments to www-patentpolicy-comment: a RAND 
policy in the W3C would push the open source community to abandon the W3C and 
create its own open source alternatives to the patent-encumbered W3C 
Recommendations.41  
In an attempt to avoid this disastrous split, Weitzner introduced greater 
transparency in the PPWG’s deliberative process—including major changes aimed at 
winning back the trust of the open source community and maintaining the W3C’s 
legitimacy.  At the end of the extended Last Call on October 12, Weitzner invited Eben 
Moglen and Bruce Perens, two prominent open source advocates who had publicly 
bashed the W3C for its RAND proposal, to join the closed internal deliberations of the 
PPWG.  The PPWG also created a public homepage to make policy documents—such as 
summaries of working group meetings—widely accessible.  For his part, Weitzner agreed 
to participate in online and face-to-face public forums, and restated the PPWG’s 
commitment to responding to the substantive issues raised from the more than 2,000 
emails sent to www-patentpolicy-comment.42   
Throughout all the commotion, Berners-Lee had been conspicuously quiet.  He 
broke his silence on October 24, with a post to www-patentpolicy-comment titled “Why I 
have not spoken personally about the patent policy issue.”  His main point was to endorse 
the consensus-building process.  He noted that his views on patents in general were well-
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known, and even provided a link to an excerpt from his autobiography where he referred 
to patents as a “great stumbling block for Web development.”  He also addressed critics 
who hoped he would take a decisive stand on patents by explaining that his “silence 
arises from the fact that I value the consensus-building process at W3C.  I am not 
(contrary to what some of the pundits might suggest! ;-) a dictator by role or nature and 
so prefer to wait and let the community resolve an issue.”43 
Given the evolving nature of Berners-Lee’s role as “facilitator” (not “dictator”), it 
is difficult to know how much influence he exerted in the subsequent internal W3C 
discussions: although the mailing list for comments on the W3C patent policy is open to 
the public, internal W3C deliberations are not.  What we do know is that, after three days 
of meetings from October 15 to October 17, the PPWG announced that they could not 
reach a unanimous decision.  They decided to seek guidance from the W3C Advisory 
Committee—a group that theoretically consists of a representative from each of the 
W3C’s Members (at this time it had over 300 Members) and meets twice a year.  No 
public records exist from the Advisory Committee meeting in mid-November, but one 
can imagine that the patent policy debate dominated the meeting.   
After the meeting concluded, Weitzner posted an “action item” sent by the 
Advisory Committee to the PPWG that introduced a new direction for the debate.  The 
Advisory Committee, after acknowledging the broad continuum of views on the 
respective merits of RAND and royalty-free licenses, instructed the PPWG to “develop as 
a first priority… an RF patent policy.”  Although Weitzner’s note emphasized “this does 
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NOT mean that the W3C has made a final decision in favor of a RF-only policy,” the 
reality of the situation was that the Advisory Committee shifted the terms of debate from 
RAND-friendly to RF-friendly ground. 44 
After several more teleconferences and meetings, the PPWG issued a revised 
proposal on February 26, 2002 outlining a royalty-free patent policy.  Weitzner 
summarized this policy as a legally binding commitment for anyone participating in W3C 
Recommendations to make any relevant patents available on a royalty-free basis.  The 
new policy was a remarkable change: in less than six months, the W3C had assessed 
consensus—among its staff, members, and the concerned public—and reversed course.  
The consensus of the community, as judged within the closed deliberations of the W3C, 
determined that a royalty-free process would best facilitate widespread development of 
Web applications, and simultaneously would minimize the significant transaction costs 
associated with licensing negotiations and intellectual property lawyers.  Although the 
practical concerns were paramount for W3C staff, defenders of the ideals of open source 
claimed victory and concluded that the W3C had averted building “a tollbooth on the 
Internet.”45  
The final version of the W3C Patent Policy, released on May 20, 2003, assured 
that “Recommendations produced under this policy can be implemented on a Royalty-
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Free (RF) basis.”  The W3C stopped short of an exclusive Royalty-Free policy by 
including an exception clause that would allow for patented technologies to be included 
in Recommendations if no royalty-free alternative existed.  Berners-Lee, in his 
commentary that endorsed the Patent Policy, was careful to point out that royalty-
encumbered technologies could still, in theory, be included in W3C Recommendations.  
However, this would occur only in exceptional circumstances, after “considerable 
deliberation” with the “substantial consensus of both those participating in developing the 
technology and the W3C Membership.”  Hardly a victory for RAND advocates, Berners-
Lee noted that the “exception process is only designed to be used in the rarest cases,” and 
should be seen as a tool for the W3C to maintain flexibility in its technical solutions if a 
lack of royalty-free solutions would halt the development of W3C technologies.46 
The revised policy was touted as a success for both constituencies of the W3C: 
where the open source community could claim victory over corporate control, the 
Member companies of the W3C took comfort that the new patent policy rendered the 
W3C and its Members less vulnerable to costly litigation and “submarine” patents.  Any 
policy was better than no policy, but the best policy was one that maintained the loyalties 
of the various constituencies in the W3C. 
Given the W3C’s dramatic and very public about-face, one can only wonder how 
much Berners-Lee influenced the Advisory Committee’s deliberations, despite his stated 
preference to let the community resolve the issue.  Weitzner dutifully rejected this notion: 
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“If Tim [Berners-Lee] were going to impose his own view as the policy, he would have 
done that two and a half years ago and saved us all the trouble.”  Weitzner—who, we 
should recall, was hand-picked by Berners-Lee to lead the Patent Policy Working 
Group—continued, “He's watched this group work, looked at our product, and I think 
he'll respect the process we're going through.”47  In the end, the W3C patent policy 
decision turned out to be consistent with its founder’s idealistic views of patents and 
software.  It surely was no accident that Berners-Lee’s personal views aligned with the 
convictions of the open source Web developing community: after all, Berners-Lee was 
the original open source Web developer.    
 
6.5  Conclusions 
It is, of course, too soon to evaluate the long term significance of the W3C’s 
royalty-free patent policy.  In the meantime, anecdotal evidence from the short and 
medium term provides grounds for cautious optimism.  To its credit, the W3C anticipated 
the growing appetite for royalty-free licenses in Web standards, and has maintained its 
leadership in this arena.  It has also demonstrated the importance of a vigilant stance on 
issues that could disrupt its authority as an institution, and has slowly and incompletely 
opened some of its decision making processes.48 
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However, the market for standards continues to be a crowded and contested 
organizational field.  Patent holders continue to litigate aggressively, and viable 
alternatives to W3C Recommendations exist for important standards for the XML 
language and for a suite of functions known as Web services.  Industry leaders such as 
Microsoft and IBM remained as dues-paying W3C Members, but, at the same time, 
continued to seek alternative venues—competitors to the W3C—that might give them 
greater control over the terms and pace of standardization.49  These alternatives include 
groups such as the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards (OASIS), the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers, and the Joint 
Technical Committee of the International Organization for Standardization and 
International Electrotechnical Commission (known as ISO/IEC JTC 1).50  In areas of 
overlap, the W3C has established liaison relationships with over three dozen such 
organizations, but beneath the cordial veneer of these relationships lies a reality of intense 
jurisdictional competition in a dynamic commercial environment.51   
The high commercial stakes of these jurisdictional battles complicates the extent 
to which critics can hope to secure democratic control over new technologies.  In a recent 
article, Sheila Jasanoff summarized some of the most important issues at stake: “Are 
                                                
49 D. Linda Garcia, “Standards for Standard Setting: Contesting the Organizational Field,” in 
Sherrie Bolin, ed., The Standards Edge: Dynamic Tension (Ann Arbor, MI: Sheridan Press, 2004), 15-
30; Steve Lohr, “Setback for Microsoft Ripples Through the World Wide Web,” The New York 
Times (September 17, 2003); Neal Levitt, “Are Web Services Finally Ready to Deliver?,” IEEE 
Computer 37 (November, 2004): 14-18. 
50 See Andrew Updegrove’s website, http://www.consortiuminfo.org/links/, for a list of 
hundreds upon hundreds of current standards-setting organizations.  




experts accountable, to whom, on what authority, and what provision is there for the 
injection of non-expert values on matters that fall in the gray zones between conjecture 
and certainty?”52  In the context of the W3C—as with other consortia that are privately 
organized and, by design, beyond the scope of government control, the answers may not 
be satisfying for those who seek guarantees of democratic legitimacy.   
One response to this dilemma has come from engineers and lawyers employed by 
non-profit advocacy groups such as the Center for Democracy and Technology.  In 2002, 
three members of this advocacy group’s staff reported on their experiments in the Internet 
Engineering Task Force and the W3C to identify potential public policy implications of 
technical proposals and to ensure that these implications were adequately considered.  
Leaving aside the problematic questions of how “public policy implications” should be 
defined (the report focused on privacy and anonymity), their report emphasized the 
difficulties that prevented the widespread replication of their experiment, including 
“systemic lacks of knowledge, time, money, and experience.”  In short, the resources of 
public interest advocates were no match for those of multinational companies, and 
completely insufficient to exert any sort of systemic influence on the complex and 
decentralized standardization process.53   
                                                
52 Jasanoff, “Technology as a Site and Object of Politics,” 759. 
53 Alan Davidson, Jon Morris, and Robert Courtney, “Strangers in a Strange Land: Public Interest 
Advocacy and Internet Standards,” paper presented to the Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference, September 27, 2002, Washington, D.C. For another useful perspective on this 
question, see Eric J. Iversen, Thierry Vedel, and Raymund Werle, “Standardization and the 
Democratic Design of Information and Communication Technology,” Knowledge, Technology and 
Policy 17 (2004): 104-126. 
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Given the relative failure of the Center for Democracy and Technology’s 
experiment to infiltrate the standard-setting process, the most realistic avenue for 
addressing “matters that fall in the grey zones between conjecture and certainty” may be 
unsatisfactory for critics committed to the ideals of participatory democracy: we must 
trust the powerful leaders of the standard-setting process.  In the W3C, these leaders 
include the reluctant monarch Berners-Lee (who, after his 2003 promotion to Knight 
Commander of the Order of the British Empire, is properly addressed as Sir Berners-Lee) 
as well as his civil servants, including Daniel Weitzner (who, recall, was a co-founder of 
the Center for Democracy and Technology before joining the W3C as Technology and 
Society Domain Leader).  However, since the industrial legislatures that compete with the 
W3C are less receptive to the egalitarian and anti-patent ideals of open source advocates, 





Networks are critiques.  The four major communication networks described in 
chapters three through six—AT&T’s national telephone network, the Internet, digital 
cellular networks, and the World Wide Web—arose in reaction to the limitations that 
their designers perceived in existing networks.  These critiques were visible in the 
technological features of each of these four networks, for example in AT&T’s centralized 
national control over telephony, in the Internet’s distributed end-to-end architecture, in 
the spectrum-efficient CDMA standard for digital cellular networks, and in the non-
proprietary standards produced by the World Wide Web Consortium.   
Beyond these technological critiques, the architects of these four major networks 
also advanced organizational critiques of their predecessors that were visible in the 
institutions that created and maintained standards.  For example, the engineers in the 
Internet Engineering Task Force practiced a modular style of innovation that was an 
explicit rejection of both the centralized model of systems innovation favored by AT&T 
and IBM and the bureaucratic processes used by the International Organization for 
Standardization.  Organizational critiques also were evident in institutions that created 
standards for digital cellular networks—unified under the power of the state in Europe, 
and left to private coordination in the United States.   
Networks are technological and organizational critiques of what came before, but  
they are not wholesale rejections or clean slates.  Each of the communication networks 
discussed in this dissertation illustrates a general historical pattern: new infrastructures 
build upon and extend existing infrastructures, even as they revise and critique the 
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existing order.  The Arpanet and Internet grew by transmitting data over lines leased from 
AT&T; users were attracted to cellular networks in part because these networks put them 
in contact with the existing base of land line subscribers; and Tim Berners-Lee designed 
the World Wide Web to transmit data over the end-to-end architecture of the Internet.  
From these examples we can identify the historical dimensions of economic change, such 
as network externalities and bandwagon effects, that persist over time.  This fundamental 
character of infrastructure—that it almost always builds on earlier infrastructures—sheds 
additional light on the process of infrastructure evolution.  Where individuals making 
incremental innovations often seek to preserve backward compatibility, entrepreneurs 
pursuing radical innovations often make a clean break.  But the most successful new 
communication networks of the late twentieth century—the Internet, cellular telephones, 
and the Web—struck a middle ground between a slavish dedication to the past and a 
wholesale rejection of it.  They preserved valuable features of both.  There is, I believe, 
an important aspect of technological change embodied in this experience—an aspect that 
historians miss when they try to make their subject appear to be unique, revolutionary, or 
unprecedented in world history.1 
The technological and organizational critiques also indicate the flexibility of one 
particular organizational form, consensus standardization, that engineers devised and 
                                                
1 These historical characteristics of infrastructure are evident in studies of different modes of 
transportation. See for example Mark H. Rose, Bruce E. Seely, and Paul F. Barrett, The Best 
Transportation System in the World: Railroads, Trucks, Airlines, and American Public Policy in the 
Twentieth Century (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006); Alex Roland, “Containers and 
Causality,” Technology and Culture 48 (2007): 386-392; and Susan Leigh Star and Geoffrey C. 
Bowker, “How to Infrastructure,” in Leah A. Lievrouw and Sonia Livingstone, eds., Handbook of 




modified to set standards for the communication networks of the Third Industrial 
Revolution.  This organizational form became both effect and cause of technical change 
during this revolutionary process.  It was originally created in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries by scientists and engineers who sought to establish common 
specifications not through market power, but instead through impartial institutions such 
as engineering societies and trade associations.  As they matured during the twentieth 
century, consensus standards bodies shared a common institutional feature: specialized 
committees and sub-committees to bring together scientists and engineers from private 
firms, government agencies, universities, and non-profit organizations.  They also shared 
common ideological assumptions such as a belief in the rational methods of professional 
engineering, a progressive view of the power of science and technology to improve 
society, a conviction that cooperation among engineers within “industrial legislatures” 
was superior to adversarial conflicts in existing judicial and political institutions, and, 
especially in the United States, an assumption that the private sector should lead. 
Consensus standards bodies were perpetually works in progress, organizations in 
flux, and sites of organizational experimentation that sustained technological evolution in 
new communications technologies.  As the Bell monopoly matured in the 1920s and 
1930s, its engineers learned to use the consensus standardization process to address 
problems, such as the “petty racket” of telephone slugs, that they could not solve within 
their extensive managerial hierarchy.  During this period, engineers also learned that 
standards bodies could help them circumvent costly and time-consuming legal 
proceedings—a feature that Paul Gough Agnew promoted in his public advocacy of the 
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American Engineering Standards Committee (AESC), and that Bancroft Gherardi 
embraced when AT&T’s telephone networks faced electrical interference from power 
and lighting networks.   
As the technical and legal foundations of the telecommunications industry shifted 
during the second half of the twentieth century, the locus of control over standardization 
also shifted.  In the new, decentralized industry structure that took shape in the 1970s and 
1980s, consensus standards bodies assumed responsibility for the design of new standards 
and new networks that had previously fallen to the network architects at AT&T and IBM 
and regulators in government agencies.  In the 1980s and 1990s, the telecommunications 
and computing industries converged around digital electronics.  When we consider 
devices such as the Blackberry or the iPhone that were brought to market in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, it is impossible—or rather, beside the point—to distinguish 
between a “telephone” and a “computer.”  The new devices were bundles of components, 
designed around consensus standards that allowed users to connect to any number of 
communication networks—the Internet, the Web, and cellular telephone networks—in a 
seamless and, one hopes, apparently natural manner. 
The objective and impartial appearance of standard-setting organizations belies 
the contested circumstances under which these organizations established their authority.  
Because their standards were not backed by the force of law, consensus organizations 
needed to establish themselves as legitimate and effective organizations.  Each of the 
institutions examined in this dissertation faced crises during which they could either 
demonstrate their legitimacy or risk losing their authoritative position.  The initial 
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construction of a new standards body usually occurred when trusted professional 
scientists or engineers—such as Elihu Thomson, Paul Gough Agnew, Vinton Cerf, and 
Tim Berners-Lee—led the way.  But there was more to the history than heroic leadership: 
for the consensus method to be effective, standards bodies needed to reach out to new 
members with different points of view.  Expansion led to controversy and, in many cases, 
reform.  Expansion also revealed the limits of consensus standardization: new rules were 
necessary to ensure that agreements were fair and legitimate for all participants, but a 
preponderance of rules also dulled the speed advantages of the consensus method.  This 
aspect of the evolutionary process could leave bloated bureaucracies in its wake.2 
For the purposes of comparison, it can be helpful to step back and consider the 
variety of standard-setting institutions—engineering societies, trade associations, industry 
consortia, dominant private firms, and government agencies—as elements of a distinctive 
American system of standardization.  To the extent that it can be understand as a coherent 
system, the American system of standardization is the most fragmented, decentralized, 
and pluralistic in the world.  Much like the history of the American nation itself, this 
system has strong traditions of voluntarism, local control, meritocracy, rights to represent 
one’s own interests, and a marked preference for private coordination of commercial 
activity.   
Based on their experiences in the federal armories, their organizational 
innovations in the steel and railroad industries, and advice from British engineers, 
                                                
2 Timothy S. Simcoe, “Delay and De Jure Standards: Exploring the Slowdown in Internet 
Standards Development,” in Shane Greenstein and Victor Stango, eds., Standards and Public Policy 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 260-295. 
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Americans created a loose network of organizations that set industrial and national 
standards during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The stable contours of 
an American system of standardization were in place by 1930, when the American 
Engineering Standards Committee was reconstituted as the American Standards 
Association and adopted rules and procedures that are still in place today.  Where 
industrial powers such as Germany, Britain, France, and Japan relied on government 
authority to set standards, American regulators never established a centralized, 
overarching authority responsible for creating and enforcing standards.  Instead, they 
consistently deferred to organizations and professionals in the private sector and created 
rules to encourage collaboration and experimentation.  Tocqueville would not have been 
surprised at the persistent importance of self-government and voluntarism in support of 
commercial development.3   
In the American case, however, the government was still an important actor.  We 
should not interpret the deference of federal policymakers as a sign that the private 
ordering of standards was anarchic or a function of pure market exchanges.  The history 
of consensus standardization in the United States demonstrates the important role of 
indirect government support of consensus standardization.  Indeed, every organization 
and network discussed in this dissertation had the implicit support of government, and, in 
                                                
3 Jay Tate, “National Varieties of Standardization,” in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Competitive Advantage (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); D. Linda Garcia, “Standard Setting in the United States: Public and 
Private Sector Roles,” Journal of the American Society for Information Science 43 (1992): 531-537; 
Samuel Krislov, How Nations Choose Product Standards and Standards Change Nations (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 83-133; and Andrew L. Russell, “Industrial Legislatures: 
The American System of Standardization,” in International Standardization as a Strategic Tool 
(Geneva: International Electrotechnical Commission, 2006). 
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many cases, an explicit declaration from government officials that private bodies were 
best positioned to create legitimate and widely acceptable standards.  Examples of this 
pattern include the AESC’s creation of safety standards at the behest of the National 
Bureau of Standards in the 1920s; the Federal Communications Commission’s 
endorsement of cellular standardization in industry groups such as the 
Telecommunications Industry Association in the 1980s and 1990s; and the relaxation of 
antitrust laws that encouraged the proliferation of industry consortia, such as the World 
Wide Web Consortium, in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
At times—particularly in the 1920s and again in the 1980s—the preference for 
industry self-regulation appeared to be little more than a strategy to avoid political 
controversy.  Advocates of private control, however, crafted rhetorical campaigns that 
emphasized the positive aspects of standardization through “industrial legislatures.”  
These campaigns convinced regulators to rely on private standards bodies because of the 
leadership of trusted professional scientists and engineers, and because they fit well with 
prevailing preferences for private control.4  This trend was evident as early as the middle 
of the nineteenth century, when elite scientists from England, Germany, and the United 
States met at World’s Fairs to create standards for electrical technologies and telegraph 
networks.   
                                                
4 Howard Coonley and P. G. Agnew, The Role of Standards in the System of Free Enterprise: a study of 
voluntary standards as alternative to Legislative and Commission control. Prepared by Request of the 




Even as consensus standards bodies became increasingly dominated by agents of 
corporate capital, the foundation of trust remained, and was most visible in the activities 
of highly-regarded leaders such as Paul Agnew, Bancroft Gherardi, Vint Cerf, Robert 
Kahn, Jon Postel, Thomas Haug, Tim Berners-Lee, and Daniel Weitzner.  In the 1920s, 
as in more recent times, the actions of these leaders and their liaisons in the standards 
process—those who ensure the smooth operation of voluntary consensus process, and 
those who cross over the boundaries of different organizations—were of crucial 
importance.  Several of these individuals led standards committees while working for 
private companies; others were employed by universities or, in some cases, by the 
standard-setting organizations themselves.  In all cases, these individuals made 
fundamental contributions to the commercial development of technology, but they did not 
channel their efforts exclusively to the proprietary gain of any one particular firm.  The 
fruits of their labor was never considered for Nobel prizes, but they nevertheless 
performed important roles in the technical development of modern society by integrating 
novel scientific and technical advances into standard devices and networks.  In this sense, 
the individuals in this dissertation provide examples that flesh out Greg Downey’s 
concept of “protocol labor,” and remind us of the immense amount of human effort 
required to create and sustain the communication networks built in the modern era.5 
                                                
5 Gregory J. Downey, “Virtual Webs, Physical Technologies, and Hidden Workers: The Spaces of 
Labor in Information Internetworks,” Technology and Culture 42 (April 2001): 209-235. See also 
Gregory J. Downey, Telegraph Messenger Boys: Labor, Technology, and Geography, 1850-1950 (New 
York: Routledge, 2002); and Amy Slaton and Janet Abbate, “The Hidden Lives of Standards: 
Technical Prescriptions and the Transformation of Work in America,” in Michael Thad Allen and 
Gabrielle Hecht, eds., Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha 
Chipley Hughes (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001). 
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The inescapable irony of the history of standardization is that the organizations 
devised to create rigid and unchanging standards were themselves part of a dynamic and 
flexible system, one that evolved through a persistent state of controversy and conflict.  
To comprehend the contours of this system, one is pressed to reconsider fundamental 
questions about the tension between freedom and order, between the political desire for 
local control and the rational impulse for uniformity.  The ultimate expression of the 
latter impulse led to the creation of international bodies that coordinated the various 
standardization initiatives that arose in diverse locations and industries.  Thankfully, the 
desire for standardization did not—or has not yet—generated the dystopic social 
conditions feared by Aldous Huxley and George Orwell.   
Engineers who work in standard-setting organizations seemed to be entirely 
uninterested in expanding their control over the whole of society.  They were not the 
heirs of the technocratic vision articulated in the 1920s and 1930s.  Instead, they sought 
to solve technical problems within their own limited domains.  Over the course of the 
twentieth century, they devised progressively larger institutions—at first the AESC on the 
national level, and eventually the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) on 
the international level—to bring more order to industrial standardization.  These 
organizations  have, in some cases, enjoyed extraordinary success.  According to 
historians JoAnne Yates and Craig Murphy, the formation of the ISO was a successful act 
of political entrepreneurship insofar as it provided a forum that “in all industrial sectors 
 
 337 
and in all parts of the world, [was] always available as an alternative to any other 
standard-setting mechanism.”6   
In recent years, however, engineers and corporate executives have rejected ISO 
and sought new alternatives such as industry consortia that they could control more easily 
and that could move more quickly.  Groups such as the Internet Engineering Task Force 
and the World Wide Web Consortium provided sleeker alternatives to large, formal 
organizations such as ISO.  These nimbler alternatives proved to be especially useful as 
the structure of the telecommunications and computer industries became more 
decentralized and market forces pressed for the rapid production of standards.  However, 
as we saw in chapters four through six, consortia and other faster alternatives introduced 
a new set of administrative and legal problems that threatened to weaken their legitimacy 
claims and technical efficacy.  These problems intensified as corporate managers began 
to abandon common technological goals and seek advantages by using standard-setting 
organizations as venues for advancing proprietary technologies and capturing monopoly 
profits.   
Standard setting organizations thus continue to struggle with the contradictory 
demands of competition and interoperability.  The proliferation of liaison arrangements 
indicate that these organizations are not isolated islands of activity.  New arrangements, 
such as one recently announced between the Internet Engineering Task Force and the 
                                                
6 JoAnne Yates and Craig Murphy, “Charles le Maistre: Entrepreneur in International 
Standardization,” paper presented at the Business History Conference, June 2007. 
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CableLabs consortium, are justified as “an effort to avoid duplication of work.”7  We’ve 
been here before.  In 1920, the first annual report of the American Engineering Standards 
Committee used similar language to justify its mission “to secure cooperation between 
various interested organizations in order to prevent duplication of work and promulgation 
of conflicting standards.”8  Engineers in the 1920s, much like their present-day 
counterparts, faced complex technical problems, constant jurisdictional conflicts, a 
competitive international economy, and the continual need to negotiate boundaries 
between government, market activity, and private collaborations. Standards change and 




                                                
7 Jean-Francois Mule and Mark Townsley, “CableLabs – IETF Standardization Collaboration,” 
January 31, 2007, http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mule-ietf-cablelabs-collaboration-
03.txt.   
8 Annual Report of the American Engineering Standards Committee, (New York: American 
Engineering Standards Committee, 1920), 1.  
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Appendix A: List of Acronyms 
 
AESC  American Engineering Standards Committee 
AIEE  American Institute of Electrical Engineers 
AIME  American Institute of Mining Engineers  
ANSI  American National Standards Institute  
ARPA  Advanced Research Projects Agency 
ARPANET  Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
ASA  American Standards Association 
ASCE  American Society for Civil Engineers 
ASME  American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
ASTM  American Society for Testing Materials 
AT&T  American Telephone and Telegraph 
BBN  Bolt, Beranek and Newman 
BESC  British Engineering Standards Committee 
CBS  Columbia Broadcasting System 
CDMA  Code Division Multiple Access 
CEPT  Conference of European Posts and Telecommunications Administrations 
CLNP  ConnectionLess Network Protocol  
CTIA  Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association 
DARPA  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DEC  Digital Equipment Corporation 
ECMA  European Computing Machinery Association 
ECSA  Exchange Carriers Standards Association  
EIA  Electronic Industries Association 
ETSI  European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
FCC  Federal Communications Commission 
FTP  File Transfer Protocol 
GE  General Electric 
GNU  GNU’s Not Unix 
GOSIP  Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile  
GSM  Groupe Spéciale Mobile (1982-1989) 
GSM  Global System for Mobile Communication (1989-present) 
HTML  HyperText Markup Language 
HTTP  HyperText Transfer Protocol 
IAB  Internet Advisory Board (1984-1986) 
IAB  Internet Activities Board (1986-1992) 
IAB  Internet Architecture Board (1992-present) 
IBM  International Business Machines 
ICCB  Internet Configuration Control Board 
IEC  International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEEE   Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers  
IETF  Internet Engineering Task Force 
IMP  Interface Message Processor 
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INARC  Internet Architecture Task Force  
INWG  International Network Working Group 
IPTO  Information Processing Techniques Office  
ISO  International Organization for Standardization 
ITU  International Telecommunications Union 
JTC  Joint Technical Committee 
LCS  Laboratory for Computer Science 
MHz  Megahertz 
MIT  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
NBS  National Bureau of Standards 
NCP  Network Control Protocol 
NCSA  National Center for Supercomputing Applications 
NIST  National Institute for Standards and Technology 
NMT  Nordic Mobile Telephone 
NSF  National Science Foundation 
NTP  Network Time Protocol 
NWG  Network Working Group 
OASIS  Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards 
OSI  Open Systems Interconnection 
P3P  Platform for Privacy Preferences 
PPWG  Patent Policy Working Group 
PRnet  Packet Radio Network 
RAND  Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
RCA  Radio Corporation of America 
RF  Royalty-Free 
RFC  Request for Comments 
SAE  Society of Automotive Engineers 
SATnet  Satellite Radio Network 
TCP/IP  Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
TDMA  Time Division Multiple Access 
TIA  Telecommunications Industry Association 
UCLA  University of California, Los Angeles 
VoIP  Voice over Internet Protocol  
W3C  World Wide Web Consortium 
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